CARDINAL CONSALVI
AND
ANGLO-PAPAL RELATIONS
1814-1824

By

JOHN TRACY ELLIS



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
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CARDINAL CONSALVI
Painted by Sir Thomas Lawrence

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1814-1824

By

JOHN TRACY ELLIS

Assistant Professor of History

in the

Catholic University of America



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

TO MY BROTHER
NORBERT E. ELLIS

PREFACE

RECENT years have witnessed not only an increased international prestige accruing to the Holy See, but also considerably more interest manifest on the part of scholars and students in the rôle played by the Vatican in the field of international diplomacy.[1] Any historical approach to the problem over the century and a half since the French Revolution must of necessity take serious cognizance of the work of the greatest ecclesiastical statesman of the early nineteenth century, Ercole Cardinal Consalvi. Recently a writer in one of the popular journals, treating the position of the papacy vis-à-vis the contemporary European dictatorships, instituted an interesting comparison between the present pope and Consalvi in their rôles as international statesmen. Speaking of the similarity of situations, he remarked:

> But there is a more striking resemblance between the representatives of the Church now and then. Now it is the statesmanlike personality of Pius XII, at the time of the Concordat (i.e., the concordat with Hitler in 1933)

[1] The series of studies published and projected by S. William Halperin of the University of Chicago, *Church and State in Italian Thought from Cavour to Mussolini; Italy and the Vatican at War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, 1939) and a third volume to cover the story of Vatican-Italian relations from 1878 to 1929, will offer a scholarly survey of the Holy See's diplomatic relations with Italy. A recent list of research projects under way in the United States, published by the American Historical Association, shows this interest in such items as Pius IX and European International Relations, 1869-1878, being done at Duke University by Lillian P. Wallace; The Peace Policy of the Vatican, 1914–1918 by Florence E. Moulton at Stanford University; and American Public Opinion and the Papacy since 1900 by Thomas P. Neill at St. Louis University. Another item in that list has since been published, viz., *The Vatican Council and the American Secular Newspapers, 1869–1870,* by J. Ryan Beiser (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942).

> still Cardinal Pacelli and the Pope's Foreign Secretary. Then it was Cardinal Consalvi, the Foreign Secretary of Pius VII. Both men share the aristocratic background, the diplomatic experience, the intimate knowledge and the impersonal judgement of their antagonist. Both were inclined to put aside dogmatic difficulties and to save the material existence of Catholicism in the realm of dictatorial totalitarianism. Both were sincere in their hopes for a *modus vivendi* and prepared to make concessions. Both were at the same time true Christians and not prepared to give way in religion.[2]

It is not, however, with Cardinal Consalvi's negotiations with Napoleon that we are concerned. That aspect of the cardinal's career has been pretty thoroughly explored on the larger canvas of Napoleonic history.[3] This study aims to show the intimate and active relations existing between the courts of Rome and London in the decade of years from the fall of the great emperor with its ensuing freedom for the Holy See, to the death ten years later of the man through whose hands those negotiations passed.

The years of the Restoration found the diplomacy of the Holy See, as that of so many other states, strongly preoccupied with the regaining of lost territories. It was that subject which formed the principal business of Consalvi's surprising visit to London in the summer of 1814. Moreover, a day when anti-papal prejudice in Great Britain had undergone a decline was the proper moment to press for an alleviation of the harsh conditions under which the English Catholics labored, and that too

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[2] "The Pope and European Dictatorship," by Dr. W. Schütz in *Contemporary Review*, No. 889 (Jan. 1940), 65.

[3] Cf. Comte Alfred Boulay de la Meurthe, *Histoire de la négociation du concordat de 1801*, 5 vols. (Tours: A. Mame et fils, 1920); François Désirée, Cardinal Mathieu, *Le concordat de 1801* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1903); Henry H. Walsh, *The Concordat of 1801* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), and P. Ilario Rinieri, *Napoleone e Pio VII, 1804–1813* (Torino: Unione tip-editrice, 1906).

was a major topic of the discussions of the cardinal and Britain's foreign secretary. Lesser concerns such as the international slave traffic, the intrigues of Joachim Murat in Italy, the peregrinations through the Italian peninsula of the Prince Regent's estranged wife, Caroline of Brunswick, the Neapolitan revolt of 1820, and even a proposed concordat between England and the Holy See, gave lively interest to the conversations and correspondence between the two courts. It is to a summary of these matters that this monograph addresses itself, with a mind to demonstrate the successes and failures encountered by Consalvi in his decade of active dealing with the government officials of Great Britain.

While Consalvi has received slightly more attention of late years from historians of the Napoleonic and Restoration periods, we still await an up-to-date and definitive biography of the man.[4] Knowledge of his career therefore is not too thorough or widespread. It had been the intention of the writer to consult the unpublished materials in the Vatican Archives and in the Public Record Office in London, but the outbreak of the war in September, 1939 made that impossible. Rather than delay indefinitely the publication of the study, he was advised to proceed in the belief that it might meanwhile prove of some assistance to students of the ecclesiastical and diplomatic history of the early nineteenth century. He is fully aware that there are a number of questions which a conscientious search of the published memoirs, correspondence, and despatches of the period have left unanswered. It is to be hoped that when the din of battle has died away and Europe has again returned to a normal state, the

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[4] The only full length biography of the cardinal is that of Engelbert Lorenz Fischer, *Cardinal Consalvi: Lebens-und Charakterbild des grossen Ministers Papst Pius' VII.* The need expressed by Erwin Ruck, one time professor of law in the University of Basel, in his monograph, *Die Römische Kurie und die Deutsche Kirchenfrage auf dem Wiener-Kongress* (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1917), has never been filled: "Eine wissenschaftliche Biographie Consalvis fehlt," 7, n. 2.

archives of Rome and London may yield the answers to some of these questions.

It is a very agreeable duty to give sincere thanks to Professor Crane Brinton of Harvard University who, among many courtesies shown the writer during his stay in Cambridge, gave generously of his time amid his multiple duties to a careful reading of the manuscript and made a number of very helpful corrections. To two former students and friends, Roland E. Murphy, O.Carm., and John K. Zeender, the writer will always be grateful for much assistance given during the preparation of the work and for reading the manuscript and proofs. To his friends, John K. Cartwright of the Catholic University of America and Edward V. Cardinal, C.S.V., of Loyola University, Chicago he is sincerely thankful for a careful reading of the proof sheets and for offering valuable suggestions and corrections. Likewise to Miss Kathryn D. Harrold he wishes to pay his thanks for giving her time and effort to the tedious task of compiling the index. Finally to the staffs of the Library of Congress, the Mullen Library of the Catholic University of America, the Widener Library of Harvard University, the Harper Library of the University of Chicago, and the New York and Boston Public Libraries, the writer is also under a debt of gratitude for the loan of books and for constant, courteous, and efficient service.

John Tracy Ellis

Feast of St. Ignatius Loyola
July 31, 1942

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	vii
CHAPTER		
I.	EARLY ENGLISH CONTACTS	1
II.	THE CARDINAL'S LONDON VISIT	21
III.	CONSALVI AT THE CONGRESS	34
IV.	THE CARDINAL AND THE CATHOLIC QUESTION	73
V.	CONSALVI, THE JESUITS, AND SOME UNFINISHED BUSINESS	132
VI.	FINAL EFFORTS	172
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	193
	INDEX	198

CHAPTER I

EARLY ENGLISH CONTACTS

ERCOLE CONSALVI was born at Rome on June 8, 1757 of a noble family. He attended the school of the Scolopii Fathers for four and a half years in Urbino and then entered upon further study at Frascati in 1771 with his brother, Andrea, where he remained for five and a half years. Higher studies were pursued at the Accademia Ecclesiastica in Rome which Cardinal Wiseman has described as "an establishment for the education of youths preparing for public life."[1] In 1784 Pius VI made him a domestic prelate and in 1793 the same pontiff named him auditor of the Rota. In 1798 when the French revolutionary armies invaded Rome, Consalvi was made a prisoner for a time.[2] Later released he was able to reach Venice by August, 1799 where the

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[1] Wiseman, Nicholas, *Recollections of the Last Four Popes,* 39. Although Consalvi completed his ecclesiastical studies and lived his entire life in the clerical state, he was never ordained to the priesthood.

[2] An interesting episode of that imprisonment is related by the close friend of Consalvi, Elizabeth, Duchess of Devonshire, in a curious little book entitled, *Anecdotes and Biographical Sketches,* which is hardly more than a collection of random notes jotted down by the lady. She stated: "During the Roman Republick, Consalvi was imprison'd in the Castle of San Angelo, having been nam'd Secretary of the Military Commission by Pius VI. The Republicans condemn'd him to banishment, and to being convey'd thro' the principal streets of Rome on an ass. Prince Chigi went to the prison to apprise him, that he might be prepar'd to meet so trying a circumstance; but Consalvi, unmov'd, only answer'd 'Poca m'importe la manière per che mi lascian andare a vedere el Papa'—Pius VI, who was then a prisoner, and at the Carbosa. So early did Consalvi's great mind and fearless character show itself. Prince Chigi told this anecdote to d'Appony." 42–43. Apparently the duchess' knowledge of neither French nor Italian was that of an expert in those languages.

cardinals were slowly assembling for the conclave to elect a successor to Pius VI who had died that summer at Valence in France.[3]

It was in the Venice conclave that Consalvi first came to international attention. He was appointed secretary of the gathering, and the new pontiff, Pius VII, whom he had supported for the office through the three and a half weary months of balloting, rewarded the monsignor by naming him his acting secretary of state on March 14, 1800, the day of his own election. The appointment as permanent secretary followed in August, and on August 11 he was created a cardinal-deacon with the title of Santa Agata in Subura. Pius VII wished to create him a cardinal-priest, but Consalvi preferred to take the status of a cardinal-deacon.[4] As the years passed and the ire of the autocrat of France rose against the Holy See and the pope's chief minister, the man who had negotiated the famous concordat of 1801 for Pius VII, resigned his office as secretary of state on June 17, 1806, due to pressure from Paris and the hope that thereby he might save his master from further humiliation and unpleasantness at the hands of Napoleon.[5]

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[3] Cf. E. Celani, "I preliminari del conclave di Venezia," in *Archivio della società romana di storia patria,* XXVI (1913), 475–518, for extracts from the unedited correspondence of Consalvi on the conclave. For details of the life of Consalvi up to 1801, cf. Engelbert Lorenz Fischer, *Cardinal Consalvi. Lebens—und Charakterbild des grossen Ministers Papst Pius' VII,* 1–70.

[4] Following the death of Cardinal Braschi in 1817 Consalvi chose as his titular church, Sancta Maria ad Martyres, better known as the Pantheon. Fischer, *Op. cit.,* 63, n. 2.

[5] Cardinal Casoni was at first appointed pro-secretary in his place. Casoni was former nuncio to Madrid and persona grata to Bonaparte. Later his duties were filled by Cardinal Pacca as pro-secretary of state. For a contemporary account of the trials through which the pope and his court passed in these years at the hands of Bonaparte, cf. *Historical Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca,* 2 vols., translated by Sir George Head. During the time Consalvi was out of office Pius VII never named anyone as full secretary of state.

The next few years were spent in quiet retirement from the affairs of statecraft, but in 1810 the cardinal was ordered brought to Paris by the emperor so that he might be kept under closer surveillance. On June 12, 1810 he was banished to Rheims at the emperor's command and it was in that spot that he wrote his *Mémoires* before his release on February 6, 1813. He rejoined Pius VII at Fontainebleau in June and remained at his side until January, 1814 when he again felt the wrath of Bonaparte, who ordered him sent to Béziers in Languedoc, feeling Consalvi too strong a personality to be so near the pope. This exile was destined to be brief, for the collapse of Bonaparte's power was already in sight. Following the release of Pius VII from his long imprisonment the cardinal joined the pope at Cesena, proceeded with him to Foligno, and then to Rome where he was reappointed secretary of state on May 19, 1814. His stay in Rome was short, for the pontiff despatched him as his envoy to the allied sovereigns assembled at Paris and the cardinal arrived in the French capital on June 2.[6] It was from the vantage point of Paris, for the moment the diplomatic capital of Europe, that Consalvi surveyed the prospects of a successful fulfillment of the high mission entrusted to him. His visit was destined to be brief, for the allied sovereigns and their suites were proceeding to London at the invitation of the Prince Regent. The determination to gain the ear of the makers of the new Europe decided Consalvi to follow in their wake.[7]

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[6] Mollat, G., *La question romaine de Pie VI à Pie XI,* 103.

[7] Silvagni, D., *La corte e la società romana nei secoli xviii e xix,* II, 762, gives a description of Consalvi which pictures him as a man with a high and broad forehead, lively eyes, grey hair, an aquiline nose slightly pronounced, a delicate mouth and pale complexion; he was marked by distinguished manners, facile speech, and a soft and insinuating tone of voice. He was amiable with his subordinates with whom he was brought into close and constant contact, and to each he gave a friendly surname. The Duchess of Devonshire, who knew Consalvi so well, has left a description of his personal appearance: "In his person he is tall, thin, of the most dignified and yet simple manners, a dark and animated eye, a thick dark brow, a

The England which the cardinal entered on June 10, 1814 was new to his eye but not to his understanding and sympathy. From the time of his days as a student at Frascati his cordial relations with various Englishmen had been almost constant. Through the influence of his former tutor, Cardinal Negroni, once the auditor of the Cardinal of York, bishop of Frascati and the last of the Stuart male line, the plans for the Consalvi brothers to study at the Nazarene College in Rome, after their training at Urbino, had been changed to the Frascati school. They had entered there in July, 1771 after the Cardinal of York had reopened his college and seminary which had been formerly in the hands of the Jesuits. Here Consalvi had remained and completed his theological course by September, 1776. It was at Frascati that, as Consalvi tells us in his *Mémoires,* he had come to know and been favored by the English prelate. "J'acquis de la sorte les faveurs et l'amour infini dont, à dater de ce moment, le cardinal duc d'York m'honora jusqu'à la dernière heure de sa vie."[8] Wiseman, commenting on the close friendship between

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smile of inexpressible sweetness and benevolence, his conversation natural and instructive, his temper mild, forgiving, yet warm and rather impatient of delay; his talents stated by all contemporary statesmen as requiring only a greater theatre to act on, to be rank'd in the first class. His peculiar characteristics are, elevation of mind and perfect disinterestedness, incapable of resentment, but a zealous friend, a lover of the arts, an excellent scholar, a knowledge of musick, a kind master, most affectionate brother, and unalterable friend." *Op. cit.,* 80–81.

[8] *Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi,* edited by J. Cretineau-Joly with an introduction and notes. II, 8. The *Mémoires* of Consalvi occasioned quite a controversy when they first appeared in 1864. An article entitled, "The Concordat of 1801," by V. V. in *The Month,* I (July–Dec., 1864), 245–256, endeavored to account for the discrepancies between Consalvi's version of the concordat proceedings and that given by Thiers in the latter's history of the consulate. The author of the article speaks guardedly of the authenticity of Consalvi's work in this year of its publication. The same year there appeared another article by C. de Meaux, "Les Négociations du Cardinal Consalvi," in *Le Correspondant,* LXIII (Nov. 1864), 527–563, which was an extensive review article rather than an examination of the

York and Consalvi, remarked: "It is possible that the partiality which Consalvi always manifested towards England, in his political career, may be traceable to the early kindness and favour which he received from one who always considered and called himself an Englishman." [9]

The English cardinal continued to favor young Consalvi even after the latter had left Frascati. As archpriest of St. Peter's, York suggested his name as vicar when that post fell vacant by the promotion of Monsignor Zondadari to the archbishopric of Siena. Pius VI refused, however, since Consalvi was already auditor of the Rota, and this would be an abuse of pluralism. York was not to be dissuaded so easily and wrote a long memoir showing reasons why the offices would not be incompatible in

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authenticity from the viewpoint of internal or external criticism. The most serious attack made upon Consalvi was by Augustin Theiner, prefect of the Vatican Archives, in his *L'histoire des deux concordats* in two volumes (Bar-le-Duc: L. Guérin et C^ie^, 1869). Theiner attempted to disprove Consalvi's work, but the fact that the writer was rather notoriously biased in Bonaparte's favor accounted in good measure for his views. The *Mémoires* had already received a defender in an unsigned article, "Consalvi's Memoirs," in the *Dublin Review,* IV (New Series, Apr. 1865), 396–423, but the strongest defense came in another unsigned article in *The Month,* XI (Dec., 1869), 607–614, entitled, "The Consalvi Controversy," and in a volume published by the editor of the *Mémoires,* J. Cretineau-Joly, which he called, *Bonaparte, le concordat de 1801 et le cardinal Consalvi* (Paris: H. Plon, 1869). Cretineau-Joly was at pains to demonstrate the authenticity of the papers which he edited and to expose Father Theiner's pro-Napoleonic bias. All in all, historians are agreed that the *Mémoires* are in good measure a true account of the facts related, though in details the cardinal erred, which was not surprising when it is recalled that they were written during his imprisonment at Rheims where all access to other sources was denied him. Hereafter this work will be referred to as simply: *Mémoires.*

[9] Wiseman, *Op. cit.,* 99. Wiseman writes of York's first notice of the young student: "It is said to have been his skill and grace in a musical performance that first attracted this notice." 102. The writer discovered another evidence of Consalvi's musical talent in Fischer who remarks that at Frascati he learned to play the violin under Angelo Grasciani and that in his youth he pursued music with a real passion. *Op. cit.,* 5.

one man's hands. Consalvi himself was granted several audiences of Pius VI on the subject, during which the pope tried to maintain his opposition to his appointment on a friendly basis and in favor of Monsignor Brancadoro. Though the Cardinal of York did not wish to yield, he finally gave way before Pius VI's firmness and Consalvi did not receive the appointment.[10] The friendship of the two men endured for nearly forty years. In the last seven years of York's life he was a direct pensioner of the British government, receiving a pension of £4000 a year from February, 1800 to his death in July, 1807. It relieved his poverty which was brought on by the French occupation of Rome in 1798. This grant came to the cardinal largely through the original impetus of Sir John Cox Hippisley, a representative of Great Britain resident in Italy in these years, and whom we shall have occasion to meet again.[11] The attachment to Consalvi is attested by the fact that the former willed him a legacy of 6000 écus. Three times the Italian ecclesiastic refused the legacy, saying there were members of York's household more in need of it than himself and that it would embarrass him in his official position. He was sensible of the fact that he irritated York by his refusal, nonetheless he remained adamant on the point.[12] Following the English cardinal's death, Consalvi saw to it that some art objects which the former wished transmitted to the Prince Regent were communicated through Viscount Castlereagh in October, 1814. Moreover a number of York's important papers were given to the British government, after they came into Consalvi's hands, again through a communication of Consalvi to Castlereagh in January, 1817.[13]

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[10] *Mémoires,* II, 37–46.

[11] "The Relations of Henry, Cardinal York, with the British Government," by Walter W. Seton, in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (Fourth Series), II (1919), 94–112.

[12] *Mémoires,* I, 31–35; II, 46–47.

[13] *The Letters of King George IV, 1812–1830,* I, 501, edited by A. Aspinall; *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 398.

The development of cordial relations between Rome and London was due to something more, however, than an accidental friendship between Consalvi and the Cardinal of York. Feelers had been thrown out by the Holy See to the English government many years before. No immediate and specific advantage followed, but at least no harm was done to the cause. For example, in February, 1772 the Duke of Gloucester visited Rome where this brother of George III's was well received by Pope Clement XIV. A leading authority in the history of papal diplomacy in this period believes that it was as a result of this visit that Clement XIV sent Monsignor Caprara, the nuncio in Cologne, secretly to London to sound out the possibilities for a closer understanding. Caprara reported from Cologne on July 12, 1772 that he found the old prejudice dying.[14]

The nuncio was undoubtedly too optimistic, for there were few chances for any specific entente that early. However, there are few circumstances that can change a people's attitude and prejudices more quickly than the abnormal conditions resulting from a war. The declaration of war by the French republic on Great Britain on February 1, 1793 engaged the two contenders in a struggle that was to continue with only brief interruptions for over twenty years. Britain discovered that she needed all the resources she could muster to cope with the unpleasant frequency of French victories on the continent. Consequently the traditional British prejudice towards Rome was not emphasized so stridently after 1793 in the hope of enlisting the aid of the papal government against France. The circumstance of Pius VI's letters to the bishops of the British Isles in the years 1792 to 1795, urging them to maintain patience in their war-time trials and fidelity to their government, did not discourage British officials from believing that in the pope might be found a future ally.[15] Moreover the fact that the anti-clerical turn taken by the

[14] Rinieri, P. Ilario, *Il Congresso di Vienna e la S. Sede, 1813-1815,* 145. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Il Congresso.*

[15] *Ibid.,* 144.

government in France sent a stream of French refugee clergy into England—at one time mounting to nearly eight thousand—brought many of the English in close contact for the first time with highly educated and cultivated Catholic clergy whom some did not hesitate to engage as tutors to their children. As one historian phrases it:

> This sudden descent upon a country where priests were hardly known, of a vast army of priests patronised and protected by the Government, did much to break down prejudice and even to give Catholicism a tinge of patriotic authorisation.[16]

The English government was not slow to realize the danger to its interests were it to continue the policy of ignoring the Papal States as it had in good measure done since the middle of the sixteenth century. Therefore in 1792 a non-Catholic Englishman, Sir John Cox Hippisley, was commissioned by London to take up his residence in Rome and act in the capacity of an agent for English business.[17] Hippisley remained in Rome until 1796,

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[16] Hughes, Philip, *The Catholic Question, 1688–1829,* 253; Fernand Mourret, *Histoire générale de l'église,* VII, 403. The beneficent influence of these French churchmen in England was recalled by the General Board of English Catholics in their letter of June 17, 1814 to Pius VII congratulating the pontiff on the recovery of his capital. It read: "It is not to be doubted, that these exiled and suffering men, by their most exemplary purity of manners and touching gratitude, conferred, in their turn, on our generous countrymen, a benefit of no small account; they inclined the hearts of their benefactors to a more just estimate of the merits of a church, which had for a long series of years been the object of their terror and abhorrence . . ." 525. The letter is printed as an appendix to Charles Butler's *Historical Memoirs of the English, Irish, and Scottish Catholics,* IV, 523–529.

[17] Gasquet, Aidan Cardinal, *Great Britain and the Holy See, 1792–1806, a Chapter in the History of Diplomatic Relations between England and Rome,* 15. This British awareness of the importance of the Holy See in time of war was illustrated again in December, 1914, when the government despatched Sir Henry Howard to extend the congratulations of George V to Benedict XV on the latter's accession to the throne. Actually the purpose was to

and his experience led him to urge some kind of formal recognition of the Holy See for practical reasons. He found that his efforts to purchase provisions from the papal government to be passed on to British ships and sailors in the Mediterranean, would be facilitated by more regular diplomatic relations.[18] Following Hippisley's departure in 1796, British concerns within the jurisdiction of the Holy Father were given over to Thomas Jackson, minister to Sardinia, who had them in his care until 1806 when the Napoleonic forces had virtually engulfed the peninsula.

Even before he became secretary of state Consalvi had shown a leaning towards England as against the revolutionary régime in France. As early as 1794 when he held the post of president of the Congregation of Arms, a kind of minister of war for the pontifical state, he had, as a recent historian says, "caldeggiato un' alleanza fra Roma e l'Inghilterra contro la Repubblica francese."[19] However, the desires of Pius VI were to maintain his neutrality as far as possible and the young minister's suggestion was not followed. That neutrality ceased to be an issue within five years, for in February, 1798 the French entered Rome under Berthier, and the Holy Father was removed first to Siena and then to Valence. Consalvi, after a brief arrest, fled to Naples where his entry was facilitated by Acton, the British minister, who had been appealed to in his behalf by the Cardinal of York.[20]

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counteract the influence of the German and Austrian ambassadors at the Holy See, for the mission was not recalled and from that time to the present Great Britain has maintained a resident minister at the court of the pope. Cf. "British Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See," by Stephen Gaselee in *Dublin Review,* CCIV (Jan. 1939), 1–19.

[18] Gasquet, *Op. cit.,* 15.

[19] Cassi, Gellio, *Il cardinale Consalvi ed i primi anni della restaurazione pontificia, 1815–1819,* 13.

[20] *Mémoires,* II, 88. Consalvi speaks of Acton as one, "qui était Anglais, fut flatté au delà de toute expression de voir que le légitime roi de la Grande-Bretagne attendait de lui une faveur." It is interesting to speculate on what George III might have thought had he heard Cardinal Stuart being spoken of as "the legitimate king of Great Britain."

The year after Hippisley's arrival in Rome as British agent witnessed the sending by Pius VI of Monsignor Erskine, a Roman-born English prelate, to London as papal agent there. Erskine left Rome on October 4, 1793 and arrived in London on November 13 where he remained for the better part of eight years, departing from the British capital for Paris on December 12, 1801. The monsignor was reappointed to his London mission by a communication from Consalvi in April, 1800 which gave him a new cipher for his correspondence.[21] Erskine sent his despatches through Canning, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, who forwarded them by the carriers of Lords Grenville and Minto. The reappointment was necessitated by the death of Pius VI. During his stay in London, Monsignor Erskine enjoyed only a private status. At no time was he recognized as the accredited minister of the pope by the British government. It was during his absence from Rome that the Papal States were overrun by the French, whereupon Erskine lost his regular income from his offices as auditor and canon of St. Peter's. In this emergency, however, he was generously treated by King George III who volunteered a provisional pension while the French occupied Rome.[22] With thirteen others Erskine was named a cardinal *in petto* by Pius VII on February 23, 1801. He sensibly requested Pius VII to keep the matter secret, fearing that his work in England would be greatly handicapped by an aroused prejudice if it became known. Erskine himself, however, privately informed George III and Pitt of his honor and they expressed themselves as pleased at his prudent silence in the

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[21] Gasquet, *Op. cit.*, 46.

[22] Brady, W. Maziere, *Anglo-Roman Papers,* III, *Memoirs of Cardinal Erskine, Papal Envoy to the Court of George III,* 145. If one were to view the Cardinal of York as an "agent" of the papacy, Brady is in error in stating of Erskine's pension: "This is undoubtedly the first and only instance since the schism, of a Papal agent subsidized by the British government."

matter.[23] A most unpleasant task given to Erskine in the course of his English visit was the commission from Pius VII to execute one of the clauses of the concordat of 1801, in so far as he was instructed in September, 1801 to inform the French bishops resident in England that they must resign their sees for the new distribution of dioceses which the concordat provided. He performed this delicate and unwelcome assignment, but not without incurring the criticism of being a Bonapartist.[24]

The Erskine mission was not without value to both governments concerned, though the prelate's own summary of his work is guilty of some exaggeration. While it is true that views were exchanged between London and Rome, yet it is going too far to speak of that exchange as open communication between the two courts for the first time in two hundred years, thus inaugurating direct correspondence between the two secretaries of state.[25] He claims he received all privileges given to foreign ministers at London though he had no public character. The monsignor did affect Britain's regard for the rights of the Holy See in all matters touching religion in the constitution drawn up for Corsica. Likewise freedom for the papal government to act against British subjects guilty of legal infractions within the Papal States, aid from the British fleet to protect cargoes of grain and the papal coasts from pirates in the Mediterranean, and the support of Britain for the interests of the Holy See in the Treaty of Amiens signed by the former with France, were claimed by Erskine.[26]

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[23] Brady, *Op. cit.*, 149. George III displayed a lively curiosity to Erskine in questioning him about the dress he would wear as a cardinal.

[24] *Ibid.*, 153.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] The following successes were credited to Erskine in his own summary of his mission in London: Impeded adoption of a motion in parliament to dissolve the communities of nuns in England; successfully blocked the execution of certain novelties which some ministers tried to introduce into Ireland concerning the bishops and priests which would have been detrimental to the Holy See's rights; secured the fact that the British ministers

This somewhat boastful and exaggerated account of the English prelate's accomplishments is accounted for in part by the fact that he felt so keenly the lack of appreciation which Cardinal Consalvi showed for his work. The two men had never been close friends. One of the clearest intimations of the feeling of the powerful secretary of state came to Erskine at Viterbo in September, 1802 when on his way to Rome for his red hat he learned that the duties of auditor, an office which he held in name under Pius VI and the first year and a half of the reign of Pius VII, would continue to be performed by Monsignor Lacchini who had been doing the work in Erskine's absence. What made the point unmistakable was that the message was communicated to him by an agent of Consalvi's. Erskine's biographer says:

> Erskine took this misfortune as a manifest sign that under Consalvi he would never, even though he were a cardinal, be promoted to any of the great offices of State, nor be called on to take part in the grand affairs

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should not interfere with the affairs of the vicars apostolic in England to which they were encouraged by some disaffected Catholic nobles; appeased existing dissensions among English Catholics; prevented scandal due to the excessive zeal of a foreign bishop who was unacquainted with English law and customs; took part with British ministers in removing impediments placed by French recusant prelates in the way of a return to France of French priests; obtained open manifestation to Paul I of Russia of the intention of the British government to restore the three legations to the Holy See; in the Treaty of Amiens the pontifical states named as such expressly by the British representative at Erskine's instance, of which he says there was no precedent since the schism; celebrated public funeral services for Pius VI in London at St. Patrick's in Soho Square on November 16, 1799; caused public prayers to be said in all chapels of the three kingdoms for Pius VI during his captivity; maintained correspondence with all nuncios and agents of the Holy See in all parts of Europe when Pius VI was imprisoned and could not do so; contributed toward getting a subvention from the British government for vicars apostolic in Scotland; and finally spared the Holy See expense by his economy and dispensing with services of paid secretaries. Brady, *Op. cit.*, 153–155.

> of the Papacy, internal or foreign. Nor was he far wrong in his anticipations.[27]

Erskine arrived in Rome on October 1, 1802. The unpleasant impression created by the news at Viterbo was confirmed by his reception from the cardinal secretary. When he went to give the customary account of his English mission to Consalvi the latter "gave little attention and evinced no anxiety for information." Hurt by this slight Erskine complained to Pius VII about his minister and told the Holy Father that the cardinal "did not even condescend to ask him about the weather in London." [28]

This attitude towards Erskine on the part of Consalvi was not altogether prompted by personal taste or jealousy. Actually the cardinal was in possession of information at the time that the Treaty of Amiens between Britain and Bonaparte was about to be broken, and knowing that the French were uncomfortably close at hand, he feared to irritate the First Consul by showing this English prelate too much favor.[29] This hardly explains satisfactorily, however, an episode which remains one of the few shadowy spots on the career of a man who was singularly free from the vices of pettiness and jealousy.

The era of general war which involved most of western Europe from 1793 to 1815 went especially hard on the Holy See. It fell to the lot of Consalvi in his office of president or assessor of the Congregation of Arms as early as 1794, to look to the defences of the papal territory. We have already seen that he favored a closer tie-up with Great Britain in that year against the French

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[27] Brady, *Op. cit.*, 191.

[28] *Ibid.*, 192.

[29] *Ibid.* Erskine was created a cardinal in the consistory of January 17, 1803. In January, 1810, he was forced to leave Rome for Paris at Napoleon's orders, delivered by General Radet. He arrived there on January 26, 1810. Fortunately for him, illness prevented his attending the emperor's marriage with Marie Louise on April 2, so he was not stripped of his official attire and is therefore ranked among the "red" cardinals. Erskine died in Paris on March 20, 1811. *Ibid.*, 225–254.

republic.[30] As the struggle deepened and spread into the Italian peninsula the problem became more acute. The revolutionaries were in hopes that by 1798 a sufficient following could be found within the Papal States to overthrow the government and bring about a republican régime there. However, very little success attended their efforts, "thanks to the energy displayed by Consalvi, then assessor of the military Congregation."[31] The governmental reforms within the Papal States, for which Consalvi eagerly yearned, and which he felt were in no way fulfilled by the new constitution promulgated in the bull, *Post diuturnas,* of Pius VII on October 30, 1800, were impossible to obtain under conditions amounting close to siege.[32] The successes of the First Consul against Austria in the Italian peninsula made a nightmare of the business of the foreign office for Pius VII's secretary of state. Especially was this true after the Austrians were forced to sign the Treaty of Lunéville with Bonaparte on February 9, 1801 which ceded the pontifical legations in their entirety to the French. The legations were promptly annexed to the Cisalpine republic in the north. From this date to May 27, 1809, the day Napoleon signed the decree before the gates of Vienna in which he abolished the Papal States, and the act of his hireling, General Radet, who on July 6, 1809 broke into the Quirinal, arrested Pius VII and took him away, there was little of a cheerful character to record in Consalvi's activities.[33]

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[30] Cf. 9 of this study.

[31] Mollat, *Op. cit.,* 56–57.

[32] *Ibid.,* 84–85. For text of the bull, cf. Andreas Barbèri, *Bullarii Romani Continuatio,* XI, 48–71.

[33] For a discussion of the Holy See's difficulties with Bonaparte from the Treaty of Lunéville in 1801 with the ensuing captivity of Pius VII, to the Concordat of Fontainebleau in January, 1813, cf. Charles Van Duerm, S. J., *Vicissitudes politiques du pouvoir temporel des papes de 1789 à 1895,* 55–108. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Vicissitudes.* On January 7, 1806, the Emperor Napoleon wrote from Munich complaining of Pius VII's unfriendliness and his own desire to "protect" the Holy See! The emperor told the pope: "Je me suis considéré, comme le protecteur du

It was after Consalvi's return from Paris where he had negotiated the famous concordat in the summer of 1801, that Bonaparte began to grow increasingly impatient with the cardinal's friendliness toward his chief enemy, Great Britain. Actually Consalvi was only trying to serve the best interests of his own government. On November 21, 1806 Napoleon had issued his Berlin decree in an effort to break Britain's resistance by crippling her extensive continental trade. The failure of the government of the pope to fall in with this anti-British policy was a source of deep irritation to Bonaparte. He was well aware of the man with whom he was dealing, for as early as January 7, 1806 he had written from Munich that he could take calmly the pope's dismissal of Fesch, his ambassador, since he realized that the hatred of Cardinal Consalvi against Fesch was such that the latter suffered only rebuffs at Consalvi's hands, "tandis que les préférences étaient pour mes ennemis.[34] Even before the Berlin decree he had ordered the Papal States to act in an unneutral manner towards Great Britain. In a letter to Fesch on February 13, 1806 from Paris he had commanded his ambassador to inform the Holy See that he expected all Englishmen and the nationals of other unfriendly powers to be expelled from Rome and the Papal States, and the ships of these powers to be forbidden entry to papal ports, and this under the menace of reducing the Papal States to the status they had before Charlemagne's day.[35] To this request the government of Pius VII returned a refusal on March 21.[36] Neither Pius VII nor his chief minister

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Saint-Siège, et, à ce titre, j'ai occupé Ancône. . . . Je protégerai constamment le Saint-Siège, et malgré les fausses démarches, l'ingratitude et les mauvaises dispositions des hommes qui se sont démasqués pendant ces trois mois." *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier,* XI, 528.

[34] *Ibid.,* 527–528. Napoleon told the pope he was free to dismiss Fesch, and then added a sarcastic note that he was also free "accueillir de préférence les Anglais et le calife de Constantinople."

[35] *Ibid.,* XII, 40.

[36] *Mémoires,* II, 434–437.

had any intentions of barring English vessels from papal ports since they were in friendly relations at the time; and in his reply the pope stated that "it would be contrary to his duty to enter into a permanent system of war which exposed him, . . . to involve himself in conflicts full of evil, since he would be forced to participate in future wars, of which he could foresee neither the justice nor the injustice; that it was not possible for him to consent to regard as his friends or enemies the friends or enemies of France.[37] Bonaparte was wise enough to suspect that behind the refusal of the mild Pius was the indomitable Consalvi, and it was at this time that he insisted the cardinal be removed from office, "sotto minaccia di rottura diplomatica e di guerra."[38] Meanwhile the cardinal worked hard to protect the property of Englishmen in the Papal States from the rapacity of French officials.[39] The papal government maintained its stout resistance to this effort to involve it in trouble with other governments and the result was Bonaparte proceeded to new excesses to break their resistance. On April 2, 1808 he signed a decree at St. Cloud which irrevocably united the papal provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino to the kingdom of Italy on the grounds that the pope refused to declare war on England and to cooperate with Bonaparte's puppet kings in Italy and Naples against Great Britain.[40]

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[37] *Mémoires,* II, 446. The document was drawn up after Pius VII's consultation with the Sacred College and it was of the cardinal's own composition. He says, "on me chargea de rédiger la réponse." *Ibid.,* II, 444. The full text of Pius VII's letter of March 21, 1806, to Napoleon can be read in Artaud de Montor, *Histoire du Pape Pie VII,* II, 121–130.

[38] Angelucci, G. A., *Il grande segretario della Santa Sede; sunto della vita di Ercole Consalvi,* 41.

[39] Gasquet, *Op. cit.,* 53. Gasquet mentions that the dossier in the Vatican Archives relating to British affairs with the Holy See for 1807 is filled with this subject about the English properties and Consalvi's efforts to save them.

[40] Duerm, *Vicissitudes,* 83. Bonaparte did not fail to show his opinion of Consalvi in his correspondence. Writing to Fesch on January 7, 1806, from Munich he said: "Dites à Consalvi que, s'il aime sa patrie, il faut

The officials of the government in London were not insensible to the efforts being put forth in Rome to maintain a friendly attitude under very harassing conditions. Following the forcible seizure of Rome and the Papal States in 1809 and the removal of the pope, the independent existence of that sovereignty ceased for the next five years. However, the British did show their con-

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qu'il quitte le ministère, ou qu'il fasse ce que je demande; que je suis religieux, mais ne suis point cagot . . . Dites à Consalvi, dites même au pape que, puisqu'il veut chasser mon ministre de Rome, je pourrai bien aller l'y rétablir." *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier,* XI, 529. Napoleon scolded to Talleyrand from Saint-Cloud on April 26 against the treatment of the French troops in Rome and told Talleyrand to inform the Roman government, "que je déclare qu'au premier soldat français qui serait assassiné, le secrétaire d'État Consalvi, véritable cause des malheurs et des dissensions qui divisent le Saint-Siège, en sera personnellement responsable." *Ibid.,* XII, 314. On May 16 he ordered Talleyrand to present to Cardinal Caprara, ambassador of Pius VII, his reactions to Consalvi's protest of April 26 on Joseph Bonaparte's assuming the Neapolitan throne and to say: "A cette occasion, le soussigné ne peut s'empêcher de le demander: que veut la secrétairerie d'État de Rome? quel esprit de vertige s'est donc emparé d'elle? et quelle conduite que celle que des hommes profondément méchants et ineptes lui font tenir depuis longtemps. Il peut dire que, si cela continue, je ferai enlever Consalvi de Rome et le rendrai responsable de ce qu'il veut faire, parce qu'il est évidemment acheté par les Anglais." *Ibid.,* XII, 375. On the same day he addressed Fesch the following injunction: "Voyez le pape et dites-lui que la note du cardinal Consalvi m'a fortement indisposé; que cet homme, par bêtise ou par trahison, veut perdre les États Temporels du Saint-Siège, et qu'il y réussira." *Ibid.,* XII, 375. The question of papal neutrality in the face of Napoleonic aggression drew forth from the Holy See a number of memorable statements on the position of the Holy Father in time of war. The principal documents have been included in a collection edited by Joseph Müller, *Das Friedenswerk der Kirche in den letzten drei Jahrhunderten, 1598–1917,* taken in good part from the Vatican Archives. Cf. the section entitled "Zeitalter Consalvis 1800 bis 1823," and especially No. 93, Consalvi's Communication to Count Khevenhüller, Austrian ambassador to the Holy See, of October 18, 1805, on the violation of the Holy See's neutrality by the French armies, 254–255; and No. 94, the reply of Pius VII to Napoleon of March 21, 1806, on the latter's demand for the Roman government to expel the nationals of his enemies from the Papal States and close the ports to their ships, 255–262.

cern for the tragic plight of Pius VII, and even attempted to rescue him from his imprisonment at Savona if he were of a mind to avail himself of the chance for escape on a British ship. This plan of the spring of 1812, of which Sir John Hippisley was an author, acting with the approval of the British admiralty in London, failed of accomplishment, for the pope hesitated to make himself a party to the scheme and suddenly on June 20, 1812 the French autocrat ordered Pius VII removed from Savona and brought to Fontainebleau.[41] It was at Fontainebleau that Consalvi rejoined the pope on June 18, 1813 after his own release.[42]

By the spring of 1814 the cause of Napoleon was clearly in jeopardy, and when representatives of the Powers met at Châtillon on March 19, 1814 to solidify their ranks and to sign a statement of their joint determination to fight Bonaparte to a finish, it contained a specific guarantee for the pope. The pertinent sentence, to which the three British delegates, Lords Cathcart,

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[41] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 124–125. This episode has documentary proof in a letter written on February 24, 1825, by Hippisley to his friend, Cardinal de Gregorio, in which he stated that in order to be sure of recording the fact he had written to a Mr. Yorke who at the time of the plan to rescue the pope, presided over the admiralty, asking him if he remembered it. On January 22, 1825, Yorke replied to Hippisley that he remembered it very well. He said he "recalled the plan perfectly . . . and the plan was adopted by the government, that the admiralty was authorized to put it into execution by means of the commander in chief in the Mediterranean." Monsignor Testaferrata, the nuncio at Lucerne, writing to Pius VII from that city on April 13, 1814, spoke in high praise of Viscount Castlereagh, who, Testaferrata says, recalled that the command had been given to the British ships in the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean, "per prendere il Papa da Savona." Testaferrata added that Castlereagh remarked the pope, however, did not find it agreeable "essere con noi." *Ibid.,* 30. For the pope's years of exile, cf. Comte de Mayol de Lupé, *La captivité de Pie VII,* 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Paris: Emile-Paul, Frères, 1916).

[42] *Historical Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca,* I, 417. Pacca says: "On the evening of that day, the 18th, the Cardinal Consalvi, whom the Holy Father anxiously expected, having already appointed him his minister for the purpose of managing a pending negotiation with the Imperial Government, arrived at Fontainebleau, and had an audience immediately."

Stewart, and Aberdeen affixed their signatures, read: "In insisting on the independence of Italy, the allied courts have the intention of replacing the Holy Father in his ancient capital." [43] The highest ranking British official in Italy enthusiastically shared at the moment the view of the English diplomats at Châtillon, for in a letter of April 1, 1814 to the Duke di Gallo, Lord William Bentinck, ambassador to Sicily and commander of British forces in Italy, giving his opinions on the disposition to be made of Italian matters by the coming peace conference, declared the allied governments should hasten:

> Above all, to restore without delay the sovereign Pontiff to his throne. The cruel sufferings of this venerable personage, combined with his extraordinary virtues and firmness, have excited, as we have seen, the greatest enthusiasm. When the conduct of the ruler of France in this respect has, more than any other act of his life, excited universal detestation, it would be an evil policy to refuse the adoption of a measure acknowledged to be of the utmost necessity by all who are anxious to behold the reestablishment of social order on its base of religion and morality.[44]

However, the good will of men such as Hippisley and Bentinck might amount to little, and even the polite pledge of the Châtillon agreement be conveniently forgotten, were not the most responsible British minister for the conduct of foreign policy of the same mind. Fortunately Viscount Castlereagh shared these views concerning the Holy Father and his just title to a restoration of his territories. He made this clear to Monsignor Testaferrata, the nuncio at Lucerne, in a conversation which the latter

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[43] Van Duerm, Charles, S. J. (Ed.), *Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec le Prince Clément de Metternich, 1815–1823,* xiv. Hereafter referred to as: Duerm, *Correspondance.*

[44] *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G.,* edited by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K. G., IX, 492. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington.*

reported to Rome in a despatch of April 13, 1814, in which he quoted Castlereagh as saying: "The sentiment and the will of my government is to put the Pope at liberty . . . and to restore to him all his States; *and in this all England has Catholic sentiments.*" [45]

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[45] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 29. Testaferrata says Castlereagh showed "una viva soddisfazione" in seeing himself among the ministers of the Holy See, a "personna suddita di S. M. Britannica." *Ibid.,* 30. Just how Testaferrata came to be a British subject the writer was unable to discover.

CHAPTER II

THE CARDINAL'S LONDON VISIT

THE friendly attitude assumed by the British government towards the Holy See and the pronounced sympathies in English circles for Pope Pius VII lightened greatly the task of Cardinal Consalvi in carrying out his difficult mission. He left Rome in the late days of May, 1814, with the aim of meeting the allied sovereigns and their ministers in the coming peace discussions. Upon his arrival in Paris on June 2, the cardinal learned that the responsible allied leaders were about to depart for London at the invitation of the Prince Regent. Realizing that the successful attainment of the Holy See's desires rested in great measure with these very men, he decided that there was but one sensible course for him to pursue and that was to follow them. The papal secretary of state was fully aware of all the implications of such a step. He knew that the penalties of *praemunire* of the law of Elizabeth's parliament of 1571 could still be validly invoked against anyone who received a papal document.[1] However, Consalvi bearing in his dossier a letter from Pius VII to the Regent, was encouraged to take the chance by the recent attitude of friendliness. Any hesitation he entertained regarding an entry into the kingdom where a Roman cardinal as such had not set foot since Cardinal Pole's landing at Dover on November 20,

[1] That the penalty of *praemunire* was not altogether a dead letter, the Holy See was reminded in 1792 when Pius VI (Mourret incorrectly says Pius VII) sent a prelate bearing a letter of thanks to George III for his hospitality to the French clergy living in exile in England. The prelate was not received upon his arrival since it would be contrary to existing law. Fernand Mourret, *Histoire générale de l'église,* VII, 402–403.

1554, was overcome by a piece of information that reached him shortly after his arrival in Paris.

It was during his first days in the French capital that the cardinal received a visit from William Poynter, vicar apostolic of the London district since 1812, and coadjutor to Bishop Douglass in that jurisdiction since 1803. Bishop Poynter was a mild man who was given to conciliatory tactics in controversial matters; moreover he was quite persona grata to the British government of the moment. Poynter brought Consalvi very disquieting news. He told the cardinal he had come to Paris to present to Castlereagh the "interessi della S. Sede," and that he was now being sent secretly by the British government to the principal cities of Italy to learn if there was solid foundation for the request forwarded to the British cabinet by certain elements in Italy, that they wished the whole peninsula united under one king. In a despatch from Paris, Consalvi communicated this intelligence to Rome on June 6, 1814. He assured the Holy See that he had quickly informed Poynter of the falsity of this view, admitting that there were a few malcontents in every city who did not like their rulers, but explaining that "la grandissima maggiorità" were loyal to their sovereigns. The cardinal begged Poynter to explain all this clearly to Castlereagh. Poynter suggested he write Castlereagh himself, which Consalvi consented to do and he gave Poynter a letter setting down the situation in Italy as he saw it. In this letter Consalvi did not lose the chance to tell Castlereagh of the full confidence entertained by the Holy Father, "nella nazione inglese, per la ricupera di tutti i suoi Stati." [2]

Rinieri attributes these reports reaching London to the Murat faction which was, of course, active throughout the peninsula during the year 1814. Regardless of their source, they worried Consalvi, for if the British government took these stories seriously it would have meant the entire defeat of his plans. It was for that reason that he was more than ever determined to win a hear-

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[2] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 367.

ing in the English capital; as he expressed it himself, it was the "ultima spinta" that sent him to London.[3]

When it came time to arrange the details of his departure, his way was made smoother through the courtesy of Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador to Paris, who gave him a document which requested port officials and others whom the cardinal and his suite might encounter, to extend full courtesies to the party. This letter, dated Paris, June 6, 1814, the cardinal carried in his portfolio.[4] It made things easier, for they met with no untoward incidents or delays on their journey to London.

Cardinal Consalvi arrived in London on June 9, 1814 just three days after the arrival of Emperor Alexander I of Russia and King Frederick William III of Prussia. At the moment London was filled with celebrities and the capital had taken on a festive air for the entertainment of the distinguished guests. The papal secretary was naturally a source of curiosity to the Londoners and others who had come to the city to observe the celebrations.[5] However, he maintained the greatest prudence, refraining from dressing as a cardinal except on extraordinary occasions and discreetly remaining away from many public functions. He was there on serious business and that business might more profitably be conducted in the private cabinets of the sovereigns and their ministers than in the gay reception chambers of London society. Consalvi realized that while exterior appearances seemed friendly, there was not an absence of danger in London for him and the interests he represented. The brave words of Lamb, British chargé d'affaires in Vienna, to Severoli,

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[3] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 367. Consalvi ended his despatch with the words: "Tutte queste ragioni mi fecero risolvere ad andare a Londra . . . Io dunque parto per Londra questa notte."

[4] *Mémoires,* I, 20, n. 1 where the letter of Stuart is printed in full.

[5] Angelucci, G. A., *Il grande segretario della Santa Sede; sunto della vita di Ercole Consalvi,* 49. While it is easy enough to believe Consalvi excited curiosity in London, one must allow that it is giving the romantic touch to historical fact to say that Londoners regarded him as "un' apparizione celeste." *Ibid.,* 51.

the nuncio there, "that England was obliged to the Pope, and that the Pope and England had saved Europe,"[6] did not override the fact that some of the British ministers were exceedingly wary of, if not hostile to, the papacy.[7] Because of a desire to remain inconspicuous and because of the crowded schedules of the sovereigns, the papal secretary delayed his audience with the Prince Regent until after the departure of the Russian and Prussian rulers.[8]

The principal preoccupation in Consalvi's mind during the twenty-six days he spent in London was the restoration of all the territories once governed by the pope. He felt that was the subject above all to which he must direct his energies while he enjoyed this opportunity of close contact with those who had in their power the remaking of the map of Europe. Nonetheless he was not unmindful of other matters. If the cardinal had had the intention of emphasizing the temporal interests of the Holy See to the exclusion of spiritual affairs—which in truth he did not—he would have been forcibly reminded of the type of jurisdiction he represented by the Holy Father himself. On June 21 Pius VII addressed a long letter to Consalvi, telling him to conduct himself while in London as the envoy of the Vicar of Christ, and urging him to use the good will displayed towards him to attempt an alleviation of the plight of the English and Irish Catholics.[9]

The cardinal seized the first opportune moment to inform officially Castlereagh, the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, of his presence in London and of his reasons for coming. He received a brief interview one morning just before a cabinet meeting, and the ministers were kept waiting until the foreign

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[6] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 31, Severoli to Pacca, June 19, 1814.

[7] *Ibid.,* 308. In a despatch of Severoli to Pacca on July 20, 1814, from Vienna the nuncio spoke of Lord Liverpool, the British Prime Minister at the time as, "Liverpool ci è aperto nemico."

[8] Ward, Bernard, *The Eve of Catholic Emancipation,* II, 91.

[9] *Mémoires,* I, 82–84.

secretary had finished with his visitor. The interview was very cordial, Consalvi explaining that he was the bearer of a letter from Pope Pius to the Prince Regent which thanked him for his consideration during the trying days of the war and recommending to the prince the interests of the Papal States. The papal secretary briefly developed the point of why England should give diplomatic assistance to Rome, adducing the pope's refusal to Bonaparte to make war on Great Britain, etc. Consalvi finished by handing Castlereagh a note which summarized the views of the papal government and which would serve as a guide to the British ministers. Castlereagh eagerly accepted it, and upon Consalvi's request promised him an audience with the regent.[10]

While awaiting further developments, Consalvi was drafting and polishing the note which he intended to present to the Powers, claiming the restoration of all the papal territories seized since the beginning of the Revolution. While the sovereigns and their ministers continued the festivities the cardinal worked. In fact on the day of the note's issuance the czar and the Prussian king were absent from the city inspecting the dockyards and reviewing the fleet at Portsmouth. Copies of the note were forwarded to Castlereagh, Metternich, Nesselrode, Hardenberg, and Talleyrand. In it the cardinal lodged a vigorous protest against the validity of the Treaty of Tolentino of February 19, 1797 signed between Pius VI and the Directory government. The startling and complete success of French arms against both Austria and the papal troops had left Pius VI with no alternative but to yield in an effort to save his subjects a worse fate. Consalvi emphasized the coercion involved and maintained that it nullified the treaty. Moreover, the fact that within a year the Directory itself tore up the document by the formal decree seizing

[10] "Un essai de concordat entre l'Angleterre et le Saint Siège," by Vicomte de Richemont, in *Le Correspondant,* CCXX (Sept. 25, 1905), 1116. Castlereagh remarked to Consalvi the unusual spectacle of a British minister receiving officially a cardinal secretary of state in the former's cabinet! *Ibid.*

the whole papal territory, carrying the pope into captivity, and declaring that the state no longer existed, gave the coup de grâce to any legality which the treaty might have had.[11] The papal secretary was anxious to put the case for the Holy See on a firm legal base and that as quickly as possible while the favorable mood of the Powers towards Pius VII lasted. He was aware that the restoration of the Papal States had been discussed in their councils as early as January in the meeting of allied representatives at Basel, and that they had expressed themselves as favorable to the Holy Father's cause. But as yet there had been no formal commitment on the part of any of the allied governments.

A factor which added to Consalvi's disquietude was the equivocal attitude of Metternich, the Austrian chancellor. The cardinal was enough of a realist to know that a restoration of the Papal States could not be won in the face of Metternich's opposition, unless the papacy could rally the support of all the other Powers against Vienna. This uneasiness of mind was in no way alleviated by the interview accorded Consalvi by Metternich during their London visit. In fact the cardinal mentioned it in two despatches sent from London on June 26 and 30 to Cardinal Pacca, acting in his absence from Rome as pro-secretary of state. He says Metternich was polite but evasive and urged that the question was an "affare europeo," and therefore the Holy See should bide its time until the matter could be discussed in the full peace conference.[12] This was hardly comforting news when Consalvi reflected on the dominance held by Austria in the affairs of the Italian peninsula, and particularly of the Papal States, with Austrian troops occupying the legations of Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna. Moreover, the active intrigues of the Murat party in Italy had not only been successful in maneuvering Metternich into signing a treaty on January 11,

[11] Van Duerm, *Correspondance,* 33–40, prints the note in full to Metternich; identical notes were sent to the other Powers.

[12] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 129–130.

1814 which guaranteed Murat his throne at Naples, but there was also an active propaganda on the part of the Murat faction for extending the boundaries of his kingdom beyond the old confines of the Neapolitan jurisdiction. The fact that this treaty had secured the approval of Castlereagh who had demanded only minor modifications, and had won the sanction of Alexander I and Frederick William III, made the cardinal's task a difficult one indeed.

It is small wonder therefore that Consalvi sought interviews with the rulers of Russia and Prussia before their departure from London. He succeeded just before they left the British capital. To both Alexander and Frederick William he bore letters from Pope Pius VII which were received with genuine courtesy and friendliness. However, neither sovereign gave any definite commitment to deliver the Papal States to their rightful ruler. Alexander went a little farther than the Prussian king in promising his good will towards the question at the coming congress in Vienna. Consalvi carried away the impression from both interviews that some hope of support might be entertained by the Holy See, especially of Russian aid, but more success than that he could not record.[13] Consalvi did not miss a chance opened for him by the czar. The latter spoke flatteringly of the pope and said he regretted he did not arrive in Paris in time to meet him. The papal secretary was quick to invite him to visit the Holy Father in Rome, adding that a true lover of art such as the Russian emperor was, would revel in the treasures of the Eternal City.[14] Alexander thanked him and said perhaps some day he could make the visit, though it was impossible for him to go at the time.[15]

[13] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 130. Consalvi had difficulty in securing these audiences due to the crowded schedules of the sovereigns. He succeeded only at the very end of their London visit; in fact Frederick William's horses were harnessed to the royal coach awaiting the king when the cardinal arrived.

[14] De Richemont, *Op. cit.,* 1124.

[15] Consalvi did entertain the Austrian emperor, Francis I, his empress, and

The departure of the allied sovereigns for the continent left governmental circles in London in a more normal state. To date Consalvi had been treated with uninterrupted cordiality and friendliness by all. He felt satisfied that the restoration of the Papal States would be backed at least to some extent by the czar and perhaps not opposed by Frederick William. The interview with Metternich had been unfruitful of anything save suspicions and uncomfortable doubts as to the course which the Austrian chancellor would pursue. It was therefore with considerable relief that Consalvi was informed by Viscount Castlereagh that he would be received in audience by the Prince Regent at three o'clock on the afternoon of July 1. After all, his primary purpose in coming to London had been to win the British government to support the Holy See's temporal claims, as well as to look to an understanding on the Catholic question in the British Isles. If he could be assured of British assistance he would feel greatly re-enforced for the coming ordeal in Vienna.

It so happened that the day fixed for the audience was the one on which the regent was receiving the envoys of a number of other governments, as well as large deputations of both houses of parliament who had come to extend their felicitations on the making of peace. Cardinal Consalvi resolved to appear in the full regalia of his office. He was placed in the audience chamber not far from a number of Anglican bishops. His natural feeling of nervousness in the unusual circumstance of his presence in such a gathering was quickly overcome when the Prince Regent, proceeding through the audience chamber, sighted him and came forward to greet him most warmly. After the public presentation to the regent, the cardinal was accorded a private audience of about a half hour.[16] George spoke of his admiration for Pope

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Prince Metternich on their visit to Rome in March, 1819; likewise he was host to Frederick William III and his two sons when they came in November, 1822. Fischer, *Op. cit.*, 326–327.

[16] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 132–135. Consalvi's pride was considerably piqued by the fact that he was received *after* the Spanish ambassador, but he said

Pius, and the cardinal replied that the Holy Father entertained a particular attachment for England. Consalvi did not fail to urge the restoration of the Papal States on Prince George, reminding him of the papal government's friendliness toward Great Britain during the war. To this the Prince Regent gave his formal promise that he would sustain the interests of the Holy Father at the approaching congress. This was one of the strongest sentiments yet expressed to the cardinal by way of support to the pope from one of the great Powers. He naturally was elated. Nonetheless he did not allow his elation to overrule his sense of reality, for he was at pains to remind the Roman government that despite the prince's promises it was the opinion of the ministry which counted in this government. He told Rome its hopes might be high, yet they should not take it "per sicurezza." [17]

Following his public and private audiences with the Prince Regent, the papal secretary of state secured two more interviews with Castlereagh before his departure from London. One lasted three quarters of an hour, but the most important, held on July 4, continued for an hour and a half. In a lengthy despatch to Cardinal Pacca written from London on July 5, the day following the Castlereagh conversation, Consalvi put the Roman gov-

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he was willing to overlook this since "il Governo inglese non riconoscendo il Papa per capo della Religione."

[17] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 140. While Consalvi was cautious in not being too optimistic, yet he felt warranted in telling Pacca that he thought he felt, "una vera disposizione di questa Corte a favorire su questo oggetto gl'interessi di Sua Santità." *Ibid.,* 152. Regarding the personal aspects of his audience with George, Consalvi had difficulty in restraining his enthusiasm. He told Pacca: "Qui mi è impossibile, assolutamente impossibile, di riferire in un modo, che corrisponda alla cosa i sentimenti, la bontà, la cortesia, la premura, l'interesse e sopratutto la vera effusione del cuore, che dal principio fino alla fine distinsero questa udienza." *Ibid.,* 136. In his *Mémoires,* the cardinal remarks that at Windsor he discussed with George the dangers of the freedom of the press, and that the Prince Regent agreed with him on the continental presses, but he gave Consalvi a brief history of the press in England, explaining it had its advantages as well as its inconveniences, "pour ce royaume tout exceptionnel." I, 26.

ernment *au courant* of the developments ensuing from these interviews.[18] He told Pacca that Castlereagh and himself had gone over, in a friendly way, a number of the important questions at stake between the two governments, and he said the latter spoke of England's desire to see justice done to the Holy See at Vienna. But Consalvi was careful to have Rome know that the foreign secretary committed himself to nothing specific —as the cardinal expressed it, he " non poteva darmi risposte più precise," just at the time.[19] In reviewing the relations existing between the two courts since the beginning of the French Revolution, Consalvi urged on Castlereagh papal aid in revictualing British ships as early as 1794, the promises of Lord Grenville given in 1795 to lend the papal claims against France the support of Britain at the peace conference, the offer of the British to liberate Pius VII from Savona in 1812, etc., as reminders of the fact that now the Holy See might legitimately expect assistance. Castlereagh replied with unfailing kindliness and sympathy, but entered upon no definite pledge. Consalvi therefore took stock of the gracious reception and kind words, but he kept his head and did not fail to remember that despite all the fine rhetoric displayed in his behalf, British policy respecting Italy remained that of looking upon the restoration only in the light of the general Italian question, and not as the claim of this or that Italian prince.

Apart from the disturbing fears aroused from the unsatisfactory interview with Prince Metternich, there were but two discordant notes sounded during the cardinal's London visit. One might very well prove a serious hindrance to the success of the negotiations upon which he was engaged with the British government, the other might disappear as quickly as it had arisen, since it seemed to rest largely on the schemes of an adventurer. The first was the request which Castlereagh made to the cardinal

[18] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 151, 163. Consalvi to Pacca. July 15, 1814, from London.

[19] *Ibid.,* 151.

for a written statement of just what the Holy See would and would not accept in the territorial settlement, in other words Rome's views of "che possiamo o non possiamo fare."[20] On the surface this appeared as a perfectly innocent and reasonable demand. However, a written commitment closely defining the limits of one's case is seldom popular with diplomatists who move more comfortably within the elastic confines of general statements which leave room for emendation and concession. To this Consalvi was no exception, for Castlereagh's request put him on the spot and the cardinal did not like it. The papal secretary tried to parry the thrust by pleading that he did not know the Holy Father's specific intentions on all these points, that he had to leave London in two days and did not have time therefore to prepare such a statement. Whereupon Castlereagh informed him he could send it to him from Paris! The British foreign secretary promised the cardinal that the document would in no way compromise him, nor would it be regarded as official, but Castlereagh would regard it solely as "per sua istruzione."[21]

This turn of events left Consalvi somewhat nonplussed. As he related to Cardinal Pacca in his despatch of July 5, he did not know how he could draw up such a paper properly, and yet if he did not do it, his failure might cause damage of a worse kind. He told Pacca therefore that he would try to give it the least harmful expression he could find by saying what he was not able to do, and explaining that what the Holy See could do pertained to the Holy Father to decide. His mood at the moment can be readily understood from his exclamation to Pacca: "Dio mi aiuterà; non sò consolarmi altrimenti."[22]

The second matter would probably prove less grave. Consalvi related to Pacca that a certain Signor Bonelli, a merchant in jewels and long a resident of London, had met the cardinal secretary and told him he was a person of influence in the Brit-

[20] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 159.
[21] *Ibid.,* 160.
[22] *Ibid.*

ish capital, having an acquaintance with the Prince Regent and a number of important lords. He spoke to Consalvi of how he had tried to be made the director general of museums but was told in London there was no such office. Then he said that a group of noble gentlemen, including Castlereagh's brother and the Prince Regent's private secretary, had informed him that the regent, in order to reward him for his services, had destined him as agent of the pope in London under whatsoever title the Holy Father should wish to give him. Consalvi was puzzled at the fellow's story, and yet, as he told Pacca, Bonelli gave him a lot of detailed information on the affair which, " io non avrei dovuto dubitarne." Nonetheless the cardinal was not taken in, for he stated he was suspicious by reason of the fact that Castlereagh had never mentioned a word about this Bonelli person and seemed ignorant of the incident. Consalvi cautioned Pacca that his reason for giving him details of the case was that Bonelli said he was soon going to Rome. Therefore if he presented himself Pacca was to be on his guard. It will do no harm to put him off with the reply that, " Sua Santità non ha ancora avuto nessuna notizia officiale di questa designazione della di lui persona." [23]

By the first week in July, 1814 the scene of the chief diplomatic conferences was again shifting to Paris whence it would move on before the summer was out to the Austrian capital for the opening of the congress. Consalvi, always in the rear guard of the main army, prepared to leave London following his final conference with Castlereagh on July 4. He departed for Paris on July 7, but not before summarizing for the intelligence of the Roman government the principal aspects of his London visit. Knowing the deep affection and regard he had for Pope Pius VII, one can believe Consalvi sincere when he told Pacca that whatever he had been able to accomplish on his mission to London was owed not to himself but to the pope, because of the high esteem in which Pius was held in the British capital.[24] How-

[23] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 162.

[24] *Ibid.,* 159. Consalvi to Pacca, July 5, 1814, from London.

ever, the laying of the groundwork for the restoration of the Papal States with the allied governments was surely his own work and a less skillful hand might have easily lost the advantage which he possessed in the universal sympathy for the Holy Father. One can therefore readily agree with the judgment that the relations of the courts of London and Rome at this time were those approximating a "vera amicizia, della quale il card. Consalvi fu come l'anima." [25] Viewing those negotiations with the British government from the vantage point of Paris six weeks later, and having just received an official communication from Castlereagh on the slave trade, Consalvi felt enthusiastic to the point of allowing his customary restraint to break down in a true Latin flourish that the British mission, "sarà certamente una di quelle tante cose, che renderanno per tutto il tempo a venire sempre più glorioso il Pontificato di Sua Beatitudine." [26]

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[25] "Pio VII (1800–1823), I giorni e le glorie di Roma," unsigned article in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 396. This article appears in three sections: 289–303; 395–409; 498–505.

[26] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 165. Consalvi to Pacca, Aug. 17, 1814, from Paris. Life in London in the early summer of 1814 was expensive, and the influx of foreign celebrities had sent prices higher still. Consalvi took a small house of six suites of rooms, two for himself, two for Monsignor Mazio and his secretary, Evangelisti, and two for the three servants. He paid sixteen or seventeen guineas a week for it. His carriage cost one and a half guineas a day, and then there were five francs to the coachman and ten francs to a guide. Consalvi's despatch of June 26 to Pacca complained of the high cost of living, but added that he practiced the greatest economy and incurred no expenses which were not absolutely necessary. *Ibid.,* 168. Consalvi to Pacca, June 26, 1814, from London. John Lingard related an amusing story about Consalvi in one of his letters to Miss Hannah Joyce, the adopted daughter of a Unitarian minister friend of Lingard's. He said that while in London, Consalvi was one day "stepping from his door to his carriage in black silk with scarlet stockings, when a man in the street cried, "Who the —— is that?" "Oh," replied another, "that's the chaplain of the Cossacks." Martin Haile and Edwin Bonney, *Life and Letters of John Lingard, 1771–1851,* 295.

CHAPTER III

CONSALVI AT THE CONGRESS

DURING the interval of six weeks between Consalvi's arrival in Paris on July 10 and his departure for Vienna on August 20, the cardinal busied himself with conferences, his correspondence with the Roman government, and preparation of his plan of action for the congress. He left Paris in time to be on hand for the preliminary negotiations, arriving in the capital of the Austrian empire on September 2, 1814. This was to be the scene of the cardinal secretary's field of operations until the day of Waterloo, for it happened he left Vienna for Rome on the day the allied armies administered the final defeat to Bonaparte, June 18, 1815.

Few statesmen of the Church have faced such heavy odds as Consalvi did in that autumn of 1814, and few have come off as generally successful in obtaining the main objectives. His principal aim was the recovery of *all* papal territories held by the Holy See previous to the revolutionary upheaval. But due to the fact that Austrian and Neapolitan troops were in occupation of large sections of the papal dominions in Italy and the French firmly entrenched in Avignon and the Venaissin since September, 1791, the cardinal's position was neither enviable nor too hopeful. Moreover, Talleyrand, who received the duchy of Benevento from Bonaparte in 1806, was now willing to barter it for an increase of Bourbon strength in the south of the peninsula. However, he counted on the good will of his friend, Viscount Castlereagh, who was coming to Vienna as the head of the British delegation, and he might also hope to capitalize upon his London contacts with Metternich, Alexander I, and Frederick William of Prussia. That he had calculated correctly on British support was

proved before the end of the peace conference.[1] Moreover circumstances favored the cardinal's efforts to win Metternich to his point of view on the Italian question. In fact one writer on the congress calls the Austrian chancellor Consalvi's "meilleur auxiliaire."[2] However, this *volte-face* was not accomplished before Metternich had convinced himself that it would be folly to urge Murat's ambitions any further. That Consalvi was able to impress himself upon the statesmen in Vienna much more strongly

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[1] Wiseman, *Recollections of the Last Four Popes,* 112. Wiseman speaks here of the admiration and esteem which the cardinal won in Vienna, and he adds: "of none more than of the representative of England. It is said that Lord Castlereagh remarked of him that he was the master of them all in diplomatic skill." In the documents edited by M. H. Weil, *Les dessous du Congrès de Vienne,* one can get a good glimpse of the main personalities of the congress through this publication of despatches to and from the congress leaders which were intercepted by the Austrian secret police agents who made digests of them, and then submitted them to Hager, chief of the secret police. These official spies upon the Austrian empire's guests did their work with thoroughness. As a result one can glean just how intimate Consalvi must have been with the Castlereagh household from the many items on his attendance at their dinner parties, receptions, etc. The coverage of the cardinal's movements was complete enough to lead one to believe that the Austrian government felt him well worth watching.

[2] Goyau, Georges, "Consalvi au Congrès de Vienne," in *Revue de deux Mondes,* XXXV (Sept., 1906), 159. Goyau attempts a revision of previous opinion on Consalvi's chief abettors. "Les historiens, jusqu'ici, imputaient au bon vouloir de la Russie et de la Prusse le rétablissement du pape Pie VII dan ses Etats. La publication du P. Rinieri témoigne, d'une façon décisive, qu'en dépit des bourrasques qui parfois s'élevèrent entre Metternich et Consalvi, le meilleur auxiliaire du cardinal dans son difficile labeur fut le chancelier d'Autriche." *Ibid.* Metternich held a long conversation with the cardinal in which he predicted Murat's fall in Italy. Since he believed this cause lost he could afford to be expansive in his compliments to the papal secretary as he concluded their interview with the remark: "There are only two persons to whom I can speak as I have just done, you and Lord Castlereagh. You two alone can understand me." C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1815,* I, 399; Rinieri, *Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca,* 134. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Corrispondenza.*

than in London, there is little doubt.[3] Here he was in the capital of a Catholic state where he could move with more ease and in a manner befitting his rank. The result was that he played no such retiring and inconspicuous rôle in the festivities and official functions connected with the congress as he had done in London.[4] The cardinal wrote some minutes of his activities during the busy

[3] It was at the suggestion of Talleyrand that Consalvi was given first place in the committee of the congress. Cf. Giuseppe Gallavresi, "Le Prince de Talleyrand et le Cardinal Consalvi: une page peu connue de l'histoire du Congrès de Vienne," in *Revue des questions historiques,* LXXVII (Nouvelle Serie), (1905), 162. Perhaps Talleyrand thought to mollify the cardinal, for it was the French delegate who insisted at first that the papal legations might be "given" to Pius VII, not "returned," thereby ignoring the pope's right to them by previous possession. Cf. Goyau, *Op. cit.,* 154. It was not until April 2, 1815, that Talleyrand agreed to relinquish all his claims over Benevento to Consalvi. *Ibid.*

[4] The documents in Weil are filled with references to Consalvi's goings and comings. The following are illustrative. On October 8, 1814, Hager reported to Emperor Francis I a list of letters and despatches intercepted, among which he says was "une lettre de lord Castlereagh au Cardinal Consalvi (sans importance)"; on the same date, "une lettre de Cooke (Castlereagh's private secretary) au Cardinal Consalvi pour lui demander une audience." He finishes this particular communication by telling the emperor how the agent examined the papers of Castlereagh in the latter's bureau, but that it would be wise not to take any further steps "prendre connaissance" of all letters to and from Castlereagh because of the dangers involved. I, 237. On October 15, 1814, an agent's report to Hager informs the police chief that the former had been to two of Lady Castlereagh's evening receptions. He names the non-English guests among whom was Consalvi on both occasions. I, 296. November 26, Hager was informed that Consalvi was again an evening guest at Castlereagh's, I, 600; and there is a similar entry for December 26, I, 736. December 29 Freddi reports to Hager that Castlereagh has told Consalvi he must leave Vienna soon to be in London for the opening of parliament on February 9 to which he must give an account of his conduct. I, 756. On January 29, 1815, Hager learns that the representatives of Lucca, Naples, Malta, Portugal, Sweden, and Consalvi "gravitent autour de Castlereagh." II, 108. A report of May 9 states that gossip runs that Consalvi has remained too long in Vienna to suit some, citing the opinion of Lord Stewart, British ambassador to Austria, who, it is said, has been so often surprised by the early morning

months of December, 1814 and January, 1815 in which he spoke of long conversations with Castlereagh, Hardenberg, Nesselrode and others.[5]

In regard to one of the lesser questions in the business of organizing the administrative machinery of the congress, Consalvi encountered stiff opposition from Castlereagh and the British delegation. Diplomatic usage had long allowed precedence to papal nuncios and representatives of the Holy See over the ambassadors of other states. To Consalvi's claim to such precedence Castlereagh at first raised strong objections, urging that to allow such would be to act contrary to the laws of Great Britain. While the British foreign secretary paid high praise to Pius VII yet he was disinclined to yield on the point, and the cardinal, while endeavoring to preserve the Holy See's privilege, did not like to press the matter, feeling, as he said, the embarrassment of an ecclesiastic saying to laymen in that age, "I wish to have preference over you."[6] The dispute dragged on for some weeks but never became acute, and on February 9, 1815 Consalvi was

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calls of the cardinal while he was still in bed, that the ambassador had to refuse to see him in the morning. II, 545. One of the most amusing incidents recorded in the record of the Austrian secret police was the reaction of the papal nuncio, Severoli, to Consalvi's presence and conduct in the Austrian capital. On January 20, 1815, Freddi tells Hager that in a conversation with the nuncio the latter told him about a fête given by Lord Stewart concerning which Severoli added: "Je m'en suis allé de bonne heure, car ces sortes de spectacles ne conviennent nullement à un archevêque, mais le cardinal, qui n'est que diacre, resta jusqu'à deux heures après minuit et s'enivra de cette fête non moins magnifique que brilliante par le concours des divinités terrestres." *Ibid.*, II, 60–61.

[5] *Mémoires,* I, 22 ff. Consalvi relates that Castlereagh expressed himself in a confidential conversation as being very pessimistic about the future and the chance of killing the revolutionary germ. *Ibid.*, I, 23.

[6] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 195. In this despatch of Consalvi to Pacca from Vienna, January 4, 1815, the former was not optimistic about his chances to win Castlereagh. He tells Pacca he has an appointment with Castlereagh on the precedence question for the following morning, "ma non ho la minima speranza di vincerlo." *Ibid.*

able to inform Pacca that the British delegates were more favorable to allowing the papal precedence in fact, though unable to admit it in principle. They seemed ready to set it down as, "an express and positive exception" for the pope, and in the end Castlereagh said with "molta cortesia" that he would take the onus upon himself and urge its acceptance by his own government.[7] The Congress of Vienna thus gave its implied, though not explicit, consent to the formula originally framed by Talleyrand, allowing precedence to the representative of the Holy Father.[8] The action which gave this solution formal approval

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[7] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 266. Talleyrand's formula for allowing the precedence of the papal representative read: "Par égard aux principes religieux et aux puissances catholiques, les plénipotentiaires consentent à ce qu'il ne soit rien innové quant au Pape." Goyau, *Op. cit.,* 144. Metternich gave his adherence to Consalvi's request, but after Castlereagh's objection Sweden joined Britain, and Russia and Prussia, at first favorable, withdrew their support when they saw Britain's stand. *Ibid.,* 144–145. One can therefore imagine Consalvi's satisfaction when Castlereagh's objections were met.

[8] Pius VII was gratified at the outcome of the precedence dispute and made public mention of his thanks in his allocution delivered before the secret consistory of September 4, 1815. "I cannot pass over the important circumstance that nothing was changed in the ancient precedence which Our Legate had above the representatives of *all* other Princes. That precedence was granted our Legate even by those glorious Princes who do not share communion at St. Peter's altar. The recognition thus granted by those Princes was certainly not in view of Our temporal power, so weak a thing in itself, but through Our Person they rendered homage to the Dignity of the Priesthood." Joseph Müller, *Das Friedenswerk der Kirche in den letzten drei Jahrhunderten,* 282–283. The full text of the allocution is reprinted here in German, 281–284. The settlement of diplomatic precedence made at Vienna has been maintained to the present in the capitals of those governments which extend diplomatic recognition to the Holy See. This has been advanced as the principal reason why Great Britain today does not receive a papal nuncio in London, though maintaining a minister at Vatican City. Since Britain never accepted the rule in principle it is the custom for British diplomats to make a protest in the capitals to which both the Holy See and Britain are accredited, and then to accept the fact, while not conceding the principle of papal precedence. Cf. the article of Gaselee, librarian of the

came on March 19, 1815 when the Powers signed the regulation drawn up to fix the rank and precedence of the various diplomatic agents. The pertinent sentence of Article IV read: "The present Regulation shall not occasion any change respecting the Representatives of the Pope."[9] This document was then incorporated as Annex XVII to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, signed on June 9, 1815.

One of the matters which Castlereagh had much at heart at Vienna was the abolition of the international slave traffic. For years agitation had been rife in Britain looking to this end. Wilberforce had led the attack which accomplished the objective in the act passed by parliament in 1807. This naturally put England at a disadvantage with those commercial states which continued the practice. Consequently Castlereagh was anxious to win a declaration from the Powers at the congress ending the traffic in African Negroes on the part of Britain's business rivals. In an additional article to the Treaty of Paris between Great Britain and France signed on May 30, 1814, the former won the adherence of Louis XVIII's government to the promise of assistance to the British delegation at the coming congress on universal abolition, as well as the pledge of France itself to end the trade definitely within five years.[10] This was encouraging, though Castlereagh would have been happier had France consented to do the job at once. The principal obstacles to ridding the world

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British Foreign Office, cited in n. 17 of Chapter I. On the subject of precedence for the papal diplomatic representatives one can consult the seven letters on this question sent by Consalvi from Vienna between December 17, 1814, and June 25, 1815, to Cardinal Pacca in a slight brochure with a very formidable title, *Il Congresso di Vienna del 1815 e la Precedenza dei Rappresentanti pontificii nel corpo diplomatico. Relazioni del Cardinale Ercole Consalvi Segret. di Stato e Ministro Plenipotenziario del Sommo Pontefice Pio VII al Cardinale B. Pacca Camerlengo di S.R.C. Pro-Segretario di Stato.* (Roma: Tipografia Vaticana, 1899.) The editor's name is not given, though there is an introduction of some length.

[9] Hertslet, Edward (Ed.), *The Map of Europe by Treaty,* I, 63.

[10] *Ibid.,* I, 20–21.

of this unseemly business were the objections of Spain and Portugal. In an endeavor to bring these states into line with British policy and to hasten France's action, Castlereagh approached Consalvi on the question of papal support to Britain. This subject had formed part of their conversations in London. The cardinal expressed his personal approval of the move, but explained to Castlereagh that the slave Powers maintained that the trade was preferable to the constant wars between these uncivilized tribesmen in which prisoners were killed and other inhuman acts performed. To Castlereagh this type of reasoning was nothing more than hypocrisy to cover their cupidity and the "infamy of such commerce."[11] Consalvi closed the discussion by promising the British foreign secretary to refer the question to Rome, and he informed Pacca in his despatch from London on July 5 that he would therefore await "the orders of the Holy Father and of Your Eminence."[12]

A few days after his arrival in Paris, Cardinal Consalvi received a copy of a circular from Castlereagh which the latter had sent to the ministers of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, informing them of his activity to rid the world of the slave trade and also of the agreement reached with France on the matter in the Treaty of Paris. Castlereagh mentioned to the three Powers that this circular was destined to be seen by Pope Pius VII. This point impressed Consalvi who saw in it the first direct, official, and open communication between Great Britain and the Holy See in centuries.[13] Consalvi in his own name sent Castlereagh from Paris his assurances that he would back abolition of the slave trade at the congress and that "the Pope will not lose a moment after his re-establishment at Rome in exerting the influence he may possess among the Catholic nations of the Continent, to awaken them to a due sense of the enormity of continuing to carry on a trade in their fellow-creatures, and if possible to bring

[11] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 154.
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.,* 165.

about its early and complete abolition." This intelligence was conveyed to the House of Commons with Castlereagh's accompanying expression of respect for the Holy See. In Rome the acting secretary of state, Cardinal Pacca, showed himself most favorable to Castlereagh's project. Nonetheless Consalvi was not satisfied with generalizations of approval; he wished a specific statement which would make the stand of the Roman government unequivocal. Pacca then acquiesced by sending a letter to Consalvi which was intended to be seen by Castlereagh, along with copies of briefs which Pius VII was sending to France, Spain, and Portugal to the effect that they should aid in this cause.[14]

Therefore when the peace conference got under way in Vienna it was expected that the British delegation would urge a joint resolution on the Powers. In fact Pacca, writing on October 31, 1814 wondered why Castlereagh was not already engaged in the matter, and the pro-secretary told Consalvi that the question had been entrusted to Castlereagh and its success or failure depended on him. Pacca expressed his surprise that Castlereagh seemed now to show little interest in the slave traffic after having displayed so much concern during Consalvi's London visit in the ecclesiastical affairs of England![15] Apparently the Roman prelate was forgetting that the international congress had many questions facing it and its progress with any one issue was bound to be slow.

Actually Castlereagh had not forgotten the wishes of his government about the traffic in Negroes, but, if he had, a reminder from the prime minister would have recalled the question to mind. Lord Liverpool, who was no lover of things papal, was not beyond using the moral influence of the Holy See in pushing the Catholic states to favorable action in the matter. Writing Castlereagh on December 9, the prime minister said:

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[14] Webster, *Op. cit.*, I, 144; Vicomte de Richemont, "Un essai de concordat entre l'Angleterre et le Saint-Siège," in *Le Correspondant,* CCXX (Sept. 25, 1905), n. 1132.

[15] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 76–77.

> Before I close this letter I am anxious to inquire whether you have had the communication you intended with the Court of Rome in this question. I should conceive that the Pope might, without much difficulty, be induced to anathematise the trade if he found he was likely to be supported by the Powers of Europe in general, assembled at the Congress. Such a proceeding could not fail to have considerable effect in the Roman Catholic countries, and would, I am inclined to believe (together with the measure of prohibiting colonial produce from countries engaged in the trade), effect the object we all have in view at no very distant period.[16]

It was not a bad calculation on the part of Liverpool, since as it has been said, " for the Catholic Powers the support of the Papal See was even more important, however the Protestant Wilberforce might distrust such an ally." [17] As we have seen, Consalvi and the Roman government did lend their diplomatic support to Britain's position, but the declaration finally adopted on February 8, 1815 and appended to the Final Act of the Congress, while affirming on the part of the eight Powers their intention of proceeding to the abolition of the slave traffic, left the date for such to be set by each of the Powers concerned, thus delaying its execution indefinitely.[18]

That Great Britain did not attain the suppression of the unhappy traffic in slaves we learn through a letter of George Can-

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[16] *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,* IX, 471.

[17] Webster, *Op. cit.,* I, 414.

[18] Hertslet, *Op. cit.,* I, 60–61. The writer was able to find no evidence of the charge laid against Consalvi that he repeated the reproach leveled at England in the slave trade committee at Vienna on January 30, 1815, to the effect that Britain, while ardent in the condemnation of the African slave trade, " displayed culpable indifference as to the acts of violence committed against the personal liberty of Christians by the Barbary pirates." *Cambridge Modern History,* IX, 662. For the pertinent documents on the negotiations among the Powers over the slave trade, cf. Comte d'Angeberg, *Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815,* II, 273–274; 403–404; 503; 527; 571–572; 612–613; 660–673; 684–687; 697–703; 704–705; 724–727; IV, 1476–1477.

ning, successor to Castlereagh as secretary of state for foreign affairs, written on November 1, 1822 to Consalvi. Canning alludes to the illicit character of his communication in the light of the law of Queen Elizabeth still in force. He told the cardinal he felt he had sufficient reason to violate the law, since he wished to have Pius VII condemn the slave trade. Therefore, " I do not hesitate to expose myself to the pains of high treason in opening a correspondence with Your Eminence." Canning urged the Holy See to press the matter with the Powers holding colonies in the western ocean since they are " all Catholic." He contended that the traffic produced a bad effect and nourished formidable prejudices, and he questioned why the pope did not again indict it. Canning thought to flatter Consalvi by saying that a word from the pope would end it. " Il ne dépend que du chef de la chrétienté catholique de faire cesser l'existence." The foreign secretary begged the cardinal's pardon for giving this opinion so boldly, but he assured him he did it only to ease the evils in Africa, " et fortifier en même temps la cause intéressante des catholiques, sous le regne du Pontife actuel, et par l'entremise du Cardinal Consalvi." [19] Unfortunately the greed for profit overrode the promises of the states still engaged in the trade and despite the fact that the Holy See had more than once interposed its moral suasion, the slave traffic continued well into the century.

However important the question of the slave trade might appear, the student of international diplomacy in this period is compelled to recognize that the statesmen assembled in the city on the Danube, in the final analysis, gave to it only a secondary

[19] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 399. The continued existence of slavery is attested by the fact that Pope Leo XIII felt compelled to make it the subject of two letters, one to the bishops of Brazil on May 5, 1888, entitled *In Plurimis,* in *Acta Sanctae Sedis,* XX, 545 ff.; and a second, *Opus tibi* of October 27, 1888, in which he sent money for the work Cardinal Lavigerie was doing to eradicate the abuses of the slave traffic in North Africa, *Ibid.,* XXI, 195–196 (Roma: Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888).

consideration. The prime purpose of their gathering was the settlement of the political and territorial problems arising out of the quarter century of conflict and change from which Europe had just emerged. It is the business of the historian to record, as far as he is able, what actually happened, rather than to chronicle his views on what might have happened or what should have happened. In any such peace conference as that of Vienna it is the political and territorial questions, involving vital and paramount national interests, which take first place. In this respect the Congress of Vienna was no exception. The delegates of the great Powers, as well as those of the small states, were present to gain as much territory and political advantage out of the reshuffle as they possibly could.

In this game of *Realpolitik* the representative of the Holy See had no intention of allowing the interests of his government to be ignored. Cardinal Consalvi was practical enough, to say nothing of his sense of justice, to expect no enlargement of the boundaries of the Papal States as they had shaped themselves before the Revolution. That was clear from his note of June 23 to the Powers at London. But it was equally clear that he was ready to wage a persistent struggle for the restoration to his sovereign of the frontiers of 1791. As we have already seen, this subject occupied most of the cardinal's attention during his London visit, and it was destined to consume the major portion of his efforts through the nine and a half months of his stay in Vienna. Up to the opening of the Vienna meeting he had not been able to elicit much more than vague expressions of good will from the sovereigns and their ministers. His task was a formidable one, and like the good diplomatist that he was, he did not underestimate the strength of his opponents.

The factors of greatest weight in the restoration of the purely Italian territories of the Holy See were the ambition of Joachim Murat, king of Naples and brother-in-law of the fallen emperor, and the support which he received from Austria. The Powers had not themselves reached any unanimous agreement upon the

disposition to be made of Murat and his kingdom. With Murat's armies in actual possession at one time in 1814 of over half of the peninsula, the situation was extremely delicate. Through all of 1814 and the early months of 1815 a final settlement was held in suspense while the Powers drifted farther apart on issues such as those of Saxony and Poland. Therefore as far as any public espousal of a desire for the return of the papal legations to the pope was concerned, the Powers feared to go on record in an irrevocable manner lest another general war should break and Murat should side with the enemies of the state which had supported Pius VII's claims. Consequently Consalvi's patience was tried by the repeated expressions of admiration for the heroic courage of the pope, followed by inaction in the matter of rewarding that courage in any practical way.[20]

It was to be expected that the Powers would look upon the Italian question in the light of Europe in general. To the victorious allies France was the principal worry for the future, and since the boundaries of Italy touched those of France what could better insure the status quo in that area than a large and strong kingdom in northern Italy? Since the allies were generally agreed that such a barrier should be erected in the north by joining the southern and northern provinces of the Low Countries under one government, the same logic might apply to Italy. One can therefore understand Britain entertaining ideas of such a state in Italy, and not being too meticulous about just what territories it embraced, as long as France was excluded.[21] As far back as eight months before the congress opened in Vienna, Lord William Bentinck, British minister to Palermo since 1811 and now commander-in-chief of British military forces in the Mediterranean, had sent his private secretary, Mr. Graham, to sound Murat about his plans for the future. Graham was instructed to learn Murat's designs but to sign no treaty with him, for apart from the fact that Lord Bentinck had no authorization

[20] Goyau, *Op. cit.*, 139–140.

[21] De Richemont, *Op. cit.*, 1118–1119.

to conclude such a treaty, he heartily detested the Neapolitan ruler. Graham learned through Campochiaro, the minister of police, that Murat had the idea of unifying Italy and rendering it free and independent. Campochiaro was careful to inform Graham that there would be no contesting of English influence in Italy, and that Murat would turn over his fleet to England, and thus with England aiding by sea Murat would conquer Italy and make it a united kingdom. This information was communicated to Lord Bentinck from Naples by his secretary in a despatch of January 7, 1814.[22] Bentinck's own conduct in the case was very questionable. That he had ambitions for himself in Italy, there is little doubt. One writer has said of him, " the outrageously incredible is nothing less on this occasion than the truth. To annex Sicily to England and rule the island himself as Viceroy is precisely what Lord William Bentinck was aiming at." [23] Moreover, Bentinck's attitude towards the Holy See was likewise highly equivocal, for on December 3, 1813 he had written the crown prince of Sicily proposing that England buy that island and that the prince could compensate himself with the Papal States, since " England could have no objection to his taking them." [24]

Within the same week in which Graham's action transpired in Naples, Prince Metternich concluded a treaty of alliance and friendship with Murat on January 11 which left the papal legations in Austria's possession and the marches under the sovereignty of Murat.[25] Under the circumstances, it is little wonder that Consalvi's mood was not a happy one when he took stock of the forces pitted against him. However, approval of the Metternich-Murat pact was not unanimous, for Talleyrand, in

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[22] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 53–54.

[23] " The Story of Murat and Bentinck," by Walter Frewen Lord in *The Nineteenth Century,* XLIV (Oct., 1898), 634.

[24] Lord, *Op. cit.,* 635.

[25] For the text of the treaty and the secret articles appended, cf. d'Angleberg, *Op. cit.,* I, 83–87.

support of Bourbon family interests and in opposition to the Bonapartes, " was pressing for the return of the Duchies to the Queen of Etruria as well as the Legations to the Pope, thus leaving Marie Louise without a crown." [26] Nonetheless the weight that would ultimately tip the scales for or against the territorial interest of the Holy See would be registered not by defeated France but by the allied governments. Among these governments Great Britain stood in top rank. What hope had Consalvi of moving England into line for total restoration of the papal territories? If one were to judge solely by the negotiations of the early days of 1814, it was a slight one. On January 22 Castlereagh, fresh from his approval, with only slight modifications, of the Metternich-Murat treaty, informed Bentinck of Austria's negotiations with the Neapolitan ruler and told the British minister to cease hostilities against him.[27] Castlereagh was careful, however, to inform Metternich on January 27 that he felt it necessary to make the Austrian chancellor aware of the fact that he regarded it as a necessity first " to confer with the Court of Palermo on this proposed arrangement in favour of his Sicilian Majesty, before any discussion can be entered upon for terminating the war at present subsisting between his Britannic Majesty and the existing government of Naples." [28] The British minister to Palermo, a man described as possessing " unmeasured ambition, masterful character and ultra-Whig views," [29] was so overcome by his hatred of Murat

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[26] Webster, *Op. cit.*, I, 402.

[27] *Correspondence, Despatches and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh,* IX, 184–185, ed. by his brother, Charles W. Vane, Marquess of Londonderry. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh.*

[28] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* IX, 196–197. Castlereagh to Metternich, Jan. 27, 1814.

[29] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1789–1919,* I, 455. For further detail of Lord Bentinck's Italian policies cf. " Lord William Bentinck and Murat," by R. M. Johnston in *English Historical Review,* XIX (Apr., 1904), 263–280. This article is by way of an answer to M. Weil's

that it was only with reluctance that he had anything at all to do with the man. In reply to instructions received early in January he had written Castlereagh that " this Treaty is a sad violation of all public and private principle." [30] The British foreign secretary was intent upon proceeding cautiously. In a letter of February 4, 1814 from Châtillon, Castlereagh confessed to Bentinck that, " in proportion as Murat's support became less indispensable, one's repugnance to the arrangement in his favour has increased." But in a second despatch the same day he informed Bentinck that the general allied cause in Italy forbade a break and therefore they must go along with him for the time being.[31] All through the spring of 1814 a lively exchange of correspondence ensued between Viscount Castlereagh and other officials and the British representative in Italy. Bentinck held stubbornly to the stand he had taken in a letter to Lord Aberdeen on January 22 that " Murat and Metternich are two swindlers of the same stripe," while Castlereagh, confessing as he did in a letter to Bentinck on February 21, that " the British Government never liked the measure; but being taken, they are perfectly ready to act up to the spirit of the Austrian Treaty and to acknowledge Murat . . ." and therefore Bentinck must fall

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Le Prince Eugène et Murat, published in 1902, in which Weil drew severe strictures on Bentinck's behavior and general competence. Johnston makes a defense of Bentinck as a person of ability and one not given to the disobedience of his government with which he was widely charged. He bases his refutation of Weil on documents not seen by the latter and on what he regards as downright errors of judgment and fact.

[30] Lord, *Op. cit.,* 627.

[31] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* IX, 234–237. Johnston has said in defense of Castlereagh's position: " Castlereagh, to whose fine judgment and diplomatic skill at this critical period history has done scant justice, wisely decided that the only course now open was to make the best of a bad bargain. He did not approve of the Austro-Neapolitan treaty, yet the vital object was the concentration of all available military forces against Napoleon. He therefore decided to subordinate the question of Naples, and . . . to offer an armistice, though not a treaty of peace." *Op. cit.,* 273.

into line with official British policy.[32] It was with reluctance that Bentinck finally consented to an armistice with Murat on February 3, but he continued his opposition to him, and Austria was sufficiently worried for its Italian envoy, Count Mier, to write Metternich on March 20 that unless Tuscany were yielded to Bentinck the latter would raise a revolt in the provinces and proclaim Ferdinand king in Naples.[33]

Lord Bentinck meanwhile was doing all he could to block Murat's success. On March 30 the British minister was given an audience of Pope Pius VII at Modena where the pontiff had made a stop on his journey to Rome following the liberation from Fontainebleau. He counseled the pope to have nothing to do with Murat's schemes, encouraging him to assume his traditional policy, and exceeded his authority by stating that if the pope wished he would place soldiers and money at his disposal to

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[32] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* IX, 286. Bentinck continued to protest Castlereagh's policy, *Ibid.,* IX, 400–401; and Castlereagh persisted in trying to moderate his difficult subordinate, IX, 409–410; 427–436. On March 30 from Dijon the foreign secretary insisted Bentinck must regulate "your conduct towards Marshal Murat upon principles of cordiality and confidence," and in a group of five despatches sent from Dijon under date of April 3 he scolds Bentinck again and again for not associating himself with the forces of Britain's ally, Austria, in Italy. Johnston maintained that Bentinck's conduct was not in violation of official instructions from London, but opposed to the instructions sent to him from Vienna by Lord Aberdeen, British ambassador there. Aberdeen, according to Johnston, was altogether too young and inexperienced for his job, and that having fallen under the spell of Metternich, he followed the latter's leads in Italian matters, even when they were not the same as those assumed by his own government at London.

[33] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 61. It is Johnston's belief that Murat's major blunder came earlier in the game, when he failed in late 1813 to associate himself with Great Britain as well as Austria. "He should either have negotiated with the British cabinet in the first place or have made the vital condition of his treaty with Austria that that power should obtain the recognition by Great Britain of his tenure of the throne of Naples." *Op. cit.,* 267.

fight Murat.[34] On April 1 Bentinck's associate, Sir Robert Wilson, who had lately arrived in Italy, held a stormy conference with Murat in Bologna where he called on the latter to declare himself once and for all and to cease his deception. He informed Murat that he should "above everything else restore without any interfering delay the Sovereign Pontiff to his See," and went on to describe how the treatment accorded Pius VII had aroused the concern of men all over the world.[35]

While these promises of British support from Bentinck and Wilson might be very gratifying to the papal government, yet Lord Bentinck was a reckless and impetuous person and there was real danger that the Holy See would be misled into taking him too seriously.[36] Despite the official attitude of his government, Bentinck continued his campaign against Murat. He took Genoa on April 18 and when Murat tendered his sword, Bentinck sent it to the Prince Regent as a curiosity. The following day, April 19, he wrote Castlereagh, telling him he was sorry the foreign secretary did not agree with him, but that if he knew as much about Murat as he did he was certain Castlereagh would approve his conduct.[37] His enthusiasm grew with his success, and soon he was promising the Genoese things the allies did not intend them to have. The upshot was that Castlereagh

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[34] Webster, *Op. cit.*, I, 259. When Bentinck learned Pius VII was in a state of financial embarrassment he gave him 4,000 crowns from the secret service funds, having learned "that he never would consent to receive anything from Bonaparte, and that his wardrobe literally consisted of four shirts only."

[35] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 85–87.

[36] Rinieri himself shares the enthusiasm for Bentinck as a supporter of the Holy See, mentioning the distinguished men who at this time were working in the pope's behalf and stating, "e più di tutti il già conosciuto generalissimo dell'esercito inglese in Italia, lord William Bentinck." *Ibid.*, 313. Moreover he quotes Severoli, the nuncio in Vienna, in a despatch of August 6, 1814, as referring to Bentinck as "impegnatissimo per la S. Sede." *Ibid.*, n. 3.

[37] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, IX, 476–477.

finally recalled Lord Bentinck on the pretext of a leave of absence in the middle of that year.[38]

The uncertainty of the entire European situation in the spring of 1814 made each Power reluctant to commit itself to definite action in behalf of the papal government. If the treaty that had been signed between Metternich and Murat on January 11 were to stand, then the interest of the Holy See would indeed be menaced, for that document had accorded Austrian approval not only of Murat's keeping his throne at Naples, but also of his extending his frontier northward to Ancona which would mean a territorial loss to the Roman government. Only to Article IV of this treaty had Viscount Castlereagh put forth mild objections, to save something for the legitimate Ferdinand of Bourbon, but otherwise he gave his assent to the agreement. A clear indication of how little sincerity could be attributed to the action of the Powers in respect to the papal sovereignty was given as early as August, 1813 when the London government instructed Lord Aberdeen in Vienna that Britain could not abandon the claims of King Ferdinand to his throne at Naples, but that "provision of a 'liberal establishment' for Murat in central Italy by way of compensation could be entertained."[39] If there was to be any territorial compensation for Murat in central Italy it would most certainly be at the expense of Pius VII; and if there was much doubt about it, the mention of a "liberal establishment" would do much to remove the doubt. The two allies, Austria and Great Britain, had not yet become fully aware of Murat's character and ambition; they therefore preserved a solidarity of policy in the early months of 1814 in order to bring Murat in against Bonaparte. In fact Bentinck drew up a note on April 2 to the Duke di Gallo, Neapolitan minister for foreign affairs, in which he

[38] For further illustrations of Castlereagh's attempts to put the brakes on Bentinck, cf. the correspondence printed in Sir Archibald Alison, *Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart,* I, 533; II, 343–345, 461, and the final recall of Bentinck, II, 480.

[39] Johnston, *Op. cit.,* 269.

stated that Britain had declined her signature to the Austro-Neapolitan treaty, " merely out of consideration for the just claims of the allied Sicilian government," and the note concluded with Bentinck's personal suggestion of " recommending, not demanding, the cession of part of Tuscany to facilitate the British operations, a prompt co-operation with the Austrians, and the renunciation of all projects of political aggrandisement." [40] In all this there was no mention of the " just claims " of the pope's government. That Pius VII might be compelled to pay part of the price of winning Murat's loyalty to the allied cause did not apparently concern them too much as a settlement seriously infringing upon the justice due to the sovereign pontiff.

Following the collapse of Bonaparte's power in March, the pressure upon the allies was much less serious, and from that time—aided by Murat's equivocal conduct—his interests drew less sympathy from the sovereigns and their ministers assembled at Paris. Through the late spring Pius VII and his secretary of state worked as best they could to secure moral support for the claims of restoration for the States of the Church. The nuncios were active, as well as certain bishops, who were employed to reach the influential statesmen. The ubiquitous Sir John Hippisley bobbed up again, writing to Castlereagh from London on May 5 that he was forwarding a set of documents which included three letters addressed to him by Pope Pius VI in which that pontiff outlined his claims to Avignon and the Comtat de Venaissin. He informed Castlereagh that Dr. Macpherson, rector of the Scots College, told him that the Holy See's views on this subject remained the same. He mentioned that he was also enclosing in his letter the instructions on this head sent many years before to Cardinal Erskine, but he felt it was unnecessary to forward the papers he possessed on the Holy See's

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[40] Johnston, *Op. cit.*, 277–278. In so far as Bentinck's activities in Tuscany and Genoa in the spring and summer of 1814 are concerned, Johnston admits he acted in an arrogant and unsatisfactory manner.

claims to Corsica. Sir John was careful to tell Castlereagh that Bishop Poynter had just left for Paris where he was going to seek out the foreign secretary to discuss with him this and other subjects in which the papal government had an interest. He said he told Poynter how delicate the whole affair was, but the bishop felt he must try everything, even that which verged on the impossible, so that Rome would not think he had neglected his commission. Hippisley closed his letter to Castlereagh with the hope that all these documents would reach him in Paris before Poynter's arrival, and he concluded: "He is not aware that I have possessed your lordship of all the circumstances of the case." [41]

The persistence with which Metternich urged the Austrian claims in the Italian peninsula is well demonstrated in a protest which he transmitted to Castlereagh at Paris on May 26. In this communication the Austrian minister stated quite clearly that the secret Treaty of Prague signed on July 27, 1813 and ratified at London on August 23, made no mention in Article XII of re-establishing the temporal sovereignty of the Roman pontiff. Metternich told Castlereagh that the house of Austria had an incontestable right to that part of Italy in the capacity of the Austrian emperor being king of Rome as well as hereditary emperor and head of the Germanic body.[42] The authenticity of this secret treaty of Prague has been seriously challenged and the investigation of scholars has yielded no trace of it. Nonetheless the protest showed Metternich as late as two weeks

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[41] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 11–12.

[42] Van Duerm, *Correspondance,* 20. Van Duerm discusses the lack of authenticity of the Prague treaty, xi–xiii. Rinieri, *Il Congress,* 35–36, likewise rejects the document, saying it received no mention from writers on this subject before Luigi C. Farini's *Storia d'Italia,* I, 4, published in 1854. Rinieri declares there is no evidence of such a treaty in the archives of either country. Webster in his *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1815,* published in 1931, a work of high authority for the diplomacy of this period, does not mention it.

before the arrival of the allied courts in London trying to swing Castlereagh to an encroachment upon the papal dominions. Danger to Pius VII's territories in the north arose from another quarter the same summer. The Count d'Aglié, Sardinian minister to London, approached Castlereagh in August for approval of a project for a united kingdom of all northern Italy under Victor Emanuel I. Castlereagh rebuffed the minister in short order and told him his sovereign's policy and system of government were embarrassing to the London government. The British foreign secretary told the count that Victor Emanuel I would do well to imitate the wisdom and prudence of Louis XVIII of France.[43]

This digression from Cardinal Consalvi's conduct of papal diplomacy in these years was necessitated by the need for some understanding of the forces at work and the conflicting interests involved in the final settlements of the Italian question. Such a background is indispensable in appreciating the difficulty of Consalvi's Vienna mission and in measuring the extent of his success and failure.

While the London visit of the cardinal secretary had borne some fruit yet the question of restoration of the papal domain was far from finally assured. The action of the congress would be definitive in the matter and therefore Consalvi bent all his best efforts to accomplish his purpose during the sessions of that conference. A little over three weeks after his arrival in Vienna, he was able to report to Cardinal Pacca in Rome that he had secured a long interview with Castlereagh lasting almost two hours in which they discussed the legations question. He found Castlereagh cautious about giving a definite commitment since the British foreign secretary was a man "assai riservato per natura." Nonetheless he did go so far as to tell the cardinal that his position had not changed from that expressed to him in London, viz., "che l'Inghilterra favorirebbe il S. Padre." Con-

[43] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* xxxviii–xxxix.

salvi was gratified at the interview, for as he told Pacca it gave him a chance to survey the Holy Father's demands from every point of view with Castlereagh.[44]

As the weeks wore on and the debate intensified over so many complex problems, Consalvi's hope of British support waned from time to time. On November 16 he wrote Pacca that the return of the legations was then in jeopardy because the allies were seeking to compensate Marie Louise and the queen of Etruria at the expense of the pope. He informed the Roman prelate that the evening before he spoke to Castlereagh at the latter's house about the matter and he added, "I am certain that he wishes to favor us, but I fear that when all the eight (the eight Powers) will be at the table, they will not know what to do, (and) necessity will draw them even in spite of themselves."[45] Three weeks later on December 9, Consalvi, again writing to Pacca, reported that the Duke of Campochiaro presented a memorandum to the four Great Powers to prove Murat's rights to Naples and to his possession of the papal marches. The duke, said Consalvi, quoted the Austrian treaty with Naples of January 11, 1814 as backing up his claims. Referring to this treaty Consalvi remarked: "Lord Castlereagh promises in his own handwriting in the margin the adhesion of England on two conditions, that is, that the indefinite compensation promised in the treaty, limit itself to the increase of 400,000 inhabitants *dans les États Romains;* and that of a compensation being found for Ferdinand IV for the loss of the kingdom of Naples," though Castlereagh stood out for an eventual re-occupation of the marches by the Holy See. Alluding to Castlereagh's consent Consalvi stated that, "all here have raised their eyebrows." At the end of the same despatch the cardinal informed Pacca of another long discussion with Castlereagh which he had, so long was it in fact that he had to put off until another time the ques-

[44] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 351–352. Consalvi to Pacca, Sept. 26, 1814, from Vienna.

[45] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 102. Consalvi to Pacca, Nov. 16, 1914.

tion of English and Irish affairs. "He has shown the best dispositions in our regard without on that account promising anything according to his fashion. He listened to me for more than two hours, and I was able to say everything I wished, and certainly I left nothing out." Consalvi stated that the sad situation of the queen of Etruria was bothering everyone, compensation being sought for her by Castlereagh and the others, but they not knowing just where to find it. Concluding his despatch with a reference to Castlereagh, Consalvi stated: "Speaking in general, I can say my Lord is well disposed, but *nisi Dominus adjuverit,* we have cause to tremble. I trust in the prayers of the Holy Father." [46] One of the greatest dangers confronting the success of Consalvi's efforts was the incessant bickering and juggling of Italian interests in an attempt to compensate Bonaparte's empress, the Bourbon family, Murat or some member of the Hapsburg family. Consalvi referred to this in writing Pacca, saying that in leaving Talleyrand's house he met Castlereagh and the latter asked him if he would help him find a place for one who would not have Parma. The cardinal replied he did not know of any place, but that certainly it ought not to be found "a spalle del Papa." [47]

The acquiescence which Castlereagh had displayed in Metternich's arrangements with Murat early in the year had begun to change as the political and military situation altered. The British foreign secretary had become definitely suspicious of the schemes of the Neapolitan ruler and it must have given Lord Bentinck no end of satisfaction when he received a letter from Castlereagh written from Vienna on December 18 in which the latter requested all the data he had on Murat. He asked that he forward to him all the information he had from his own and

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[46] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 144–148. Consalvi to Pacca Dec. 9, 1814. Consalvi related that Castlereagh's adhesion to the Metternich-Murat pact had been announced in parliament at London in opposition to the foreign secretary, and that all the papers had published the story.

[47] *Ibid.,* 110. Consalvi to Pacca, Nov. 18, 1814.

the impressions of others on "the conduct of Murat under the engagements he had contracted." Castlereagh told Bentinck to seek information from any source "you can avail yourself of, without attracting attention." He wanted the information because "our relations with Sicily and Naples are likely to become a subject of important consideration both here and in England." [48] It was a request to which Bentinck, with his phobia against Murat, must have responded with zest. Despite all the warnings sent to Bentinck from his government, he continued his active intrigues in Italy with the radical element and became the subject of a number of despatches from Pacca to Consalvi during the period of the congress.[49]

While Murat's treachery was ultimately killing his cause, not only with Britain but with his chief sponsor, Metternich, Cardinal Consalvi was busy attempting to win as many of the official delegates as possible to the papal point of view. With this intention in mind he held a long conference with Lord Clancarty, one of the committee of five appointed to investigate the legations question. He informed Cardinal Pacca that he answered

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[48] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 221.

[49] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 505–507. Rinieri summarizes despatches of Pacca to Consalvi of January 21, 23, 26, 1815 in which Pacca describes Bentinck's audiences with Pius VII and two interviews with himself. Pacca related that there was much gossip in Rome about Bentinck's visit there, but that he held a good opinion of him despite the gossip. *Ibid.,* n. 1, 506. Rinieri relates that the investigations and trials of 1819–1820 of members of secret sects brought out evidence of Bentinck's being a promoter of these sects, especially the Guelfs. He is inclined to discount the ambitions and intrigues of Bentinck at the time. In the light of Bentinck's definite schemes for some sort of an Italian state to be dominated by Great Britain, the faith of Cardinal Pacca in him and the later lenient judgment of Rinieri, come within the category of misplaced confidence. Pacca at the time and Rinieri, the editor of his correspondence, were both probably influenced in their judgments of Bentinck by his anti-Murat bias. Of his violent antipathy for Murat there was no doubt, but that he supported the Holy See against Murat for other than his own selfish purposes, it would be difficult to maintain.

objections raised by Clancarty and found the British delegate in the main, " nelle migliori disposizioni *possibili* a nostro riguardo." Clancarty assured the cardinal that he would work to the end that the legations would not be touched, but that Consalvi must remember it was not possible after twenty-five years of turmoil to restore everything just as it was. Nevertheless he would do his best and the cardinal might count on his good dispositions. If in the end Consalvi found he had acted otherwise, then the cardinal would know that " la necessità non ha legge." [50] On February 11, 1815 Consalvi was able to report to Pacca that he felt fairly sure of all attitudes except England's. He quoted the Duke of Wellington as having spoken on Murat as " c'est une tâche qu'il faut laver," but the cardinal added he did not know whether this was given as the private opinion of the duke or as that of Wellington's government.[51] Two weeks later Consalvi could report real progress when he informed Pacca that Austria had decided against Murat getting the papal marches and had reached an understanding thereon with King Louis XVIII of France. What made the news even more agreeable was the fact that Metternich informed him that Castlereagh was a party to it just before the latter's departure from Vienna for London where he was going to report to parliament. Consalvi was able to tell Pacca that Castlereagh would declare to parliament that, " Murat is not recognized as King of Naples, but Ferdinand." [52] It must have come as a distinct relief to Consalvi to learn that the ambitious pretensions of Murat in Italy would no longer be supported by the allies.

The stunning news of Bonaparte's departure from Elba and his arrival in France was spreading quickly over the continent by the time that Consalvi's cheerful despatch of February 25

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[50] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 153–154. Consalvi to Pacca, Dec. 21, 1814, from Vienna.

[51] *Ibid.,* 316–317, n. 1. Consalvi to Pacca, Feb. 11, 1815, from Vienna.

[52] *Ibid.,* 297. Consalvi to Pacca, Feb. 25, 1815, from Vienna.

reached Rome. In fact Cardinal Pacca wrote Consalvi on March 20, saying Bentinck had sent a letter dated six days before informing the Roman court of the prospective meeting of the fallen emperor and the troops of Louis XVIII between Grenoble and Lyon, and Pacca expressed the hope that the king's forces might be successful: "Voglia il Cielo, che abbia un felice successo." The cardinal had not measured Marshal Ney's treachery, for the very day he penned his letter to Consalvi the ex-emperor triumphantly entered Paris.[53] With the re-appearance of Bonaparte most of the long-ranged plans for the new Europe were temporarily set aside in the face of a renewed crisis. However, no essential changes were made in the outline of the settlement for Italy as it had thus far progressed. Pacca wrote Consalvi on April 12 to tell him that two days previous Pius VII had a letter from Bentinck the contents of which made it easy to understand the scheme which Murat had for occupying the Papal States and Rome. Bentinck was therefore still on the trail of his old foe. Pacca enclosed a copy of Bentinck's letter to the pope written from Turin on April 6, wherein the British minister expressed the warmest admiration for the pope and told him a tribute was owed to him for his esteemed qualities, "which a true Englishman perhaps more than any other, should be urgent to pay in these critical circumstances."[54] Just a week before Waterloo Consalvi sent Pacca a despatch in which he spoke of his nervousness about the possibility of revolt in the Papal States. He told Pacca he would always recall the advice given to him by Wellington after he had replied to the duke's question concerning the Neapolitan spirit towards Murat, that the latter did not have the lower classes with him and was thus at a disadvantage as to numbers. To this the duke answered: *"You do not judge rightly in this; with regard to revolutions against the*

[53] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 416. Pacca to Consalvi from Rome, Mar. 20, 1815.

[54] *Ibid.,* 457–461. Pacca to Consalvi from Genoa, Apr. 12, 1815, with enclosures.

governments, you must distinguish the more numerous elements from the active element; the latter is the deciding factor." [55]

In the early spring of 1815 the strain of work at Vienna told so heavily on the uncertain health of Edward Cooke, the chief of staff of Castlereagh at the congress, that it was decided he should take a holiday in Italy. This brought one of Viscount Castlereagh's closest and most trusted advisers into intimate contact with the papal government. Writing from Rome on March 17, Cooke informed the British foreign secretary that everyone in the pope's capital was expecting the arrival of Murat's troops at any time. Cooke informed Castlereagh that Murat had written letters to Cardinal Fesch which the latter read publicly and in which Murat declared he would support Bonaparte's fortunes. In the face of imminent invasion many had begun to flee from Rome, and Cooke reported that " his Holiness has made preparations for leaving Rome when necessary." Cooke wrote that he heard Murat had said he would be neutral, and even support the allies, if Great Britain would declare for his establishment at Naples. Following this lead, Cooke sounded out the bishop of St. Malo, French ambassador to the Holy See, to determine if the Bourbons might not agree to making a deal with Murat. He found the bishop wary of committing himself, for as he told Cooke, Louis XVIII's regard for his family interests was so strong that he, St. Malo, would not venture to approach Murat without explicit instructions from his government. He added that Murat had broached the subject to him, but he informed Cooke that he remained non-committal, neither favoring nor discouraging the plan.[56]

In Cooke the British minister had a competent observer on the scene in the Papal States. On April 13 Cooke, again writing from Rome, told his chief that there was little to fear from Murat's intrigues finding a friendly reception in papal circles.

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[55] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 731–732. Consalvi to Pacca from Vienna, June 12, 1815.

[56] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 275–276.

When Murat invaded the Papal States with an army of 80,000 men, occupied Bologna and Florence and advanced on Rome, the Holy Father and his court fled to Genoa, for as Cooke stated in his letter, " the Pope and his Cardinals were naturally averse from trusting to the assurances of Murat, who, in his whole conduct, has shown himself incapable of acting without the profligate contempt of sincerity and truth." In the same despatch Castlereagh's aide told him that Murat's proclamations to rouse support for his united régime were treated in the Papal States " with ridicule," and he added: " The Romans in general are attached to their ecclesiastical government, and the few who wish a new order of things do not look up to such a regenerator as Murat." Cooke personally felt so little fear of Murat's success in the pope's dominions that he said he meant to remain on in Rome and await an answer to Castlereagh's first letter. He was in Rome for more than his health. As we shall see later, he was to use this opportunity to sound out the Roman government on the prospects for an understanding on questions affecting the English Catholics. While he was conscious of his duty, he explained to Castlereagh he had not fled with the government for another reason, namely that he felt he could do little serious business with the papal court under the circumstances. " I thought nothing could be done officially in the midst of such uncertainty." Cooke lamented to Castlereagh the harm that many unthinking English travellers in Italy were doing by lauding Murat as " one of the great men of the time," as " the best friend to England," etc. But he assured the foreign secretary that he felt certain the latter would not grow uneasy at these reports when he had time to examine all the evidence of Murat's treachery which had been forwarded to him. In the manner of a good reporter he told his superior that he tried to get from Cardinal Sommaglia " all the proofs the Court of Rome had obtained of his (Murat's) participation in Bonaparte's schemes. He said they had all been transmitted to Vienna; so I trust they have been sent to your lordship from Prince

Metternich and Cardinal Consalvi." [57] Cooke was almost as strong in his hatred of Murat as was his fellow countryman, Bentinck. Writing to Lord Stewart on April 15 from Rome, he excoriated Murat for his duplicity and told Stewart that, " by his palpable and open falsehood, he obliged the Pope to quit his dominions, by showing that his word was not to be trusted." [58] The final blow to Murat's hopes was delivered soon after Cooke's communications to Vienna. Serious Austrian resistance was offered to Murat's armies beginning on April 10 and in a little less than six weeks his cause was lost and he fled in disguise from the remnants of his armies on May 19.

While the armies of the allied Powers were gathering in the west for the final encounter with Bonaparte, the diplomatists at Vienna were hastening the end of their task. For some time before the allies renewed the war on Napoleon, both Austria and Great Britain had ceased to support Murat's cause in Italy. Thus one threat to the full restoration of papal territories was removed. The full story of the irresponsible and treacherous conduct of the king of Naples had convinced Austria of its mistake in signing a treaty with him. It remained therefore only to work out a plan for compensations to Bonaparte's Hapsburg wife, to Marie Louise of Bourbon, ex-queen of Etruria, and others. Consalvi was vigilant all through the last weeks of the congress and continued to try to save for Pope Pius VII every square inch of the papal dominions of 1791. Considering the odds against which he worked and the rival ambitions of the petty princes, to say nothing of the preponderant weight of Metternich's plans for Austrian domination of northern Italy, the cardinal came off rather well. Article CIII of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna stipulated:

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[57] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, X, 308–309.

[58] *Ibid.*, X, 311–314. A postscript to this letter would seem to indicate that Cooke and Bentinck were not working in very close co-operation. " I know not a word of Burghersh or Lord W. Bentinck."

The Marches, with Camerino, and their dependencies, as well as the Duchy of Benevento and the Principality of Ponte-Corvo, are restored to the Holy See.

The Holy See shall resume possession of the Legations of Ravenna, Bologna, and Ferrara, with the exception of that part of Ferrara which is situated on the left bank of the Po.

His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and his successors shall have the right of placing Garrisons at Ferrara and Comacchio.

The inhabitants of the countries who return under the Government of the Holy See, in consequence of the stipulations of Congress, shall enjoy the benefit of Article XVI of the Treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814.

All acquisitions made by individuals, in virtue of a title acknowledged as legal by the existing laws, are to be considered as good, and the arrangements necessary for the guarantee of the public debt and the payment of pensions, shall be settled by a particular Convention between the Courts of Rome and Vienna.[59]

The pertinent passage in the Treaty of Paris of May 30, referred to in the fourth paragraph of the Article quoted above, had to do with the guarantee given by the Powers against violation of persons or property because of previous political views or acts. It read:

The High Contracting Parties, desirous to bury in entire oblivion the dissensions which have agitated Europe, declare and promise that no Individual, of whatever rank or condition he may be, in the Countries restored and ceded by the present Treaty, shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested, in his Person or Property, under any pretext whatsoever, either on account of his conduct or political opinions, his attachment either to any of the Contracting Parties, or to any Government which has ceased to exist, or for any other reason, except for

[59] Hertslet, *Op. cit.*, I, 267–268.

> Debts contracted towards individuals, or acts posterior to the date of the present Treaty.[60]

Try as he might, Consalvi was not able to secure the entire papal dominions exactly as they had been in the year 1791. The exceptions, however, were of a minor nature. The French government refused to yield Avignon and the Venaissin, while Metternich insisted for military reasons upon annexing that part of the papal legation of Ferrara which lay on the left bank of the Po. The stationing of Austrian garrisons at Ferrara and Comacchio was directed more against the revolutionaries of central Italy than against the pope. Apart from these two small areas therefore Consalvi accomplished his purpose. Nonetheless he felt the exceptions were worth a protest, and therefore on June 14, 1815, just four days before he left the Austrian capital, he issued his second formal attack upon the Powers' giving recognition to the Treaty of Tolentino. He was at pains to show again that in the opinion of the best international lawyers such as Grotius and Wattel, a treaty was annulled if violated by one of its parties. Consalvi felt there was every evidence of France having violated the Tolentino treaty with Pius VI. Moreover he quoted Wattel to the effect that the annihilation of a state left all treaties of that state ceasing to exist at the moment the state's existence came to an end. Consequently when the Papal States had been rendered temporarily extinct by Bonaparte, any validity the treaty signed by the papal government might have had, was likewise wiped out.[61]

Although the Powers received the cardinal's protest courteously, and it was formally recorded as an annex to the Final Act of the Congress with copies of the same ordered deposited in the archives of the conference,[62] yet nothing practical re-

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[60] Hertslet, *Op. cit.*, I, 12.

[61] Van Duerm, *Correspondance*, 71–79, prints the text of the official protest of Consalvi to the Powers.

[62] Hertslet, *Op. cit.*, I, 283–285.

sulted from Consalvi's action. The papal secretary of state could not have hoped that his protest would cause the Powers to change their arrangements at this eleventh hour of the long and tedious sessions in Vienna. The protest was rather in the nature of a statement of principle on the issue involved, and it put the pope and his minister on record for any future eventualities in the matter. The most cogent evidence for the fact that it was but a formal protest resting on principle, is revealed by the circumstance that the years that followed witnessed no serious effort put forth on the part of the Holy See to retrieve Avignon, the Venaissin, and the strip of Ferrara.[63] But because of these infringements upon the just territorial claims of the Roman government, Cardinal Consalvi refused to affix his signature to the Final Act which was signed on June 9.

That the pope and his secretary of state were disappointed at the failure to secure full restoration is undoubtedly true, for otherwise one must regard Consalvi's strong protest of June 14 as a gesture lacking sincerity. However, the success of the cardinal's efforts was so near to complete satisfaction that the attitude of the Holy See pursued shortly after the congress was in no way intransigent. In fact in less than three months Pope Pius VII delivered on September 4 his consistorial allocution to the college of cardinals in which he reasserted his claims to Avignon, taken without compensation, and his objection to Article CIII of the Vienna treaty which permitted Austria to retain part of the Ferrarese legation, but at the same time he expressed his gratification at the return of most of the papal dominions. This same allocution carried a protest against the secularization of ecclesiastical rights in Great Britain, but it also expressed a very pointed compliment to the British government

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[63] Some effort was made later by Consalvi to secure compensation from France for the seizure of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. Cf. Ph. Sagnac, "Le concordat de 1817. Etude sur les rapports de l'église et de l'état sous la restauration," in *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine,* VII (Dec., 1905–Jan., 1906), 189–210; 269–288.

for the assistance rendered to the Holy See in the restoration of the major portion of his domain. "Nor can we forego the pleasure of mentioning the Prince-Regent of England who so vigorously supported us at the Congress." [64] This graceful allusion to Britain's part in the transactions was not lost upon the London government, and Hugh Clifford, a prominent English Catholic, writing to Consalvi on October 25, 1815 informed the cardinal of the fine effect which the benevolent words of the pope had produced in England, that they had been published in all the papers, and had served to contribute much to the good opinion and veneration which grew daily for the person of the Holy Father.[65]

Cardinal Consalvi's Vienna mission was finished. His last week was spent in putting the finishing touches to his protest notes, bidding good-bye to friends, making preparations for his departure for home, and finally sending ahead the despatches which would cover for his government the closing episodes of the congress. In that vein he wrote Cardinal Pacca on June 12: "The Lord has finally crowned with a happy success the efforts of the Holy Father . . . Eight provinces and one small principality . . . return under the domain of the Holy See . . . The pontificate of Pius VII . . . will count among its glories that of having recovered these provinces at a time when everything seemed to render the thing impossible." [66]

One of the less important matters of business which forced itself upon the attention of Viscount Castlereagh and Cardinal Consalvi during the period of the congress, was the peregrinations of Caroline, Princess of Wales, the estranged wife of George, the Prince Regent of Great Britain. Their marriage had been an unhappy one from the outset and the prince came to have

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[64] Müller, *Op. cit.*, 283. Allocution of Sept. 4, 1815, of Pius VII to the Sacred College.

[65] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 397.

[66] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 704–705. Consalvi to Pacca June 12, 1815, from Vienna.

such a vehement dislike of Caroline and was at so little pains to conceal it, that it had become one of the outstanding subjects of international gossip. Consalvi, as we have seen, was bent on keeping the good will of Britain. It must therefore have been rather disconcerting to him to learn in a letter from Cardinal Pacca on October 31, 1814 that the princess was reported to be headed for the Eternal City from Florence. Pacca told Consalvi preparations had been made to receive her such as " si usano a questa Sovrana come consorte del Principe Reggente l'Inghilterra." Pacca knew the case and told Consalvi that the reason he was writing him all the details was because he felt he might find them valuable in dealing with Viscount Castlereagh.[67] Consalvi made Caroline one of the chief subjects of his letter of November 16 to Pacca and informed him that while the Prince Regent was in open rupture with his wife, the people of England were for her; therefore the papal government had better follow " un certo camminar nel mezzo," as the grand duke of Tuscany had done. Over two weeks before Consalvi wrote this letter Caroline had arrived in Rome, requested and received an audience of Pius VII which went off well, and showed enough signs of a short visit for Pacca to inform Consalvi in a despatch of November 5 of details on her Italian itinerary and the rumors of her approaching departure from Rome.[68]

Consalvi's keen sense of the fitness of things prompted him to inform Castlereagh fully of what was happening in Rome between the government and the princess. On November 18 he wrote Pacca telling him of an interview which he had with Castlereagh in which he was so pressed for time that he could not urge the case of the legations, but he did discuss the presence of the princess in the papal capital. He read Castlereagh parts of two despatches describing Caroline being received by the pope with honors due to her rank and he added to the British secretary

[67] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza*, 79. Pacca to Consalvi, Oct. 31, 1814, from Rome.

[68] *Ibid.*, 92–93. Pacca to Consalvi, Nov. 3 and 5, 1814; Consalvi to Pacca from Vienna, Nov. 16, 1814.

that he was free, if he wished, to transmit the contents of these despatches to his government by the courier then ready to leave. Castlereagh replied that he approved the showing of honors to the princess in keeping with her rank, but in his communications to London he would mention nothing of the incident, knowing the regent's aversion for his wife.[69]

While the visit of the Princess of Wales to Rome itself was a relatively brief one, she did not leave Italy. On March 20 Pacca mentioned her in his despatch to Consalvi as still being at Civita Vecchia, and that she had confided to the monsignor, who was papal delegate there, certain information concerning the movements of Murat. From what she disclosed Pacca told Consalvi it had become clear that Murat had been foretold of Bonaparte's escape from Elba and was in concert with him.[70] The late spring found the princess at Genoa whence Pope Pius VII had fled when Murat's troops invaded the Papal States. From that city Pacca wrote to Rivarola on May 6, 1815 and stated that the day before His Holiness had returned the visit of the Princess of Wales at her villa a short distance out of Genoa. He was at pains to describe how graciously Caroline received the pope, kissing his foot as he was leaving, saying flattering things about the inconveniences to which he had been put in visiting her, etc.[71]

Caroline remained on in Italy for a number of years and was naturally an object of interest to English visitors to the peninsula. In March, 1819 James Brougham wrote a letter to his brother Henry from Villa Vittoria which constitutes almost a report on Caroline's activities, and Brougham remarked, "The Pope and G(C)onsalvi are extremely civil to her, and on the best of terms."[72] One would gather an opposite impression of

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[69] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 128. Consalvi to Pacca, Nov. 18, 1814, from Vienna.

[70] *Ibid.,* 416. Pacca to Consalvi, Mar. 20, 1815, from Rome.

[71] *Ibid.,* 665. Pacca to Rivarola, May 6, 1815, from Genoa.

[72] *Letters of George IV,* II, 274. Brougham felt Rome would be the best

Consalvi's "civility" towards the princess from his own letter to Castlereagh written a little over a year later. In a postscript to this letter of April 7, 1820 the cardinal informed Castlereagh that Caroline, who was back in Rome then, was leaving in two days for Pesaro and that she had said after a short stay there she would return to England. Consalvi concluded: "Elle est *furieuse* contre moi, parceque je suis resté ferme dans le parti pris, et je n'ai voulu céder même a de menaces de vengeance." [73] This would hardly sound as though the cardinal's conduct towards her had drawn Caroline's good humor in Consalvi's regard. In an interview which Consalvi had the following winter with Lord Colchester who was visiting in Rome, he mentioned to his guest that he had a letter from the lady who now bore the title of queen of England, and she had informed His Eminence of "the triumphant issue of her trial in the House of Lords," and she had asked the cardinal to lay this information before the pope. To this Colchester in his diary added: "To which he (Consalvi) had sent for answer that he had received Her Majesty's letter, which he had laid before his Holiness." [74]

What might easily have become a serious source of embarrassment to the Roman court thus passed without injury to the relations with the British government. Castlereagh approved the conduct of the pope and the cardinal secretary towards the princess, and they did not extend their courtesies to the point of rousing the ire of George IV.

It is interesting to note the opinions expressed of Consalvi by

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place for Caroline to remain, for he told his brother: "This is certainly the best country for her to be in. She is on such good terms with ye Pope and Cardinals—and there being no Minister at Rome, she is not insulted there as at Vienna and other Courts. Her plan is to take a house in Rome and go there occasionally when she can afford it, and I *fear* she will go there for the Holy Week." *Ibid.*, II, 280.

[73] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* XII, 239.

[74] *Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester,* edited by his son, Lord Colchester, III, 185–186, entry under date of Dec. 11, 1820. Hereafter this work will be referred to as: *Diary of Lord Colchester.*

some of those who had occasion to observe him and work with him during the long months in the Austrian capital. Even before the opening of the Congress the counselor of the Bavarian legation in Vienna, a man by the name of Steinlein, felt the selection of Cardinal Consalvi by Pope Pius VII to represent the papacy at the congress, indicated that the Roman government intended to assume more than a passive rôle in the negotiations. Writing to King Maximilian of Bavaria on July 30, 1814 from Vienna he said: "Le choix des ministres, le Cardinal Consalvi et Mgr. Della Genga, prouve qu'il se prépare à en parler avec cette fermeté qui lui a fait cette grande réputation dans les derniers temps." [75] The Austrian secret police received a report sent to Hager dated November 6, 1814 that Count Rechberg, minister of Bavaria at the congress, was so enthusiastic about Consalvi he thought that the cardinal would be acclaimed pope by the conclave when Pius VII's approaching death should occur.[76] A certain Freddi, one of Hager's police agents, sent in a report on September 26 to Hager in which he transmitted information received from Perez de Castro, the Spanish chargé d'affaires, who in turn had it from Labrador, the Spanish ambassador, concerning the sojourn and "l'adroite conduite" which the cardinal had pursued at Paris.[77] On the same day a report of the agent Schmidt gave to Hager a list of the sovereigns and prominent statesmen attending the congress in Vienna with the sums of credit opened to them by the chief bankers of the city. Consalvi was among the few who enjoyed "crédit illimité." [78] We have already referred to the flattering remark of Prince Metternich when he told the cardinal, "there are only two persons to whom I can speak as I have just done, you and Lord Castlereagh. You two alone can understand me." [79]

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[75] Weil, *Op. cit.*, I, 38.
[76] *Ibid.*, I, 481.
[77] *Ibid.*, I, 119.
[78] *Ibid.*, I, 136.
[79] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza*, 134.

Nevertheless the estimates of Cardinal Consalvi were not all of a favorable tone. A report to Hager early in the negotiations gave the information on September 22 that the public in general occupied itself but little with Consalvi, and it added that the minister of the papacy had not—so they say in the great world—very much influence in Vienna, "et il s'en aperçoit."[80] Some two months later Hager was informed by a report of December 27 that there was considerable grumbling against Consalvi's ultramontane principles and "ses finesses et ruses par trop italiennes."[81] A recent authority is generous with his praise of the cardinal's tact and restraint in dealing with the British government in the London negotiations, and careful to point out the cordiality existing between Castlereagh and the papal secretary of state, but at Vienna he felt that Consalvi was "too apt to bargain for small favours."[82]

One of the interesting and little known episodes in connection with the Congress was the prospective visit of the Holy Father to Vienna while the conference was still in session. In the despatch to Cardinal Pacca from Severoli, the papal nuncio in Vienna, the latter informed the pro-secretary of state that the Paris papers had in early August stated that Pope Pius was thinking of going to the congress. He told Pacca that the *Wiener-Zeitung* repeated the story in its issue of August 27. Severoli expressed the view that the Masons would oppose the proposed journey, but he believed the people would welcome it. On October 13 Cardinal Pacca sent word to Consalvi that the pope, he believed, would be willing to undertake the trip if it were a question of advancing thereby the spiritual and temporal welfare of the Church. However, Pacca personally felt it would be

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[80] Weil, *Op. cit.*, I, 101.

[81] *Ibid.*, I, 743.

[82] Webster, *Op. cit.*, I, 317–318, 335. For a recent discussion of Consalvi's general activity at Vienna cf. Adolfo Omodeo, "Cattolicismo e civiltà moderna nel secolo xix, III: Il cardinale Consalvi al Congresso di Vienna," in *La Critica*, XXXVI (1938), 426–440; XXXVII (1939), 24–36.

better if the Holy Father remained in Rome for two reasons, viz., the expenses involved in such a journey and the serious doubt that the pope could accomplish any good by his presence in Vienna. The cautious Consalvi could envision little gain resulting from such a venture, and in a reply dated November 1 he told Pacca that the trip could be made only with great risk of exciting the Powers over return of confiscated ecclesiastical goods. As a faithful servant of the Holy See he did not insist the pope should not come, but he advised against it.[83] The counsel of Consalvi and Pacca prevailed. The pope himself was not anxious for the arduous effort of the long journey at his advanced age and thus the proposal was allowed to drop.

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[83] "Le deliberazioni del Congresso di Vienna, Settembre 1814—Giugno 1815," in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* I (1915), 401–404, discusses the episode briefly in an unsigned article. For the correspondence between the two cardinals over the matter cf. Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 35, 47.

CHAPTER IV

THE CARDINAL AND THE CATHOLIC QUESTION

THE general success attained by Cardinal Consalvi in his efforts to regain the territories of the Papal States for Pius VII, in which he enjoyed the counsel and support of Viscount Castlereagh, was but one of the major problems which formed the subject of the intimate conversations of the two statesmen during the early days of the Restoration period. The other was that of the status of the Catholic subjects of the British crown in England and Ireland. This domestic issue had plagued the governments in London and Dublin all through the latter half of the eighteenth century. The governing element was reluctant to touch the old penal laws against the Catholics, and it was not until 1759, when Consalvi was but a child of two, that an opening wedge came in the form of the implicit permission for Catholics to recruit in the army, surely a doubtful consolation at best. This is not the place to discuss in detail what came to be called in Anglo-Irish politics the Catholic Question.[1] We are here concerned solely with the immediate background of the problem as it affected the government's conduct towards the Catholics when Cardinal Consalvi was forced to make it a matter of official concern in his discussions with Castlereagh.

The cardinal was fortunate in the man with whom this delicate question had to be broached. Viscount Castlereagh had been known for many years to favor some sort of relief for the Catholics. In fact in his office as chief secretary for Ireland, to which he had been appointed by Pitt, he had espoused their cause.

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[1] An able discussion of the whole matter can be found in Philip Hughes, *The Catholic Question, 1688–1829.*

He drew up a memoir for Pitt which embodied all the more cogent arguments for emancipation of the Catholics. Speaking of this document, Cornwallis, lord lieutenant of Ireland, in a letter of December 1, 1800 to the Duke of Portland, said that it "entirely comprises every material argument that can, in my opinion, be urged on that important measure."[2] Castlereagh sustained the Catholic position in the face of official British opposition.[3] Nonetheless the gains made in the measure of 1791, and those that had preceded it, were mostly negative in removing restrictions on various minor activities. Little had yet been done to enable the Catholics to engage in active participation in their own government, and they were clamoring for the right to take their place in parliament and to share in the making of laws. A circumstance that added to the difficulty facing Consalvi was the fact that the case for the Catholics had not become an official policy of the British cabinet either one way or the other. When Prime Minister Perceval was assassinated on May 11, 1812 the Protestant ascendancy suffered a real blow, for with the formation of the new government under the leadership of the Duke of Liverpool, it was decided that members of the cabinet were free to support or oppose the case for Catholic emancipation. The result was an aid in one way, for, as Hughes points out, "the

[2] *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis,* III, 306. Edited with notes by Charles Ross, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1859). Castlereagh even took up the knotty question of salaries for the clergy of Ireland, admitting they were much too low. He worked out a system for government pay to them, all the way from the bishops to the lower clergy. Of course he advocated this not only because he felt they had need of greater incomes, but because he would look "to an arrangement of tithes, and to a provision for the Catholic and Dissenting clergy; calculated in its regulations to bring them under the influence of the State, as essentially necessary to mitigate, if it cannot extinguish, faction." *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* IV, 400. The memoir on this subject, entitled "On the Expediency of Making Further Concessions to the Catholics," is printed in Castlereagh's *Correspondence,* IV, 392–400.

[3] Richemont, Vicomte de, "Un essai de concordat entre l'Angleterre et le Saint-Siège," in *Le Correspondant,* CCXXI (Oct. 10, 1905), 63.

old attitude of official hostility to Emancipation was abandoned. Henceforth for fifteen years Government was neutral and Emancipation an open question for its members." [4] The change was reflected at once in the adoption of a motion by Canning on June 22, 1812 by one hundred and twenty-nine votes in Commons which called for consideration of the Catholic claims in the next parliament, whereas eight weeks before a similar proposal had been defeated by a majority of eighty-five votes. However, this failure of the cabinet to adopt a definite joint policy made action difficult, and the years of Liverpool's government witnessed the strange phenomenon of Castlereagh and Canning, who entered the government in 1816, regularly voting for the emancipation measure in the Commons while their colleagues, Liverpool and Wellington, the latter taking cabinet rank in 1817, voting against it consistently in the Lords.[5] Such a regrettable division of opinion within the cabinet naturally helped to side-track the Catholics from their ultimate goal. This aspect of the problem, however, was not lost upon Consalvi, for he reported it to Rome in a communication of June 18, 1814 about a week after his arrival in London.[6]

One of the chief worries of the British government in regard to the emancipation of the Catholics was that participation on their part in the public life of the United Kingdom might result in embarrassing circumstances through their loyalty to the Holy See. One way of lessening the danger on that score was for the government to insist that it have some voice in naming the bishops; the thought was that such a measure would help to insure keeping the Catholics in line through their religious superiors. In the debates of the spring of 1808 the proposal had been openly made by Grattan and Ponsonby, former lord chancellor of

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[4] Hughes, *Op. cit.*, 267.

[5] Temperley, Harold W. V., "George Canning, the Catholics and the Holy See," in *Dublin Review,* CXCIII (July–Sept., 1933), 6.

[6] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 169, Consalvi to Pacca, June 18, 1814, from London.

Ireland, that the king be given at least a negative voice in the naming of the bishops.[7] Once in the open, this issue was the cause of long and bitter controversy. But it did not die, and again in January, 1810, Grey and Grenville returned to the demand that the veto of the crown be accepted in some form or other.[8]

Throughout the last years of the eighteenth and the first years of the nineteenth century various safeguards had been advanced to insure the issue by the government of a grant of political liberties to the Catholics. Among these were the proposal to give state pay to the clergy and in that way control them; a second was to demand an oath of allegiance from all Catholics, and four oaths were actually framed, which only led to the deepening of hatred on both sides. Another move was that of having the government interest itself in the training of the Catholic clergy so as to insure their being loyal to the crown. The opening of Maynooth College in 1795 through state aid, was intended to serve this end of creating a docile clergy. Each measure in its turn stirred new bitterness and left the problem farther than ever from solution. However, efforts continued to be made to reach a settlement. Grattan and Ponsonby returned to the assault in the spring of 1813, and the actual drafting of a new Catholic relief bill was given over to Charles Butler, a distinguished Catholic lawyer. It was discussed through the first weeks of May, and on May 13 it passed its second reading in the Commons by a majority of forty-two. At this point George Canning came forth with what he felt were necessary additional securities against the danger. Following discussions with the framers of the bill and with Lord Castlereagh, Canning announced his demands for a royal veto on the selection of bishops and the right of *exsequatur* or censorship of all bulls, dispensations, and other papal documents entering the British Isles.

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[7] Hughes, *Op. cit.*, 261.
[8] *Ibid.*, 265.

These two safeguards were to be exercised by two commissions, one each for Great Britain and Ireland.

At once a new storm broke over the amended bill of 1813 and John Milner, titular bishop of Castabala and vicar apostolic of the Midland district (1803–1826), hurried to London to throw his weight against acceptance of the measure. The consequence of this move was that the Catholics in England at once were torn between two quarreling camps, the one following Milner against the bill, the other following the committee of the Catholic Board, a group of nearly sixty composed of the vicars apostolic, the Catholic peers, and about thirty others who supported it. The Irish bishops in conference at Dublin the last week in May had denounced the bill, as had Daniel O'Connell, in spite of the efforts of Lord William Plunkett to persuade O'Connell to the contrary. To O'Connell's mind the provision concerning the veto was nothing short of a sell-out to the British government of purely Catholic interests.

Despite the fact that the bill was killed when an amendment suggested by Abbott, speaker of the Commons, carrying the provision to delete the clause opening parliamentary seats to Catholics, was carried by four votes, yet the probability of its coming up again was very real. With the prospect of further controversy in mind William Poynter, titular bishop of Halia and vicar apostolic of the London district (1812–1827), felt it the part of prudence to consult Rome and secure the opinion of the Holy See on the bill which had just gone down to defeat. At the time, of course, England was considered missionary territory by Rome and therefore the business concerning that country fell to the jurisdiction of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide. Bishop Poynter entrusted his inquiry to Dr. Macpherson, the rector of the Scots College in Rome. The appeal reached Rome at a time when the government of the Church was in a state of sad confusion. The Holy Father was still the captive of Napoleon at Fontainebleau, the cardinals scattered, and the congregations in charge of secondary officials who were attempting to carry on

amid the most serious handicaps. It happened that the Propaganda office at the moment was in the care of an old prelate as vice-prefect, Monsignor Quarantotti. The enterprising rector of the Scots College proceeded to use the circumstances to secure the answer he wanted from Quarantotti and his aides, and in so doing his action was anything but straightforward and honest. He prevailed on the vice-prefect to rebuke Milner for his extreme language and Troy, archbishop of Dublin, for interfering in a dispute between the English bishops. Moreover he insisted before the special commission of canonists and theologians which Monsignor Quarantotti had with difficulty assembled to hear the evidence, that all possible speed was necessary and that the vice-prefect's competence in the case was clear. He urged further that the greatest care should be taken not to offend the British by disapproving the bill of 1813, since the London government was in a position to be of so much help at the time to the temporal interests of the Holy See. In thus presenting the case, Macpherson did not hesitate to give Quarantotti and his commission a doctored version of Poynter's correspondence.

Considering the fact that the most competent and learned ecclesiastics had fled Rome, that the Propaganda was in the hands of a superannuated prelate and a secondary group of canon lawyers, and that the procedure of the English bishop's agent was guilty of misrepresentation of Poynter's full mind in the matter, it is not surprising that in its meeting of February 15, 1814 the special commission gave its counsel in two rescripts both of which Quarantotti signed. These two documents consisted of, first, an approval of the bill of 1813 which " Catholics may with satisfaction and gratitude, accept and embrace . . . in the form in which your lordship has laid it before us;" and secondly, an appeal for Poynter to use his influence with the crown to have the Holy Father regain his lost territories, since the British and papal governments had shared friendly relations during the war against the French.[9]

[9] In an appendix to his volume, *Il Congresso di Vienna e la Santa Sede,*

The contents of the rescript became known in England in late April. The English bishops, with, of course, the exception of Milner, were ready to accept its contents, but only Archbishop

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1813–15, 673–676, Rinieri reprints the original of the Quarantotti rescript addressed to Poynter, on the bill of 1813, dated Rome, February 16, 1814. The document is likewise printed in English translation in the appendix to the work of Charles Butler, *Historical Memoirs of the English, Irish, and Scottish Catholics,* IV, 518–523. Quarantotti stated, "It is our ardent wish, that this act, so much desired, may at length be passed." Furthermore he spoke as one having authority to decide on the bill's acceptability. "We, who, in the absence of the supreme pastor, are placed over the concerns of the sacred missions; and, for that purpose, are invested with full pontifical powers, have thought it incumbent on us to remove every ambiguity and obstacle which might impede so desirable a conciliation." Quarantotti had only one slight reservation, viz., that the English clergy's freedom to carry out the divine mandate of Christ to instruct in the true faith be in no way interfered with by that part of the oath which touched upon their disturbing the Protestant government or church. "If . . . it be the meaning of the legislators—that the ministers of the Catholic church are not forbidden to preach, instruct, and give counsel, but are only prohibited from disturbing the protestant church or government by violence and arms, or evil artifices of whatever kind, this is just, and entirely consonant to our principles." Moreover he raised no serious objection to the veto, and concluded after explaining his understanding of the English demand, "by the authority vested in us, we allow that those who are designed for a bishopric or deanery, and are proposed by the clergy, be admitted or rejected by the king, according to the proposed bill." On the third count, namely the exercise of the *exsequatur* on papal correspondence, Quarantotti felt no vital principle was here violated, for he wrote that, "Since communication with the head of the church in spiritual and ecclesiastical concerns is not prohibited, but the inspection of the committee regards only matters of civil policy, this likewise ought to be acquiesced in." He concluded by exhorting the British Catholics to unity of action and that, "If the bill shall be passed, by which the Catholics shall be freed from the penal restrictions by which they are now held, they not only embrace it with entire satisfaction . . . , but express the strongest sentiments of gratitude to his Majesty and his most august council, for so great a benefit; and by their conduct, prove themselves worthy of it." It is little wonder that this rescript stirred a spirit of resistance among many of the Catholics of the British Isles, particularly the Irish.

Troy of Dublin among the Irish hierarchy would extend any recognition to the Quarantotti settlement. The Catholic Board thanked Pius VII for it in a letter of June 17, 1814, in which they said:

> . . . we have lately with unspeakable joy received from these venerable men, to whom your holiness had in your absence delegated the power of inquiring into, and sanctioning by their approbation, the conduct of the faithful, a rescript, in which, after a full examination, they declare their decided sense of the blamelessness of our conduct, and use the most cordial expressions of respect and thanks to the legislators of our country . . .[10]

But the Irish hierarchy in a meeting at Maynooth voted their opinion that the rescript was not binding, and they delegated Milner and Murray, the vicar general of Dublin, to proceed to the Holy See with a direct appeal to the pope for a nullification of the judgment of the vice-prefect of Propaganda. By this time the empire of Napoleon had crashed, Pius VII had been liberated, and he was on his way to Rome to repossess his capital from which he had been absent for almost five years. Under the circumstances there were many problems more vital to Pius VII at the moment than an immediate decision on the Quarantotti case. Actually his residence in Rome was to be of short duration, for Bonaparte escaped from Elba in February, 1815 and Murat's forces threatened the papal capital. Once more the Holy Father had to flee, this time to Genoa. It was from Genoa that his decision was given on the controverted rescript. In the meantime there had been some interesting developments of the affair elsewhere.

In January, 1814 Cardinal Consalvi had been banished from the Holy Father's presence at Fontainebleau by Napoleon's orders to Béziers in Languedoc. Nevertheless his exile was brief, for

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[10] Butler, *Op. cit.*, IV, 527. The entire letter is printed as an appendix by Butler, IV, 523–529.

within three months came Bonaparte's first abdication and the cardinal was free to rejoin Pius VII which he did at Cesena, proceeding in the pope's entourage to Foligno and thence to Rome. It was on May 19, 1814 that Pius VII reappointed Consalvi as his secretary of state. Thus it was into his hands that there came the delicate problem of Catholic liberties in the British Isles which were tearing asunder the unity of clergy and laity alike. Naturally Consalvi, when he found time to turn his attention to the problem, was compelled to look upon it from the larger view of the general relations between Britain and the Holy See which at that moment, when the latter was eager to secure the approbation of Europe for the return of its stolen properties, needed to be maintained on a friendly footing.

It was late in the year 1811 that Castlereagh had entered the Perceval cabinet as successor to Wellesley in the office of secretary of state for foreign affairs and leader of the Commons, a post he was to hold until the day of his suicide in August, 1822. As already indicated, Castlereagh was no enemy to the principle of emancipation for the Catholics. However, he had witnessed the failure of Pitt's endeavor of 1801, of Grenville in 1807, of Canning in 1808 and 1812, and the fiasco over the bill of 1813. As leader of the ministry in the Commons it was a matter of direct concern to him. In an effort to approach the question with as full an understanding as possible, he had sent a communication to the resident ministers of Great Britain abroad, asking them to furnish the foreign office with as complete data as they had on the status of the Catholic religion in the country to which they were accredited. It read:

> My Lord (Sir). The same Mail, which delivers to you this letter, will be the bearer of a letter to you from Sir John Hippisley on the subject of the exact state of the Roman Catholic Religion in the country in which you are resident. I am to request that you will have the goodness to pay every possible attention to the points upon which Sir John Hippisley asks you for informa-

> tion, and that you will transmit to him, through this office, the result of your inquiries. I am, etc.[11]

With the memory of the many previous failures Castlereagh felt there might be some chance of success if there was also a preliminary direct negotiation with the Holy See on the question.[12] In a conversation early in 1814 with Monsignor Testaferrata, papal nuncio to Lucerne, the British foreign secretary had expressed his willingness to do all he could to secure the papal dominions to Pius VII, recalling the offer of the British ships in the Mediterranean to put themselves at the pope's disposal during the Napoleonic persecution. He took occasion to inform the nuncio of the British government's complaints against the Irish, and he made it clear that all Britain demanded was an oath of loyalty from the Catholics such as they gave to Protestant princes in other countries, and he added, " Il Papa potrà tutto acquietare." [13]

It is small wonder that Castlereagh, gravely preoccupied at the moment with the multitude of serious problems consequent upon the fall of Bonaparte, and gratuitously supplied with conflicting evidence on the Catholic reaction to the Quarantotti rescript, should have been sincerely puzzled over what step to take next. On February 1, 1814 he was informed by letter from Sir Henry Parnell that the latter had just returned the week previous from Dublin where he had heard a rumor from one of the best informed Catholics that the Irish bishops were entertaining an idea of a concordat with the pope to obtain a " strictly domestic nomination " of bishops, and that they were willing to propose such a measure to Pius VII. Parnell informed Castlereagh that this story had sent him to Archbishop Troy of Dublin who told him that such a plan was indeed under consideration. Parnell

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[11] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 149, n. 2. Rinieri gives no more specific date for this letter than the year 1813.

[12] Richemont, *Op. cit.,* 66.

[13] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 29–30.

then proposed to the archbishop that he write him (Parnell) a letter which would be intended for Castlereagh's perusal, but that otherwise these negotiations should be kept in strict secrecy. Parnell advanced the opinion to Castlereagh that he felt "quite confident" if such a negotiation could be set on foot with the pope over a domestic nomination that "there will be no difficulty in securing his consent to the proposed Concordat." He went on to assure the foreign secretary that if the plan carried, the Catholic Board would also approve it, for the archbishop of Dublin had reassured him about the board's "implicit obedience to the Bishops."[14] The archbishop's letter to Parnell, dated January 28, 1814, which the latter enclosed for Castlereagh's guidance, stated that since he was asked about the question of a possible arrangement envisioning a strictly domestic nomination of bishops in Ireland to avoid the government's sensitiveness over foreign influence being exercised, he would reply as follows. The pope as supreme pastor of the Church could not surrender or be deprived of his right of granting canonical institution of bishops. However, the nomination of bishops in Ireland was—and long had been—de facto "purely domestic" in so far as the Holy See did not grant canonical institution to any but native Irish previously named, recommended, and postulated by the provincial bishops of Ireland or the clergy of the vacant diocese. The archbishop continued that in Catholic countries such nominations were regulated by concordats in which the Catholic sovereigns "as patrons and protectors of the Catholic Church are privileged, under specific conditions, to nominate to Bishoprics." But this privilege could not be extended to non-Catholic sovereign states. Nonetheless Troy felt:

> a Concordat, or agreement between his Majesty of the United Kingdom and his Holiness might be entered into, whereby the present mode of nominating, recommending, and postulating, to Bishoprics in Ireland by the

[14] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* IX, 225–226.

> respective Catholic provincial Bishops or clergy of the vacant diocese would be confirmed, and the nomination rendered in all future times completely domestic, precluding the possibility of any foreign influence.[15]

Archbishop Troy expressed his opinion to Parnell in an optimistic vein when he said, "I am confident the Pope would sanction such a Concordat, or agreement; nor will the Catholic Bishops of Ireland refuse their co-operation to effect it." He concluded by suggesting that the foreign secretary should see the pope's representative at the approaching peace conference about the matter.[16]

The ubiquitous Sir John Hippisley, whom we have met before as the unofficial English representative in the Papal States in the last decade of the eighteenth century, was also at hand with counsel for Castlereagh. Under date of April 29 he wrote the latter from London that his friend, Dr. Macpherson of the Scots College, had returned from Rome "yesterday" and had brought with him letters from Quarantotti and Poynter, the result of a "solemn deliberation held with *three other prelates* in the confidence of Pius VII., though M. Quarantotti *himself* possesses by delegation from the Pope, *all the powers* excepting that of the actual appointment of Bishops."[17] Hippisley informed the foreign secretary that the four prelates had decided that Rome "shall yield to the provisions of the King's Government respecting *both* those points, but object to the extent of the oath constructively, as interdicting the liberty of argument in preaching, teaching, etc., which might be construed to extend injuriously to the Established religion—such a construction say they, must be put on their ordinary practice, when inculcating what they consider as doctrinal truths." Apparently Sir John was much impressed with the Quarantotti rescript and the success of Mac-

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[15] *Ibid.*, IX, 227–228.
[16] *Ibid.*, IX, 226–228.
[17] *Ibid.*, IX, 526.

pherson's efforts at Rome. However, his favorable impression was not very long-lived, for within a week the rumblings of the storm began to reach him. On May 3 he wrote Castlereagh again, this time to tell him he believed Ireland would refuse the project of Quarantotti; he quoted an article from the Dublin *Evening Post,* a copy of which reached him the day previous, in which that paper hoped against any attempt at a veto of the selection of bishops by the government, and stated that if the pope should try it then they thought the Catholics "will *not be bound even by him.* We allude to the possibility (*a very remote and contingent* one, we are free to admit) by which he may be induced to *recommend even a qualified veto.*" Hippisley added that as far back as 1809 a certain Mr. Keogh published a tract on the veto in which he said it would be "much easier to *pull down a Pope than set up a veto.*" [18]

The same week found Alexander Marsden proffering information from Dublin to Viscount Castlereagh on the Irish reaction to the Quarantotti document. This correspondent enclosed a newspaper from Dublin showing strong opposition to the rescript,

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[18] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 5–8. (Presumably the italics are Hippisley's own.) Hippisley informed Castlereagh that he was writing just then because Poynter intended to leave for Paris the following day in order to present to the foreign secretary "Quarantotti's hopes." In the same letter Hippisley stated Bishop Poynter had written Lord Bathurst regarding British support for regaining of the papal territories; he said he saw Bathurst and explained the circumstances of a similar papal plea made through him in 1795 to Lord Glenville. He mentioned that before he left Rome in 1795 Pius VI had written him several letters on the subject of his claims to Avignon, the Comtat de Venaissin, and later to Corsica. He said he told the pope not to urge claims to "les Antibes." However, the pope did so, and he, Hippisley, was authorized by Grenville at the time to give Pius VI the answer which in substance was the same as that given Poynter by Bathurst, viz., that the papacy should appoint a minister or agent for the congress called to right the different claims of the sovereigns who had engaged in or suffered from the war, and that at such a congress, "the English Plenipotentiaries would be happy to pay every attention to the just claims that might be brought forward by the See of Rome."

but as if it were to render Castlereagh's confusion complete, Marsden concluded:

> I have had conversation with a very respectable Roman Catholic Bishop, on the subject of the rescript from Rome. He thinks it will be favourably received by the clergy here. They consider that, in resisting the terms proposed, they did their duty as trustees for the Pope, and not having the means of communicating with him. He has no doubt but that the sentiments contained in the letter have the approbation of the Pope, and are of full authority. He stated the component parts of the committee as nearly the only part that he thought would require a more favourable arrangement for the Catholics. In respect to the construction of the oath, as it regarded preaching, etc., he saw no difficulty. He regretted, as others of the Bishops and Catholics have done to me, the total want of communication with their body and the Irish Government.[19]

Charles Butler, one of the principal authors of the rejected Catholic relief bill of 1813, addressed Castlereagh from Lincoln's Inn on May 13 and enclosed copies of two Irish newspapers which reprinted the Quarantotti rescript in the original and in translation and added, as Butler says, " the grossest abuse of the letter and its writer." Butler warned Castlereagh against Bishop Milner since, " Dr. Milner, the worst enemy of the Roman Catholic cause in the present times, is now either at Paris, or on his way thence to Rome." He suggested that the Holy See be guarded against Milner's " misrepresentations," and the Irish bishops recommended to acquiesce in the Quarantotti settlement. Butler apologizes for addressing Castlereagh directly in the matter, but added he was prompted to do so by " the very kind interest taken by your lordship in the concerns of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects." [20]

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[19] *Ibid.*, X, 13–14.

[20] *Ibid.*, X, 31. The hatred between Butler and Bishop John Milner was well illustrated by the latter's publication of *Supplementary Memoirs of*

That Castlereagh was unfortunate in his informers we shall have ample reason to see from the ensuing developments of the Catholic question as it unfolded in the negotiations between the foreign secretary and Cardinal Consalvi. In the first place, Sir Henry Parnell, writing so optimistically of the prospects for Irish acceptance of the Quarantotti settlement on the authority of "one of the best informed Catholics" in Dublin, and his subsequent interview with Archbishop Troy, either did not know or withheld the information from Castlereagh, that Troy was not representative of the mind of the Irish hierarchy on the matter of accepting the concessions outlined in the document from the vice-prefect of Propaganda. Archbishop Troy, a Dominican, had for some years been rector of San Clemente in Rome until his appointment to Dublin in 1789. He belonged to what was then called the Cisalpine persuasion, a designation better known as the ultramontanes later in the century. Naturally the British minister would be impressed with the letter from the archbishop of Dublin, but Castlereagh was not made aware of the fact that the archbishop stood alone among the Irish bishops in accepting this point of view. As for Hippisley, he was old at the game and had been posing as knowing the mind of the Roman court now for twenty years without representing it with any notable success to the government in London. Sir John, who has been referred to as "that never idle meddler in matters ecclesiastical," [21] had his own version of how the question might be settled, and he was not adverse to playing the rôle of Father Joseph to Castlereagh in this problem of which he was supposed to know so much and the foreign secretary relatively little. Hippisley for all his prolix correspondence did not know the mind of the Holy See in the spring of 1814. He was at best a doubtful informer. Finally Marsden's "very respectable Roman Catholic Bishop"

English Catholics addressed to Charles Butler, Esq. (London: Keating and Brown, 1820), which was in the nature of an extended rebuttal of Butler's *Historical Memoirs.*

[21] Hughes, *Op. cit.*, 254.

of his Dublin letter was probably Troy again which did not add much to Castlereagh's authentic data. As was mentioned above, one can readily understand the confusion over the whole affair in the mind of the busy foreign secretary at a time when he was absent in Paris in the midst of the preliminary conferences to settle the peace of Europe.

Such then was the situation in England when Cardinal Consalvi received his commission from Pope Pius VII to proceed to Paris to meet the plenipotentiaries of the allied Powers, a circumstance which was to lead to the cardinal's visit to London, and the opening of the direct negotiations between Consalvi and Castlereagh over the political status of His Majesty's Catholic subjects.

The visit of nearly four weeks which Cardinal Consalvi made to the British capital early in the summer of 1814 was, as we have seen in connection with the negotiations on the return of the Papal States, a period of intense activity for the Holy Father's secretary of state. Important as the territorial rectification appeared to the Holy See, it was not unaware or unmindful of the sad plight in which its spiritual subjects in the British Isles found themselves. As mentioned previously, if there had been any disposition on the part of the cardinal to emphasize the purely temporal interests of the Holy See to the exclusion of the rights and liberties of the British Catholics,—and there is no evidence of such a disposition on his part—he would have been reminded of his two-fold duty in the letter addressed to him by Pius VII from Rome on June 21, 1814. While charging his secretary to convey to the Prince Regent the testimony of his affectionate and sincere gratitude for the cordiality of Consalvi's reception in England and urging him to seek the support of the British government for the return of the papal dominions, he was at pains to let Consalvi know how much an equitable settlement of the Catholic question meant to him. The pope added:

> You are not only charged with a great diplomatic mission, you are also the representative of the Vicar

> of Christ. We beg of you to have the heart of a father on behalf of those poor English and Irish Catholics who for centuries and from generation to generation have suffered in their goods, their liberty, and their rights in order to remain true to the ancient faith of their ancestors. You are the first Cardinal since the reign of Elizabeth to obtain permission to tread the soil of Great Britain. This privilege has its obligations, and we must not shut our ears to the cry of the persecuted. There is no need to tell you what the Church expects of you. We know you well enough to feel sure that you will take advantage, with moderation and prudence, of the exceptional situation in which you are placed. Let nothing be done precipitately, but, at the same time, nothing must be forgotten which could mitigate the lot of the Catholics.[22]

In the face of this strong advice Consalvi had to steel himself for what would be a nerve-wracking diplomatic duel with British officialdom, tinged as it was with considerable anti-papal bias and steeped in nearly three centuries of legal tradition against the Catholic claims.

The prudence and tact maintained by Consalvi during his London visit have already been referred to, such as his remaining away from official functions, infrequent appearances in public, etc. However, his time was profitably spent during the first three weeks in interviewing representative people and getting first-hand acquaintance with the milieu in which his work was to be done. During these same days the time of the British foreign secretary was taken up with the entertainment and business attendant upon the visit of the allied sovereigns to the British capital. But the first days of July saw their departure, and then Castlereagh could give more of his attention to the cardinal and his problems.

In the long interview which Consalvi had with Castlereagh on July 4 the subject of the Catholic demands was discussed, and

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[22] *Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi,* I, 82–83.

that on the initiative of the foreign secretary himself.[23] Castlereagh informed Consalvi that he thought the two courts should get together privately on the matters in which they were mutually interested, and for that purpose he would have no difficulty in receiving "privately" someone with power to treat from the Holy See. This negotiation would have to be private until such time as the laws of England would permit it to become public. Castlereagh suggested that perhaps a chargé d'affaires of the Holy See might be admitted in London and a British subject with like standing sent to Rome, neither of these to show a public character for the time being. He added, however, that the man named to London should be a person of genuine ability, wisdom, and prudence. Consalvi, though very agreeably shocked at the proposal of Castlereagh, stated to Cardinal Pacca in his despatch of the following day that, "I did not hesitate a moment to tell him that there could be certainly nothing more gratifying to the Holy See than to be able to have such an English minister in Rome." The cardinal was quite content that the status of the representatives should remain private until the anti-Catholic laws were repealed. When he asked Castlereagh if such a minister sent to London should be a layman or an ecclesiastic, he received a stronger shock in being told he should be an ecclesiastic. Consalvi confessed to Pacca that he heard this reply "con mio stupore." He added that he could not believe such an emissary might hold in London the title of nuncio, but perhaps he might be given the title of ambassador as Monsignor Arezzo had at St. Petersburg.[24]

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[23] Richemont, Vicomte de, "Un essai de concordat entre l'Angleterre et le Saint-Siège," in *Le Correspondant,* CCXX (Sept. 25, 1905), 1128.

[24] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 157–158. Consalvi to Pacca from London, July 5, 1814. This was not the first time that such a direct diplomatic approach had been mentioned in British circles. Hippisley had expressed the idea to Lord Hobart as early as February, 1799. Edmund Burke had stated there should be direct negotiations with Rome in 1793 and he had declared that, "If we refuse them, the bigotry will be from our side and not from that

During the course of their discussion Castlereagh told the cardinal that he did not wish to ask anything of the English Catholics which their principles would not permit, but that the government would not yield on the emancipation question without some guarantee of the good behavior of the Catholics and the harmless character of their Roman correspondence. Castlereagh's demands were not new to the representative of the Holy See. They consisted of the three-fold guarantee of: (a) an oath of fidelity to be taken by the Catholics to uphold the British constitution; (b) a voice in the naming of the bishops; and (c) a royal *exsequatur* on the correspondence of the Holy See with the Catholic Church in the British Isles. In urging these claims the foreign secretary brought forth the Quarantotti rescript as an indication of the approval of Rome to these conditions given four and a half months previously. The mention of the Quarantotti episode embarrassed Consalvi and, as he confided to the pro-secretary of state in his despatch of July 5, he tried to steer away from that unhappy subject and keep his replies to Castlereagh on the ground of general principles. In regard to the oath and the voice in selecting the bishops, Consalvi informed Castlereagh that he believed some amicable arrangement could be effected on those two points, though he was careful not to specify just how that might be done. But as for the royal *exequatur* on papal correpondence, he was quick to inform Castlereagh that it was "una cosa impossibile," for even though it had been allowed to certain Catholic governments it was only tolerated and in no way approved by the Holy See. In so far as precedents in the veto question were concerned—Castlereagh's aides having covered the case of other non-Catholic governments pretty well for him—he was able to state to Consalvi that he had in mind some such voice as that permitted to the rulers of Prussia and Russia by the Holy See in the selection of bishops for those two non-Catholic lands.

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of His Holiness." Richemont, "Un essai de concordat entre l'Angleterre et le Saint-Siège," in *Le Correspondant,* CCXXI (Oct. 10, 1905), 70–71.

Consalvi had to agree that this was a precedent which might be followed in the case of Great Britain. Not wishing to commit himself definitely when in truth he was not in possession of the Holy Father's intentions on these specific points, Consalvi sought a way out by telling Castlereagh that he felt it would be to the best interests of all concerned for the pope to address himself directly in a letter to the bishops of England, Scotland, and Ireland wherein he could make known his sentiments on the three demands which the British government saw fit to urge before it would again consider Catholic emancipation. This might be done either directly by the Holy Father or through the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith—either channel, thought Consalvi, being much better than to attempt a discussion of the Quarantotti letter.[25]

Shortly before the cardinal's departure from London for Paris, Viscount Castlereagh asked Consalvi for a note that would cover papal procedure in such cases as the proposed agreement with Rome. He requested this explanation of the customs of the Holy See for his own guidance so that he would know what might be obtained and what could not be yielded. Since some months before, as we have seen, he secured information from the other capitals as to how they handled the nomination of bishops and exercised control over writings from Rome, it was perfectly natural and legitimate to ask such information of the Holy See. However, the inquiry placed Consalvi in a very embarrassing position. The cardinal could not deny the request was a fair one, and yet he feared that he might overstep his authority and be guilty of a blunder. He urged his own lack of power to outline such procedure, his ignorance of the intentions of Pius VII, his imminent departure from London, etc. But Castlereagh was not to be put off, so the cardinal made a promise that he would try to send such a document to the foreign secretary after he reached Paris. Nearly six weeks later he was still worrying

[25] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 155–157. Consalvi to Pacca from London, July 5, 1814.

over the incident, and he confessed to Pacca in a letter from Paris that he knew he ought to comply with Castlereagh's request and write him the Holy See's views which he promised he would do before leaving London, but, as he expressed it, "piuttosto che commettere qualche grosso sbaglio, sotto il pretesto di altre occupazioni ho mancato alla mia promessa." [26] Consalvi said he knew some would put down his failure to act as due to *finesse italienne,* but regardless of that he felt he had done right; he added, "God is my witness that I did not know how to act otherwise, and I have chosen what was the lesser evil." [27]

With this confession made to Cardinal Pacca on August 17, he wrote Castlereagh the next day asking to be excused from not fulfilling his promise to send the data, and stating that it was not possible, under the circumstances, for him to do so. Knowing the cardinal for a man of high moral character, we can appreciate that he felt he was doing the right thing in withholding the information demanded by Castlereagh; but on the other hand one cannot fail to understand how Castlereagh might feel himself shabbily dealt with in the case. It is one of the few incidents in these negotiations where the cardinal might, with some justice, be accused of an excess of *finesse italienne,* to employ his own phrase. That it caused no serious rupture in the relations between the two statesmen is evident from the resumption of their cordial interchange of views when they met again at Vienna.

The friendly interview of the cardinal with the Prince Regent held on July 1, 1814 had led to a bit of good-natured banter about

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[26] *Ibid.,* 164. Consalvi to Pacca from Paris, Aug. 17, 1814.

[27] *Ibid.* In a despatch of July 25, 1814, of Consalvi to Pacca from Paris, the former tells the pro-secretary of state that there were two incidents of his English negotiations which left the most pleasing impressions with him, viz., the sending to him (Consalvi) by the foreign secretary of a despatch "nelle formole più ufficiali" (he was referring to the note to the Powers on the slave traffic); and the second was what Consalvi expressed as the nobility of thought and the beneficent heart of a generous nation which, in the matter of slavery, set an example to all Europe. *Ibid.,* 165–166.

the Catholic question, but to no definite results or commitment on the part of the ruler that he would throw his support to the cause of Catholic relief. In fact his contacts with the future George IV on this question netted the cardinal, in the final analysis, slender consolation. In a communication to Pius VII written from London on June 21, he told the pope:

> The Prince Regent and the highest of the aristocracy have made a point of overwhelming me with every kind of consideration and most friendly and respectful kindness. And in our familiar intercourse, when, gently and in season, I turn the conversation on to certain religious questions which are very delicate to touch on, the Prince Regent, putting his hand to my mouth as though telling me to be silent, but in reality encouraging me to speak, would call out with an inimitable accent of affected fear, and, in effect, of good humor, "Hush, hush, Cardinal tempter; when listening to you I seem to see Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth following me as avenging spirits." [28]

This joviality on the subject of emancipation for the Catholics doubtless gave encouragement to Consalvi. But it did not deliver their political demands. Moreover, as is well known, the years ahead were to take some of the edge from George's kindly disposition towards the question. The Fitzherbert chapter of the prince's life was nearing its end with his approach to the reality of power, and with his Catholic morganatic wife passing from her dominant position, George became increasingly conservative on yielding rights to his Catholic subjects. Within a decade his mind would be quite closed on the matter, and the final victory in 1829 would be accomplished only after a severe struggle to get the king to yield. By that time Consalvi would have been removed by death for some years.

Consalvi had reached the end of his London visit. To date

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[28] J. J. Dwyer, "Cardinal Consalvi," in *Dublin Review*, CLXXVI (Apr.–June, 1925), 226; Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 131–138.

not much more had been accomplished for the cause of relief to the Catholics than to canvass the ground of possibilities. One of the ugliest aspects of the problem arose from the hatred which the Irish bore to the English government. Pretty nearly every move made during the previous quarter of a century had led to a series of mutual recriminations, misrepresentations, and embittered feeling between the two nations, and even between the two Catholic groups. The Irish hierarchy and their people, not unnaturally, were suspicious of every proposal put forth by the government at Whitehall, and they did not scruple to fret that government when it was in the closing episodes of the great contest against Bonaparte. Consalvi had probed as well as he could the depths of this feeling in Ireland and he appreciated the gulf that separated these two embattled sections of the fold of the Church.

In this connection Consalvi attempted to give Cardinal Pacca a true picture of the situation. In his despatch to the pro-secretary from Paris under date of August 17 he told him he had forwarded a set of documents entitled *Hybernia Catholica* which was handed to him by an Englishman of Irish sympathies.[29] He informed Pacca that he was not able to vouch for the integrity of the writer or the truth of the facts stated therein which were mostly criticisms of the English Catholics and abuse of the British government. Consequently Consalvi cautioned Pacca not to place too much credence in the documents. Among the contents was a copy of what was alleged to be secret instructions which the British cabinet had drawn up for the Canadian government against the Catholics of that country. Another document purported to involve a number of the English Catholics and even the vicars apostolic of England and Scotland in this business. In the same despatch Consalvi said Irish opinion on the English Catholics might be represented as believing they did too much truckling to their government. He added he did not have time to assemble sufficient exact data on the English laity's

[29] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 176 ff.

attitudes and conduct, but he could vouch to Pacca for the loyalty of the English clergy—even to their accepting a repudiation from the Holy See of the Quarantotti rescript, in their endeavor to be guided by Rome's wish as "their rule." The cardinal was frank in his criticisms of Bishop Milner to the pro-secretary, saying Milner was imprudent and a troublemaker and very much disliked by the British government. More than once, he told Pacca, Castlereagh had said that if the Holy Father wished to please the British he could do so by freeing them "da questo Milner." As for Milner's colleague, Bishop Poynter, vicar apostolic of the London district, that prelate was quite acceptable to Whitehall.

While Consalvi's communications to Rome on the English and Irish Catholics doubtlessly did favor the former, he was not without his praise for the deep faith of the Irish, but, as he said, some of them did not hesitate to use the "pretext of religion to favor their political designs and purposes against the government they hate." Therefore he warned Rome to take into consideration the fact that the Irish opposition to the moves of the British government on the Catholic issue was at times inspired by political reasons. By way of explanation to the Holy See of this attitude upon the part of the Irish hierarchy and clergy he said two major facts could be adduced to explain it: first, the Irish clergy were entirely too much influenced by the Irish nobility who responded to their material needs; secondly, the clergy simply did not know what church-state relations in other countries were all about; they were thinking in terms of two or three centuries previous. Consalvi concluded this part of his despatch with the judgment that as a consequence of all these factors, it was necessary for Rome to dismiss a good part of this opposition from Ireland.[30]

In circumstances such as these, where it was difficult for the Holy See to secure sufficient first-hand information to reach a

[30] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 170–173.

decision between two quarreling parties, it was Consalvi's suggestion to Cardinal Pacca that the Roman court adopt as a rule of procedure the institution of an impartial examination entirely independent of the relations and sentiments of the various parties. This examination would probe the nature of the case in question to see if in itself the thing was evil or not, and if the examiners wished to reject a particular proposal, then discover whether or not there were good reasons to sustain such a refusal.

Applying this rule to the major case before the governments of Rome and London at the moment, the cardinal stated that he thought it was necessary to examine the three demands made by the British government as its price for complete emancipation of the Catholics, to determine whether or not these demands were in themselves admissible. From his own scrutiny and analysis of those three demands—not as contained in the Quarantotti rescript but in his own despatch of July 5 from London—Cardinal Consalvi told Pacca he could see nothing which they contained that was in itself bad. Moreover, he went further and let it be known that he could see no good reasons for refusing them, particularly since the English government was willing to give emancipation in return, and too since such privileges had been given to other governments without the latter's according any favors in exchange to the Church. There was also, as he made clear, the prospect of the grave harm that would come through a refusal of these terms.

Taking up the three demands singly, Consalvi asked his Roman colleague what intrinsic evil there was in the oath demanded of the Catholic subjects of the British crown, providing that oath was conceived in licit terms, when such an oath was permitted in the concordat of 1801 with France. How could the Holy See likewise refuse the British government its limited and moderate demand of having a voice in the naming of the bishops and deans when such a privilege was accorded to Russia, Prussia, and other non-Catholic governments? "If tomorrow the English Govern-

ment instigated this claim *nakedly and simply without any reciprocity,* how could we sustain a refusal?" As for the third demand, i.e., the right of censoring the documents entering the British Isles from the Roman curia, when one reduced that to a measure not accorded but only tolerated by the Holy See, how could the latter complain when it was being done by all the governments, Catholic and non-Catholic alike? Consalvi added that this was what the British government must be saying at the very moment in which he was writing, when they read in the French newspapers that this same law was revived and proclaimed by Louis XVIII on a solemn occasion and with very decisive words.

One feels as he reads this long communication of the cardinal to his government that he was here making a stand for meeting the British demands by marshaling every fact and argument he could think of to do service to the cogency of his case. It was obvious that he wanted to meet the British demands and thereby effect an agreement. However, he was careful not to allow his enthusiasm to run away with his prudence or outdistance his authority in the matter. He informed Pacca that what he must have above all else were, "*le più precise* istruzioni" before he arrived in Vienna, so that he would know exactly the mind of the Holy Father and the pro-secretary. He thanked Pacca for telling him in his despatch of July 23 of the great confidence which Pius VII placed in his judgment; this was all very gratifying, but he could initiate no real negotiations with Castlereagh, "if I do not know what are the intentions of the Sacred Congregation and of His Holiness on the subjects in question." [31]

That the pope was anxious to reach an understanding with Great Britain on the matter there is no doubt. In fact he was ready to do anything to please the English short of performing an action incompatible with his duty as head of the Church. The Holy Father's eagerness and good dispositions were made clear to Castlereagh by Consalvi in a letter of August 7 and the car-

[31] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 176–180. Consalvi to Pacca from Paris, Aug. 17, 1814.

dinal himself was reassured of it in a despatch from Pacca on September 19.[32]

The seriousness with which the Holy See viewed the matter can be seen from the fact that four days before Consalvi's long despatch was written, Cardinal Pacca, acting for Pope Pius VII, had composed a letter on August 13, 1814 in which he transmitted the task of a thorough investigation of the English Catholic question to a committee of the cardinals with instructions that they were to scrutinize the three demands of the London government which he outlined for them, weigh and study the matter carefully, and then report on it. In communicating the data to the cardinals, Pacca was careful to state that the British government demanded an oath of loyalty from its Catholic subjects, but intended that it should be couched in terms which " would not be in opposition to the principles of their religion." Regarding the second demand, that of a voice in naming the bishops, Pacca told the cardinals the British government wished the privilege of being informed of the names of the individuals before they were proposed to the Holy See so that if it should be found that the electors had selected someone of a troublesome nature—one possessing " sentimenti torbidi "—or one who was openly hostile to the government, the latter would then ask the electors to substitute another name and inform them of the identity of the new candidate. As for the third demand, that of the royal *exsequatur* on papal correspondence, Pacca related that the British claimed they were asking only what all other states, Catholic and non-Catholic, enjoyed, except of course for documents emanating from the Sacred Penitentiary. The British minister was asking this not only for the security of the government but also to calm

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[32] Richemont, *Op. cit., 72.* Viscount Castlereagh had requested that a model of an equestrian sculpture group in the Quirinal be permitted to be made for a similar statue to be erected in London to honor the Duke of Wellington. Pius VII ordered Canova to call the Academy of St. Luke of which he was president, so that designs could be worked out by its members to comply with the English statesman's request. *Ibid.,* n. 2.

the apprehensions of the Anglicans, Puritans, Methodists, and other sects.

Cardinal Pacca informed the cardinals in his letter that Consalvi had objected "rigorosamente" to this last request, having informed the British statesmen how repugnant such a demand was to the liberty of the Church and that even though the Holy See may have tolerated it elsewhere it never ceased to protest it. Nonetheless he related that Castlereagh had told Consalvi that if emancipation from the penal laws and the grant of political rights were to come to the Catholics by a public and permanent act, then these guarantees to the government from the Holy See must be given in a similar way, which, Pacca added, would consist in a convention framed in Vienna between Castlereagh and Consalvi during the sessions of the peace conference about to open. He did not fail to represent Consalvi's mind to his fellow cardinals when he told them the secretary of state had repeatedly insisted with the Holy See that he be authorized by Rome "a trattare e concludere una tale Convenzione."

Pacca asked the cardinals therefore to give these matters their serious consideration and he placed them under the secrecy of the Holy Office about all details. He requested them to work as speedily as possible and to make their suggestions for Consalvi's instructions as precise as they could. Further, they were to draw up a formula for an oath to pacify the English government, to frame in terms as "innocui" as one could conceive, the article regarding the election of bishops, and to submit the most cogent reasons they could think of to justify Consalvi's negative already given to Castlereagh on the question of the *regio exsequatur*. Finally Pacca warned them once more of the need for secrecy, delicacy, and speed, and informed them that Consalvi was leaving Paris on August 15 for Vienna and would be in need of his instructions when he arrived in the Austrian capital.[33]

[33] Rinieri, *Il Congresso,* 180–182. Pacca to the Congregation of Cardinals from the Quirinal, Aug. 13, 1814.

It was just a week after Cardinal Pacca's letter communicating to the special commission of the Sacred College the task outlined above, that Cardinal Consalvi left Paris for Vienna for the opening of the congress that was intended to bring a stable peace to Europe. The papal secretary of state was en route from August 20 to September 2. Already the delegations were arriving and settling down to the preliminary discussions of the most important international conference to assemble since that of Utrecht in January, 1712 which brought to an end the wars of Louis XIV. We have already witnessed the meetings of the cardinal and the British foreign secretary at Vienna on the subject of the papal restoration. We are here concerned solely with their conversations during the congress on the proposed settlement of the Catholic question and the possibilities of a concordat being reached between the two governments.

If one is to understand the difficulties which beset the path of an amicable agreement between Rome and London on the outstanding issues involved, he must keep constantly in mind the many-sided nature of the discussions. Not only was the cardinal hoping to negotiate a settlement for the Catholics of the British Isles, but simultaneously he had to conduct the delicate negotiations looking to a restoration of the Papal States, to face the serious problem of religious conditions in France, the German world, and elsewhere, as well as to contend with the difficulty created by the fact that the armies of Joachim Murat were, within the matter of a few weeks, to overrun part of the States of the Church.[34] Under such a strain it is not surprising that the negotiations on the Catholic question had to be conducted in

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[34] For a general survey of the critical questions facing the Church in the period of the restoration, cf. Josef Schmidlin, *Papstgeschichte der neuesten Zeit.* 1 Bd. *Papsttum und Päpste im Zeitalter der Restauration (1800–1846)*, 178–298. (München: Verlag Josef Kösel and Friedrich Pustet, 1933.) There is a French translation of the first part of this volume by L. Marchal, *Histoire des papes,* T. I, Première Partie, *Pie VII, le pape de la restauration, 1800–1823,* 162–382. (Lyon: Emmanuel Vitte, 1938.)

a halting fashion. Could the cardinal have concentrated on solving that problem alone, and had not the mind of Viscount Castlereagh been distracted by a hundred more pressing problems, there would have been a much greater chance of ultimate success. As it was, the two statesmen had to content themselves with broken conversations on the matter in the early weeks of the congress. In these conversations Consalvi went as far as he dared in granting concessions to the British point of view. He even offered several forms of oaths which might be taken by the Catholics to the British crown, assuring the government of their political loyalty. Moreover the cardinal agreed that in so far as the naming of bishops was concerned, there might be a committee of five Catholic peers for England and five for Ireland appointed to certify to the loyalty of the candidates for the episcopal office in those countries. This point carried the implication that if the committee should not so certify, the candidate would not be urged by the Holy See. Likewise Consalvi stated that the Holy See might see its way clear to consulting His Majesty's government as to the suitability of a particular candidate and if the man in question were not found acceptable he would not be appointed. However, on the third demand affecting the censorship of papal documents entering the British Isles, the cardinal was adamant as he had been in London.[35]

Meanwhile things had been happening in Rome. The English business was handled ultimately by the Congregation for Ecclesiastical Affairs. This body had not only heard the English official side of the case, i.e., the three demands, but it had also heard the opposition to such from England and Ireland which was expressed by Bishop Milner and Dr. Murray, vicar general of Dublin, who had hurried to Rome in the summer to forestall any acceptance of the London government's conditions. On September 1 the congregation let it be known that action could be expected within a week. On September 8 it gave its decision. Again the greater part of the document concerned itself with

[35] Ward, Bernard N., *The Eve of Catholic Emancipation*, II, 132–133.

the familiar three demands. As regards the oath of fidelity, the congregation agreed that such could be conceded, and it even proposed the same oath as that inserted in the concordat of 1801 with France, or if that should prove unsatisfactory to the British government, then the suggestion was made of adopting the oath permitted by Pope Clement XI to the English Catholics in the reign of George II. The congregation viewed more seriously the matter of naming the bishops. The reply of Benedict XIV in a similar instance to the inquiry of the bishop of Breslau in May, 1748 was recalled, namely that the Holy See never accorded a privilege of this kind to sovereigns belonging to another communion. However, the congregation speaking in the name of Pius VII, saw no difficulty in having the ecclesiastics who were charged with presenting candidates for the episcopacy take a special oath by which they engaged themselves not to propose anyone of whom, in conscience, they doubted the pacific and faithful character. On the third point there was no yielding, since the question of communications of the Holy See with the episcopacy and faithful in all lands touched the "very life of the Church." In this the pope was unable to recognize any human power superior to his own, or to allow any limitation on his own authority. The question was raised of what might come to the unity of faith if, for example, a pope or a council might decree something which would be received in the whole world but be forbidden in England. They endeavored to reassure Great Britain that it would have no need to fear any action taken by the Holy See through its correspondence which would run counter to concepts of civil obedience from its subjects. Finally on the question of a concordat or convention with Great Britain, its *form* could not be that of a genuine concordat, since the Holy See did not wish to give an example or set a precedent by such an act with a non-Catholic government.[36]

In all these negotiations at Rome the hand of Lorenzo Cardinal Litta was prominent. This prelate who had been appointed

[36] Richemont, *Op. cit.*, 74–77.

by Pius VII after the restoration as prefect of the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith, made a long and detailed explanation to the congregation of the English demands in which he revealed himself as unfriendly to the project. As for the rescript of Quarantotti, Cardinal Litta stated that it was prompted by the circumstances of the time with the pope in captivity, the cardinals scattered, etc., and he added that as soon as the pope was freed he had put the whole affair in the congregation's hands. Therefore little serious weight was to be given to the rescript—such would seem a legitimate inference from Litta's attitude.[37]

In viewing the action which the congregation took towards the proposal for an entente with Great Britain, it must never be forgotten that the whole project had been presented in the light of one with which Cardinal Consalvi, at least in its broad outlines and with the exception of the *exsequatur* demand, had agreed. That this played its part in the decision of his fellow cardinals there can be little doubt, for a number of these men were of the *zelanti* persuasion and felt that the cardinal secretary of state was far too ready to accommodate himself to the spirit of the age. On the English question the cardinal prefect of Propaganda aligned himself pretty consistently against Consalvi and with Milner and the Irish opponents.

The news of the congregation's decision, together with copies of the letters despatched from the Holy See to the Irish bishops, were sent by papal courier on September 17, 1814 to Consalvi at Vienna.[38] Quite naturally he was disappointed at what appeared to be the ruin of his efforts for an English agreement and he referred to the decisions of the Roman court as "alquanto

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[37] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 617.

[38] *Ibid.* Vicomte de Richemont is apparently in error when he states that the decision of the congregation was made known to Consalvi by papal courier at Vienna on September 19. *Op. cit.*, 73. It was not possible in 1814 for a courier to travel the distance between Rome and Vienna in two days.

strette e rigide." Despite the setback suffered, Consalvi did not despair of a final solution and he was encouraged to this end in a letter from Cardinal Pacca on October 13 in which the pro-secretary expressed his hopes for the continuation of negotiations with Castlereagh and his anxiety to learn the latter's reactions to the Holy See's position. Pacca told Consalvi in this despatch that he was free to inform Castlereagh that Milner was not telling the truth when he represented Pius VII as having disapproved the Quarantotti rescript. The pro-secretary informed Consalvi that the pope had never spoken of it, that he had begun to examine the matter and then being informed of the conferences with Castlereagh on Consalvi's part, he let the matter drop and turned directly to the three articles proposed by the British.[39] The pope had assumed a very guarded attitude on the whole question. When, for example, he replied to the letter of congratulations of the English Catholics in which they had spoken of their joy at news of the rescript, Pius VII endeavored to moderate their enthusiasm a bit. He remarked:

> . . . being desirous to further the laudable and earnest desire, with which you are inflamed, of serving your country, not only in heart and mind, but also by active service (consistently as certainly is your resolution with the principles of your religion), the rescript which, during our absence, and the dispersion of our venerable council, was on the sixteenth day of January last issued, and sent to you by our beloved son, the secretary of the *propaganda,* inasmuch as it turns on a matter of the highest moment, we have given, as you already know, to those of the congregation of our venerable brethren, the cardinals, to whom matters of this nature are usually referred; in order to be examined by them maturely, and *ab integro;* we, however, entreat you to be persuaded, that in this important matter we shall most willingly

[39] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 34. Pacca to Consalvi, Oct. 13, 1814, from Rome.

> comply with your wishes, as far as the dignity, the purity, and the integrity of the catholic religion will allow.[40]

While somewhat chagrined at Rome's action, nonetheless Cardinal Consalvi was too good a diplomatist to throw over the whole business as finished. He handled Viscount Castlereagh as artfully as he knew how, not letting the foreign secretary know that Rome's answer constituted a rather strong "no" to a number of his cherished plans. He indicated to Castlereagh that it might be better to defer action in the matter to a more auspicious moment. He was frank in telling Cardinal Pacca of his distress at the intelligence contained in his despatch, however, and expressed his regret that the Congregation of Ecclesiastical Affairs did not find itself able to underwrite the project of a concordat with Great Britain. Consalvi now wondered if inadvertently he might have contributed to some misunderstanding at Rome by assuming in an earlier despatch that the negotiations were still in progress whereas actually Pacca informed him in his letter of September 17 that the answer of the congregation "would be sent on the morrow." Consalvi apparently had offered some further suggestion in the thought that it would arrive before the decision was made.[41] On one point of the

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[40] Butler, *Op. cit.,* IV, 530. Letter of Pius VII to the Catholics of Great Britain, Rome, Dec. 28, 1814, printed as an appendix by Butler. Either the Roman copyist or the editor made an error in the date, for Quarantotti's document was dated February 16, not January 16.

[41] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 140–141. Consalvi to Pacca, Nov. 19, 1814, from Vienna. There is a definite obscurity here which the writer has been unable to clarify. It would seem to arise from Rinieri's failure to print Pacca's despatch of September 20 (the date given by Consalvi). Obviously Consalvi had sent some suggestion, but just what it was it has been impossible to determine. Moreover, he apparently felt it might change matters in Rome, for he closes his despatch with the words: "If by some happy combination the thing has not yet taken place, it is well to suspend it at once. If it has we must be patient, although the mishap is certainly unfortunate."

business at Rome, Consalvi was clear—he did not want Cardinal Litta mixing in a problem which the papal secretary felt he did not understand. He informed Rome that Litta was not only ignorant of the state of things in England relative to the government, but that a certain severity in his nature would not permit him to enjoy a common meeting ground with the English mind nor to enter into the English manner of seeing the points which formed the object of their demands. The thought of Litta's trying to reconcile Poynter and Milner, both of whom were then in Rome, made Consalvi very uneasy, and he therefore suggested that Rome hold its hand until he could come in person to explain all the issues involved.[42]

Meanwhile Castlereagh's preoccupation with other business made him quite willing to accept Consalvi's suggestion for delay, for the cardinal sent word to his government that the foreign secretary felt it ought to be deferred since it would only be a new imprudence to push the concordat proposal just then with the Irish pursuing such refractory conduct and parliament not able to muster one-third of the necessary votes for the measure. Castlereagh thought if they waited they might be able to arrive at "una utile conciliazione della cosa." It was probably about this time that there arrived in Vienna the communication of Sir John Hippisley to Castlereagh written from London on November 10. In that long letter Sir John informed the foreign secretary that much was to be hoped from Poynter's moderate counsels when he arrived in Rome. He was at no pains to conceal his ill-will towards Bishop Milner, already in the Eternal City. He said:

> Dr. Milner is still at Rome, and the Pope has expressed a desire to see also his opponent, Dr. Poynter, who is on the eve of departure, and whose moderation may possibly constitute some counterpoise to the ardent temperament of this "Modern Becket," as your lordship

[42] Rinieri, *Il Congresso*, 619.

> will see Dr. Milner *now* designated in the journal he patronises.[43]

That the Irish were excited there is little doubt. As far back as May they had sent off representatives in Milner and Murray to Rome to protest the acceptance of the three demands and any moves for a concordat. Meanwhile their national press and leaders were not silent. When news reached Ireland that the cardinal was treating of the critical Catholic question with Castlereagh in Vienna, it was the occasion for a fresh outburst, not only against the British government and Consalvi personally, but even against the Holy See. Daniel O'Connell sensed a bargain being struck at Vienna. To his mind Castlereagh was holding out the bait of support for restoration of the Papal States, hoping to get Consalvi to concede what he termed, "the effectual supremacy over the Catholic Church in Ireland." O'Connell was not quite sure whether Consalvi was a dupe or a knave. In one of the most violent speeches which he delivered on the subject the Irish leader went so far as to say:

> Consalvi, the Italian, either betrayed or sold our Church to the British minister at Vienna; indeed the exact amount of his price is stated to be eleven thousand guineas. Though a Cardinal, this man is not a priest. He is a secular Cardinal, just fit for any bargain and sale; right glad, I presume, to have so good a thing to sell as the religion of Ireland.[44]

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[43] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 197–199. Hippisley to Castlereagh, Nov. 10, 1814, from London. In a postscript to the same letter dated November 20, Hippisley gave definite information on Poynter's journey. "I came to town a few days since, and found Dr. Poynter leaves town for Rome next week; Mr. Branston, who was bred an English lawyer, accompanying Dr. Poynter, at the instance of Cardinal Pacca, who serves his interests at Lisbon."

[44] O'Connell, John (Ed.), *The Life and Speeches of Daniel O'Connell, M. P.,* II, 209 (Dublin: James Duffy, 1846). By a curious coincidence O'Connell's heart was buried at his request in the church of Sant'Agata in Subura which for sixteen years had been Consalvi's titular church.

It is needless to say that the cardinal was in no way guilty of such trafficking in the interests of the temporal power of the Holy See. But although untrue, such inflammatory speeches as these from the acknowledged leader among the Irish Catholic laity did not exactly conduce to the creation of the atmosphere necessary for calm diplomatic negotiations.

The conversations in Vienna between Castlereagh and Consalvi continued fitfully through the closing days of 1814 and the first months of the new year. That they were still talking on the subject we learn from a letter of March 4, 1815 in which Consalvi wrote Pacca that in so far as the demand of a portion in lands for the Irish bishops was concerned, a matter that had been broached sometime earlier in England, Viscount Castlereagh had expressed himself forcefully to the cardinal against such a proposition, saying that the English court would sooner cease to be a court than to allow a thing so "eminently anti-constitutional."[45] Soon all Europe was to be electrified by the news of Bonaparte's escape from Elba in the last days of February. This event produced a profound effect upon the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna, and it was not unrelated to the progress of the pourparlers on the Catholic question. The Holy See was again threatened in its own territory by the armies of Murat of Naples and after some hesitation the pope finally made the decision to evacuate his capital and left Rome on March 22.

Shortly before the papal court moved from Rome to Genoa the center of the Anglo-papal conversations shifted momentarily from Vienna to the Eternal City. It was in this spring that Edward Cooke, who had been named undersecretary of state by Castlereagh in 1812 and was a close friend of the viscount, as mentioned previously, had come into Italy for a rest due to impaired health. Once arrived in Rome, Cooke entered actively into the negotiations for a settlement with the Roman government on the outstanding questions. On March 18 Cardinal

[45] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 330. Consalvi to Pacca, Mar. 4, 1815, from Vienna.

Pacca informed Consalvi by letter that "the other morning" Cooke had presented on the part of the English government the proposition of having a chargé d'affaires at the respective courts, these officials to have a public or private character as it should please the pope. Pacca told Consalvi that he reserved to Pius VII to give an answer to Cooke's inquiry but that he, Pacca, had shown Cooke "all possible satisfaction." The pro-secretary stated the anxiety in Rome was so great at the moment that he doubted if he would have time to assemble all the rules governing such a proposal. Cooke had likewise expressed his wish to speak, together with Bishop Poynter, of the ecclesiastical problems in England, but Pacca stated that since such questions came within the jurisdiction of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide, they could hold such an interview with the prefect, Cardinal Litta. Pacca concluded his despatch by saying that such a discussion would surely do no harm.[46] Two days later in a second communication Pacca wrote Consalvi that Cooke had an audience that morning with Pius VII and the latter expressed himself as experiencing a real pleasure at seeing the relations between the two courts stable. The pope was quoted by his pro-secretary as having told Cooke that when respective ministers should be designated it would be better that they should be public rather than private; and if it was thought under these circumstances that it would be preferable to defer the designation of such diplomatic agents, the pontiff left that to the will of the British government.[47] This response and treatment from the pope and his acting foreign minister was doubtless of encouragement to Cooke who took a lively interest in the Catholic question and had "hopes of settling it during his residence at Rome."[48]

When the anticipated invasion of papal territory by Murat took place the Roman court, as has been said, left the capital

[46] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 413. Pacca to Consalvi, Mar. 18, 1815, from Rome.

[47] *Ibid.,* 416. Pacca to Consalvi, Mar. 20, 1815, from Rome.

[48] Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812–1815,* I, 409.

on March 22 for the north. Cooke was so confident of the ultimate failure of the invader and his inability to do much damage, that he decided to remain in Rome. He was not unmindful of his mission, but as previously mentioned, he explained in a letter to Castlereagh on April 13, "I thought nothing could be done officially in the midst of such uncertainty." In the next phrase Cooke reported optimistically to Castlereagh on London ultimately winning its point with the papal government on the basis of the original terms of 1813. He said, "your lordship may be assured that the principles stated in Quarantotti's letter will be agreed to." During these days Cooke and Bishop Poynter were working in cordial co-operation and he stated that the bishop wished the names of men eligible for bishoprics to be sent for approbation previous to the election and the election then made from the approved list. This struck Cooke favorably, and he gave his personal reactions to Castlereagh:

> I like this idea: it gives a negative previous to election, and gives the power to Government of selecting for the Pope's investiture the one of the three to be elected most agreeable. I have no doubt, when you have once a Minister accredited here, there will be no difficulty any longer on any part of the subject, except, *perhaps,* the giving a stipend to the clergy.[49]

Meanwhile the court of Pope Pius VII had arrived at Genoa on April 3 where the pontiff took up a temporary residence awaiting the removal of the danger to his person and government at Rome. Pacca too had gone to Genoa in the company of his vicar general and it was from there that he addressed his next despatch to his colleague in Vienna.[50] Not only the immediate officers of the government left Rome, but a number of persons who were in the Eternal City on business made the journey to

[49] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 308–309. Cooke to Castlereagh, Apr. 13, 1815, from Rome.

[50] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 457–461. Pacca to Consalvi, Apr. 12, 1815, from Genoa.

Genoa to keep in touch with the curia. Among these were both Poynter and Milner, the leaders of the rival English Catholic factions. Milner remained for a few days only, departing on April 11 for London, but Bishop Poynter stayed on for about three weeks. In a letter of April 29 to Consalvi the pro-secretary told him that Poynter had left the day previous for London in the company of Brainstol, his vicar general. Pacca related that Poynter left in high spirits, having been given a letter by Cardinal Litta which contained the possible concessions of the Holy See to the British government. In this letter Litta, speaking as prefect of Propaganda, gave Poynter the mind of the Holy See on the whole question. In so far as the oath demanded of the clergy was concerned, " His holiness is willing to believe, that the British government is not disposed to exact from the catholics, any other oath than such a one as shall indeed afford full security to the government, respecting the loyalty and obedience of the catholics, but shall not, in any manner, either be at variance with the principles of the catholic religion, or hurtful to that most holy religion of Christ." He therefore submitted three possible oaths which the pope stated the English Catholics might take. As for the election of bishops, " his holiness will feel no hesitation in allowing those to whom it appertains, to present to the king's ministers a list of candidates, in order that if any of them should be obnoxious or suspected, the government may immediately point him out, so as that he may be expunged, care however being taken to leave a sufficient number for his holiness to choose therefrom, individuals whom he may deem best qualified in the Lord for governing the vacant churches." But on the third point, the right to examine the correspondence of the Holy See with the British bishops, "*it cannot even be made a subject of negotiation.*" Litta reminded Poynter that if the British government pleaded that some governments assumed this right, such was to be explained as the abuse, not the right exercise of legitimate power. He concluded that " confident hopes may therefore be entertained, that the government will not persist in their demand,

inasmuch as the church cannot give up its right." Should the British government be satisfied with these decisions and grant emancipation to the Catholics, then " his holiness purposes on his part to address a proper brief to all the bishops and faithful catholics of Great Britain, with a view of not only proclaiming to the whole world his grateful sense of the clemency and generosity displayed by the most powerful British government, but of exhorting the catholics themselves to exert their utmost endeavours in proving loyal subjects . . ." [51]

A similar letter had been sent through Poynter to the archbishop of Dublin and to Bishop Milner. In turn Poynter felt safe in promising the satisfaction of the British government with these arrangements.[52] Just two weeks later Consalvi wrote a letter to Castlereagh, who had left Vienna for London, to put the latter abreast of his latest moves. He informed the foreign secretary that he had sent to Pope Pius a full account of their conversation held just before his departure, relative to the negotiations to be undertaken with Bishop Poynter in London. The papal secretary told Castlereagh that he was anxious to accommodate himself to the views of the British government, " as far as the duties of our religion permit it." Consalvi related that he had written Poynter in Rome, telling him to wait upon his return there, but foreseeing that it might be a prolonged affair, he had told Pius VII to go forward with the business and if necessary to treat with Poynter even before he reached Rome. Events in Italy, so the cardinal continued, had necessitated Pius VII's re-

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[51] Butler, *Op. cit.*, IV, 531–536. Litta to Poynter, Apr. 26, 1815, at Genoa. Butler prints the text in full in an appendix.

[52] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza*, 523–524. Pacca related that Poynter was given many attentions at the pope's Genoa court, being twice invited to the table of the noble retinue of His Holiness. All these niceties, thought Pacca, helped to put Poynter in a happy mood. He added that Lord Bentinck, who had taken a great part in Poynter's favor, was leaving Genoa too, it being rumored that Bentinck had had his command in the Mediterranean taken away, and that henceforth the English troops were to be at the command of the king of Sardinia.

moval to Genoa, and there the pope and Poynter had discussed the Catholic question. Poynter was anxious to return to England, so His Holiness acquainted him with his views on the matter at hand. The Holy Father's position had met with Poynter's approval, and the latter had remarked that he had no doubt that his government would also approve. Consalvi told Castlereagh that he had been instructed from Genoa by the pope to give knowledge of all these transactions quickly to the British minister which herewith he gladly did. He concluded with the hope that the close of the congress would enable him to get back to Rome during the month of June, and he assured Castlereagh that nothing would be treated with more speed and care than these very negotiations. Thus while awaiting further orders at Rome he renewed on his own behalf to Castlereagh the offer of his services for anything which might meet the pleasure of the British foreign secretary.[53]

Cardinal Consalvi was coming to the end of his Vienna mission with a substantial victory to his credit in the matter of the restoration of the papal dominions, but only a moderate hope for success in the affair of the English Catholics and a concordat with their government. After having received and digested the contents of Pacca's last communication, which enclosed copies of the correspondence of the Holy See with Bishop Poynter, Consalvi composed a lengthy despatch to Pacca on May 15. He stated that he perceived the letter to Poynter had decided on the three articles which were at the root of the whole business. Concerning the article on the oath, Consalvi declared the statement given to Poynter was the same as he had earlier announced to Cooke who had not taken exception to it. As for the second point, on the election of bishops, the expression given to that question was again practically the same as Consalvi had outlined in London to Hippisley who had appeared satisfied with it after he had given him to understand that it was far better that the electors, before

[53] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 351–353. Consalvi to Castlereagh, May 13, 1815, from Vienna.

sending their proposals and letters of recommendation to Rome, make a direct and confidential communication to the ministry itself. This procedure would contribute to a greater trust between the cabinet and those proposing the names; likewise in this way it could be ascertained if the names of those proposed for election were displeasing to the government and if that proved true, the name of such a one should not be put on the list. Consalvi said he explained that this was preferable to setting up a mixed congregation to examine the qualities of those elected, and then referring them to the government for their opinion, as had been proposed by Monsignor Quarantotti. Consalvi went on to say that he had read in the published bill of parliament the proposition made by Canning to the effect that five Irish lords should testify to the government on the civic virtues of those designated for Irish sees. But the cardinal stated that he had proposed in letters to Rome, and to Cooke who was not at all displeased with it, that means be taken which would give to the government less than is given by the arrangement conceived in London, and which he now sees adopted in the letter committed to Poynter. With this latter arrangement there would come about, although indirectly, the admission of a certain appearance of a veto, which would be such only if rigorously interpreted, but yet it will be called by that name by the government. Consalvi had made the former suggestion to Cooke and to Rome, but there was now no longer any place for that since the other measure had been written to Poynter. The form in Poynter's letter, although not so good from the Church's point of view, was not for that reason bad, and Consalvi believed it certainly would be accepted by the British government.

The cardinal stated in relation to the third article, i.e., the supervision of documents from Rome, that it ought to be admitted also, for since it clearly says that the Holy See cannot agree to such nor sanction it, yet it will read that *sustinere ac tolerare cogitur,* as is done elsewhere. Consalvi stated that on the matter of the *regio exsequatur* he would say here what he had

said repeatedly elsewhere, viz., that the Holy See suffers but does not approve the *regio exsequatur*. However, he said that in writing he would feel a little repugnance to say *tolerare cogitur* since the Holy See had objected so much to the first point in the French Organic Articles which was directed to that very end. Consalvi doubted if they would be able to protest further when the letter to Poynter should be published, as published it certainly would be, and then the *tolerare cogitur* would be seen. If to the *tolerare cogitur* phrase were added "after having made all possible protests," there would be less fear of objection.

Consalvi informed Pacca that as for the rest of the business he believed he had put it in good hands by arranging with Lord Castlereagh that the affair be discussed with Bishop Poynter, a man held in high esteem by the English government. If the British government could not be satisfied through Poynter with what Rome was disposed to do, then it could probably not be satisfied at all. "I have a firm confidence in the success of the affair," Consalvi stated in concluding this section of his despatch. Consalvi had one more major point to communicate to Cardinal Pacca, and it was that there would be a further article on which the British government would insist and that was a salary or pension to be paid by the government to the bishops of Ireland. The government of England held closely to this thing and was disposed, said the papal secretary, to treat the Irish bishops most equitably. The reason why the British insisted on the point was that the bishops in their actual need were maintained by the faithful, but that meant the Catholic Irish lords. These gentlemen, reduced to ruin as Irish, sought profit for their political opposition to Britain by maintaining the bishops whom they influence in turn to sway the Irish Catholics against England. Therefore the British ministry wished that the bishops would accept an aid or pension from it, and since the Irish hierarchy had opposed this proposal, the London government would like Rome to induce them to accept. Consalvi told Pacca that he had informed Castlereagh that the Holy See did not approve the

pension but would wish that they have some properties, even if in the end these should amount to less than the pensions. To this, however, Consalvi reported Castlereagh as returning a firm refusal, saying that it were more possible that England should no longer be an island than that their laws permit to the Catholic clergy the possession of lands. Consalvi here stated that he did not see how the Holy See could refuse this demand of England when it had been admitted that the bishops of France—and most likely and unfortunately soon the bishops of almost all Germany —found their official support in aids or pensions and not in lands.[54] Apparently this last point of the livings of the Irish bishops was being postponed in London in the hope of securing agreement on other matters first, for Cardinal Pacca wrote Consalvi from Florence on May 30 to the effect that Poynter had written to the curia and the curia and the congregation had digested his letter, but that Poynter had said nothing about the bishops of Ireland.[55]

Meanwhile the British foreign secretary had finished the most pressing business which had brought him to the Austrian capital and had now returned to London. In fact he left Vienna in early May before the letter of his friend and undersecretary, Edward Cooke, written from Rome on April 13, could be delivered to him. An answer to Cooke's communication was made by Viscount Castlereagh on June 4, 1815, writing from St. James's Square, and in that long letter he informed Cooke that a messenger from Vienna had brought his despatch of April 13 only a few days before. He explained the delay further by saying that the disturbed condition of affairs in Italy had made him hesitate, for he did not know where Cooke could be reached. It is in this communication of June 4, just two weeks to the day before Cardinal Consalvi departed from Vienna for Rome, that the whole situation regarding the Catholic question and a possible

[54] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza,* 594–597. Consalvi to Pacca, May 15, 1815, from Vienna.

[55] *Ibid.,* 690. Pacca to Consalvi, May 20, 1815, from Florence.

concordat with the Holy See was laid bare to his colleague who had worked hard while at Rome to bring success to this undertaking. Up to the writing of the letter Castlereagh had not yet seen Poynter nor read the documents which the bishop had brought with him from the papal curia at Genoa. Castlereagh told Cooke he had wished to know first the result of the agitation over the Catholic question at home as well as the nature of Poynter's information. He said the latter described his instruction to Castlereagh from the Holy See as "satisfactory," but, declared the foreign minister to Cooke, "to be so, it must be quite explicit upon all the principles which might and ought to constitute a good Concordat and State settlement. I am afraid that, partly from their taste for mystery, and partly for the purpose of trying to turn these concessions to political account, that the Court of Rome will endeavour to make the whole hinge on a negotiation with our Government, and that little more will appear upon the face of the rescript than an avowal of the Pope's readiness to meet the wishes of the British Government as far as the principles of the Church will permit him." If such should prove to be the case, then Castlereagh could foresee no tangible results from the negotiations. He cited to Cooke the division within the ranks of the cabinet on the question, and stated that feelings *"in all quarters"* were more adverse than they formerly were and he felt sure it would be impossible for him at the moment to bring his colleagues to any common opinion on the matter. Castlereagh told his friend that when they had parted in Vienna months before he had suspected no regular convention could be made by Cooke, no matter how well-disposed he found the Roman government, but now he had reached a conviction on the point that it could not be done. However, the foreign secretary did not despair of anything being done, but he felt it must come, not from some formal act on the part of the government, but from the intervention of "such discreet and leading Catholics" as felt the need of strengthening their claims "to indulgence"—as Castlereagh puts it—with their own gov-

ernment and parliament. This they could do by procuring the sanction of Rome to the principles contained in Grattan's bill. It was vain, said Castlereagh, " to expect that those who are adverse to the Catholic concessions will labour to remove the main obstacles to their success." He again insisted that it was the Catholics themselves who must do the job. Two years ago when there had been a great enthusiasm for Catholic emancipation the Catholics failed to receive the bill " with common sense or common decorum." Now public opinion had veered away from their cause and that opinion could not be arrested in its course without some activity on the part of the Catholics to show a different attitude. " They must positively determine to make love to the Protestants—making war will not do, nor will secession and inactivity reinstate the cause where it was."

Castlereagh was anxious that Cooke should inform the Roman government of the true state of affairs in England. He summarized the case so well that one could not do better than to quote it in full:

> I should recommend you to make this understood at Rome: you must undeceive them, if they suppose that the British Government, however well disposed to the Pope's interest, will take the initiative on this question; and the Catholics must themselves find the means of putting their intentions and principles beyond dispute, if they desire to conciliate. I see so much of the High Church spirit abroad at this moment, that I should not deem it discreet at present to excite it by any formal recognition of the Pope's authority. A regular treaty, I am clear, cannot be attempted, nor should I wish to encourage his Holiness to send a regular mission to this country. If there was any prudent individual sent here in the first instance, to solicit the political good offices of the Prince Regent and his Government, and who might afterwards remain as a species of unavowed Resident, much good might arise from such an arrangement, and we might reciprocate it; but ostentation must be avoided, and what is requisite must be done quietly, and not be

> unnecessarily brought into notice. There exists every friendly feeling to the Pope's interests in this Government—quite as much, I think, amongst the opponents as amongst the friends to the question of emancipation; but they will not relish anything like a new system, and the religionists in the country would be very likely to cry out if my friend Consalvi's red stockings were seen too often at Carleton House.
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> Upon the whole, I should wish you to advise the Court of Rome to be content for the present with receiving hints and suggestions from the Government, as to the means of being of use; but that they should determine to act ostensibly through and upon their own body, till the feeling here is better prepared for a direct intercourse on the part of the State with the See of Rome.[56]

The above statements of Viscount Castlereagh put the whole question in a clear light from the British point of view. The government, ever sensitive to public opinion, realized that the enthusiasm shown for the Holy Father and his interests at the height of the contest against Bonaparte, was now definitely cooling. In time of dire need anyone may appear a friend, but the general relief occasioned by the fall of the titan and a return to more normal procedures in Great Britain witnessed the revival of a sentiment that had characterized the policy of that government for well-nigh three hundred years. It can be expressed best perhaps in the terse cry often emitted at public demonstrations in England—" No popery." It would be a falsification of the facts to say that all the familiar machinery of the old anti-papal campaigns was again set in motion. That did not happen, and in good measure probably because it was not necessary. With a divided cabinet, an increasingly unfriendly ruler, and a vast majority of the nation's population opposed to any " formal recognition of the Pope's authority,"—to use Castlereagh's phrase —there was little danger. A regular treaty or concordat was

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[56] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 375–378. Castlereagh to Cooke, June 4, 1815, from London.

then out of the question. The intoxication of victory had dissipated the chastened, and therefore more cordial mood, of the British public to the Catholic question as it had manifested itself in 1813 when the last public debates were heard on the matter. A further handicap was the vociferous opposition of the Irish, an opposition, as we said before, not directed alone at British officialdom but leveled as well against the more moderate attitudes of the English Catholics, the majority of their ecclesiastical superiors, and even against the Holy See. The Catholics of the British Isles presented no united front in this critical year 1814–1815, and the best efforts of Poynter to continue the discussions with profit were overcome in part by the bewilderment arising from the internal strife among the Catholic population of His Majesty's government. In such a situation it was futile to anticipate any immediate action, as Castlereagh hoped, "through and upon their own body." That body was for the time being torn to pieces by mutual suspicion, ill-will, and in some cases downright misrepresentation.

Despite this unfortunate turn of events in England, the Holy See remained open-minded on the question. As one has put it, "The disposition of the Pope to grant the power of veto remained firm for some time, in spite of the loud clamour of the Irish, whose representatives at Rome were received with cold comfort." [57] In other words Rome refused to close the door upon the negotiations while there was left any hope of a solution. An instance of this attitude of the Holy See is found in the official reactions to the mission of the Irish Franciscan, Richard Hayes, who was appointed on August 29, 1815 by a meeting of the Catholic Board in Ireland, to proceed to Rome where he was to convince the pope of the danger of any further dealing with England. The Franciscan spent the best part of the next two years in Rome where he succeeded not at all in his mission. His intransigeance aroused the ire of Cardinal Consalvi who felt Hayes' tactics would do real damage to Anglo-papal relations.

[57] Webster, *Op. cit.*, I, 409.

Not only did Consalvi resent him but he also succeeded by his persistence in annoying Baron Ompteda, Hanoverian ambassador to the Holy See, through whom English business with the Roman government was transacted. Finally Hayes' imprudent moves brought the cardinal to the point of giving him twenty-four hours to get out of Rome and three days to clear the Papal States entirely. Hayes returned to Dublin after his expulsion in July, 1817 and in December of that year he made his report to the Catholic Board which only served to further embitter feelings, particularly against Cardinal Consalvi.[58] This sentiment on the part of the Irish leaders towards the papal secretary of state did not spend itself while there remained any danger of a revival of the concordat idea. The Irish press reflected extreme views in such utterances as that of the Dublin *Daily Chronicle* in its issue of August 2, 1816 characterizing Consalvi as "a perfidious minister (who) is the mere agent of the British Government."[59] The *Orthodox Journal,* first published in July, 1813 as a monthly magazine with William Eusebius Andrews as its editor, was still carrying on the campaign as late as July, 1819 when it described Consalvi's power as, "the influence which an ambitious and crafty minister of state had obtained over the mind of the Pope, and who was leagued with the British ministry to grant the veto."[60] In such an atmosphere it was hardly possible to hope for a joint and reasonable approach being made by the Catholics of the two nations to their common government, or even eliciting the active assistance of the Holy See for their cause.

Another real fly in the ointment of a peaceful arbitration of differences between the Holy See and England, as well as between the two groups of Catholics, was the temperament and conduct

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[58] Amherst, W. J., S. J., *The History of Catholic Emancipation and the Progress of the Catholic Church in the British Isles from 1771 to 1820,* II, 291, 296.

[59] Ward, *Op. cit.,* II, 151.

[60] *Ibid.,* II, 177.

of Bishop Milner. This man, who of course enjoyed great prestige among Irish extremists, was at loggerheads with everyone. As Hughes says, "On almost every matter that involved the common action of the four bishops, (of England) Milner contrived to have views of his own, and inevitably, with his own views, a resolution to secure their execution that no external force could break or bend." [61] Not only did his fellow bishops differ with him but he had completely alienated the good offices of the principal British statesmen. Even the Catholic Board found Milner too troublesome and when he issued his "Brief Memorial" on the bill of 1813 and cast aspersions on some of their number by speaking of "false brethren," the board passed a resolution on May 11, 1813 stating, "that, under the present circumstances, it was highly expedient that the right reverend Dr. Milner should cease to be a member of the private board or select committee, appointed by the general board of British catholics." [62]

That Rome had not entirely despaired of a favorable settlement one might glean from the graceful and complimentary references which Pope Pius VII made in his allocution of September 4, 1815 to the Sacred College. He expressed his gratification at Consalvi's reception in London where, he said: "In that wealthy city We received the greatest evidences of good-will. For not only was Our Legate permitted to appear publicly, wearing the insignia of his office (an event which had not occurred for two hundred years), but in a solemn audience of the Prince Regent, to whom he handed Our Brief, he received so many manifestations of sympathy for Us personally, that We are bound to ex-

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[61] Hughes, *Op. cit.*, 254.

[62] Butler, *Op. cit.*, IV, 271. As a sample of how far the feeling against Milner went cf. the lengthy letter written by Bishop Poynter while in Rome to Cardinal Litta on March 15, 1815, in which Poynter gave the cardinal a detailed refutation of Milner's position in this controversy since 1809. *Ibid.*, IV, 469–507, printed as an appendix.

press Our gratitude and high esteem as well to this Prince as also to the estates of this magnanimous nation."[63] This did not pass unnoticed in England, for as we have previously noted in a letter of Hugh Clifford, a prominent English Catholic, to Consalvi on October 25, the words of the pope's allocution were published in all the papers and had contributed to the good opinion and veneration which the English felt for the person of the Holy Father. Clifford informed Consalvi that the Duke of Sussex had told him that it appeared to be the intention of the ministry to propose the Catholic question again in the spring of 1816, but he was unable to enlighten the cardinal as to what the conditions of the bill would be.[64] The Holy Father likewise made a real effort to create the proper atmosphere in the British Isles for any favorable action the government might take, when he addressed a letter on February 1, 1816 to the Irish hierarchy on the subject of the veto. The pope referred to the solution offered the previous spring in the communication of Litta to the archbishop of Dublin, and he added, " with what pain then do we find it expressly declared in your letter, that the expedient which, amongst others, we signified that we would follow, for satisfying the government of the loyalty of those to be elected bishops, not only did not meet your approbation, but appeared to you to threaten destruction to the catholic religion in Ireland!" Pius VII reiterated the qualifications laid down for giving the British ministry a veto, citing again the precedent of Benedict XIV in his letter of May 15, 1748 to the bishop of Breslau about non-Catholic princes naming to vacant benefices, and he declared, " we carried our precautions so far, that we proposed

[63] Müller, *Op. cit.*, 282. Allocution of Sept. 4, 1815, of Pius VII to the Sacred College.

[64] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 397. Hugh Clifford to Consalvi, Oct. 25, 1815. The tone of this letter would lead the reader to believe that Consalvi's correspondent was not in possession of a very realistic grasp of English public opinion at the moment. Otherwise he could hardly have been beguiled into painting for the cardinal the roseate picture given in his letter.

nothing which could with truth be said to convey to the government a power as to the choice of bishops. We only declared that we would grant a certain power of exclusion . . . with this stipulation and condition, that after the erasure of those names, a sufficient number of candidates shall remain, from which we, and the popes of Rome, our successors, may freely choose him, whom we judge of all the most worthy of the episcopal rank and office." The pope alluded again to the aid given him by the British government in recovering his territories, for " the British government was amongst the chief of our supporters, in procuring our return to the pontifical chair, and our restoration to our ancient independence in the exercise of those spiritual rights, which the hand of violence had wrested from us." He tried to reassure the Irish bishops concerning the list of candidates for vacant sees, since " the list in which the names of the candidates are to be contained, will certainly not be made out by the government, but by the care and attention of those, being catholics, who usually propose to this see persons for promotion to the vacant bishoprics of your kingdom." Likewise in refusing such a privilege to the British government the pope made it clear he would be denying them something granted to other non-Catholic governments, since " not catholic sovereigns alone, but others also who are separated from our communion, claim a share in the appointment of ecclesiastical persons to bishoprics, situated in those parts of their dominions which yet adhere to the catholic faith; a claim which this see feels it necessary to submit to." As a final argument Pius VII stated he felt the grant of the limited veto was necessary if Catholic emancipation was ever to be won.[65]

[65] Butler, *Op. cit.*, IV, 536–548. Letter of Pius VII to the archbishops and bishops of Ireland, Rome, Feb. 1, 1816. The letter is printed in full in an appendix. Pius VII advanced as an argument for the veto that if emancipation came the government would surely wish the right to have a say in who should be the bishops since they would then be "qualified to sit in parliament." It is an interesting speculation as to what the British cabinet in 1816 would have thought had they considered the prospect of the Catholic bishops entering parliament! In one particular the pope was a bit too

Nor did the prospect of a more regular diplomatic understanding between Rome and London emanate solely from the former. The British minister to the court of Florence, who entertained very pronounced views on the papal government, was yet not adverse to advancing either the British or his own personal interests by drawing closer to the Roman court. Writing from Florence on March 27, 1816 to Castlereagh, Lord Burghersh told his superior:

> My despatches are but of little interest: we are stupidly dull and quiet in Italy. The Roman States are, however, dissatisfied with the Pope's Government; the people in insurrections constantly give vent to their feelings. With regard to our communication with that Government, I cannot but return to what I have formerly stated, that, for our consular establishment at least, you should name some person, who should have the charge and direction of the inferior agents, and who should manage the correspondence with the Government.[66]

"What he had formerly stated," was in one instance that, "It is of the utmost importance that a legal channel of communication with the Pope's Government should be provided. From the want of it every Jacobin, every knave or fool speaks for the name of England and is attended to." This Burghersh had written in a

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certain of the connection between the passage of a Catholic emancipation measure and the veto, for he went so far as to tell the Irish hierarchy that such bill "never, certainly, will pass, without our previously granting the privilege in question." *Ibid.*, 545.

[66] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* XI, 197. Burghersh to Castlereagh, Mar. 27, 1816, from Florence. Burghersh was quite excited by these agents and one can see his determination to curb them if possible by some superior authority. He says: "You can hardly be aware of the conduct of some of these agents; their extortions in some instances, their mighty demands from the Government, and their ridiculously haughty demeanour, not to mention their under-practices, of which I constantly hear, neither distinguished for wisdom nor honesty, make it very necessary that some arrangement should be made with regard to them."

communication of the previous July.[67] It is quite possible that those whom Lord Burghersh chose to style " Jacobins, knaves or fools " might have received some attention from other members of the papal government, but the cardinal secretary of state was too well acquainted with British personnel and practice to be taken in by adventurers and thus imperil the relations which he had labored so diligently and discreetly to construct. In fact in this year 1816 Consalvi made another attempt to open the discussions on a possible entente between the two governments. To this approach Castlereagh replied on January 22, 1817 with the characteristic graciousness always shown towards the cardinal. While Consalvi undoubtedly appreciated the friendly tone, the foreign minister's polite refusal to re-open the question could not have been other than a disappointment. Castlereagh wished that the cardinal should " be assured of the sincere desire felt, not only by myself but by my colleagues in the Government, to evince their respect for His Holiness the Pope and to cultivate the most friendly and intimate good understanding with the See of Rome. Your Eminence is aware that in the present state of our laws there are difficulties and delicacies to be observed, but I trust that nothing will impede the mutual desire between the two States to render to each other genuine and reciprocal acts of kindness." [68] Very politely spoken, but hardly contributing much to advance the cause which the cardinal cherished. Obviously conditions had not improved since a year and a half previous when Castlereagh had written his revealing letter to Edward Cooke placing the Catholic question in cold storage as far as the British government was concerned. This communication of January, 1817 to the cardinal would probably fall within the category of what Castlereagh in his letter to Cooke had described as his wish that, " the Court of Rome . . . be content for the present with receiving hints and suggestions from the Government." It would take pretty broad liberties with the text

[67] Webster, *Op. cit.*, II, 113.
[68] *Ibid.*, II, 113.

for Consalvi to read any significant "hints" or "suggestions" in the platitudinous utterance of the foreign secretary early in the year 1817. Despite all that, the correspondence continued between the two statesmen throughout the remainder of this year and only a little less frequently for the years that followed.[69]

Moreover not all the Irish hierarchy were of the Milner persuasion and Consalvi could hope for a friendly and moderate conduct from Dr. Patrick Curtis who was appointed to the primatial see of Armagh by the Holy See on August 8, 1819. The archbishop-elect wrote Castlereagh on September 22, informing him of his promotion to Armagh and expressly saying he would never have acquiesced in his own elevation by the Irish "prelates" had the British government not previously expressed its "consent and even approbation to that measure." Curtis' letter was a model of graciousness, promising to do all he could for Castlereagh and his colleagues, saying he would work for peace between the two peoples, and urging love and respect "for our august Sovereign."[70] This letter would imply that the British government had exercised a review of this appointment which would come pretty close to the controverted veto. One can imagine what O'Connell would have said had he been aware of the contents of Curtis' letter to Castlereagh.

In line with the policy of keeping the channels of communication open for future consultation on the question, the Holy See, under Consalvi's prudent guidance, did not fail to counsel moderation on the English and Irish Catholics. On April 29, 1820, for example, Pope Pius VII ordered the cardinal prefect of Propaganda to write a letter to Bishop Milner rebuking him for the

[69] Robert Aubrey Noakes, "Cardinal Consalvi and England," in *The Month,* CLXXIV (Aug., 1939), speaks of the fact that, "there is an interesting set of letters to and from Castlereagh and Consalvi preserved at the Public Record Office. They are all for the year 1817." 131. It was this correspondence, together with that preserved in the Vatican Archives, that the writer hoped to examine until the war in September, 1939 made such an investigation impossible for the time being.

[70] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* XII, 148–149.

violence of his language in the articles he published in the *Orthodox Journal.* Of course Milner and his sympathizers interpreted this scolding from the Holy See as due to the interference of the cardinal secretary of state.[71] That Consalvi had a hand in it was probably true, for he never failed to see the broader aspects of the problem and to strive for a general entente that would place the relations of the two governments on a stable and friendly basis. As one has expressed it, " the mutual friendly relations which existed between England and Rome, the strong wish in Rome, and the desire of a large party in the United Kingdom, were circumstances which combined to induce Consalvi to make sacrifices to which, under other circumstances, he might not have advised the Pope to consent." [72]

It was in 1821 that the final effort was undertaken in Consalvi's lifetime to reach a solution to the Catholic question through parliamentary action. Motions introduced for such legislation by Parnell and Grattan had been defeated every year between 1815 and 1819 with the exception of 1818. Yet on March 7, Plunkett introduced a bill for Catholic emancipation at a time which found the dissension between the various groups of Catholics in the British Isles if anything worse than it had been before the bill of 1813. The new measure provided for an oath to be taken by Catholics entering parliament, which, it was hoped by its sponsors, was sufficiently innocuous not to offend Catholic belief. The second part of the proposed legislation provided for censorship of communications with Rome and the veto on episcopal appointments. With the full debate on the bill, the old quarrel flared up with fresh heat. Once more the Catholics themselves divided, even the bishops of both England and Ireland showing no unity. Bishop Poynter, who had been delegated by the Holy See to speak, tried in vain to win some amendments through discussion with the parliamentary leaders.[73] Milner

[71] Amherst, *Op. cit.,* II, 333.

[72] *Ibid.,* II, 300.

[73] The English Catholic friends of Poynter had heard a rumor that the

opened battle again. The bill got through its third reading in the House of Commons by a majority of nineteen votes on April 2, but suddenly on April 17 the House of Lords threw it out by a vote of a hundred and fifty-nine to a hundred and twenty. With this defeat the question received a temporary quietus and for the next two years there was relative silence on the burning issue of Catholic relief.[74] By the time that it again moved to the forefront of parliamentary business, the cardinal had lost two of his principal supporters in the cause—Castlereagh died in August, 1822 and was followed to the grave by Pope Pius VII just a year later. The man who came to the foreign office to replace Castlereagh was one whose views were not essentially different from those of the late foreign secretary on the Catholic question. In other words George Canning was realistic enough to admit the seriousness of the issue, to endeavor to settle it for the political peace it might contribute, but he lacked the cordial personal relations with Consalvi which his predecessor had enjoyed. The late Professor Temperley, writing of Canning's attitude on the matter of Catholic liberties, phrased it thus: "Canning's conception of the Catholic problem in England, and indeed everywhere, was principally political. . . . At one time he played with the idea of 'securities,' but rejected this after realizing the impracticability of obtaining any not approved by the Pope." [75]

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latter's enemies had succeeded in poisoning the mind of the pope against him and wrote Pius VII on June 30, 1817, pleading with the pontiff not to remove Poynter as vicar apostolic of the London district. On August 30 the pope replied and told the Catholics to silence their fears since he had the highest regard for Poynter and never had "the suspicion of which you are apprehensive; and much less, had we ever thought of removing him from his apostolic vicariate." Butler, *Op. cit.,* IV, 405–408 where the two letters are printed.

[74] Hughes, *Op. cit.,* 286–288.

[75] "George Canning, the Catholics and the Holy See," by Harold Temperley in the *Dublin Review,* CXCIII (July–Sept., 1933), 8–9. Canning was always cautious when dealing with anyone connected with the issue. Temperley says: "He, therefore, never had any direct communication with

Catholic priests or laymen on the subject of their claims." *Ibid.,* 10. He managed to get his information through the Catholic press or indirectly. An interesting example of this official caution occurred when in September, 1823, Pope Leo XII sent George IV a letter announcing his accession to the papal throne. As foreign secretary the letter went to Canning, but he would not handle it until he had a legal opinion on the matter from the law officers of the crown. On November 20, 1823, he wrote to the chancellor, Lord Eldon: "I am not disposed to incur the Penalties of *Praemunire.* Does your lordship concur with the Attorney and Solicitor-General that I should do so by answering the Papal Secretary of State's letter myself and by advising his Majesty to answer that of the Pope?" In reply Eldon submitted a memorandum in which he said: "I have communicated to Mr. C. in private letters what occurs to me as having a tendency to establish that this letter from the Pope is not such as, independently of any question of *Praemunire,* should be offered to his Majesty. Upon the first construction of the Acts it seems to me that the opinion of the A. G. and S. G. is right, however questionable it may be whether effect would be given to that construction." The foreign secretary's request and Eldon's reply are printed in *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning,* I, 94–95, edited by Edward J. Stapleton (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1887). In his article on "British Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See," in *Dublin Review* (Jan., 1939), Stephen Gaselee, librarian of the Foreign Office, says that Canning "would have liked to institute regular diplomatic relations," 11. However, no proof of this desire is offered. Moreover it is a bit surprising to find Gaselee saying: "After the conclusion of Monsignor Erskine's mission to England I do not know of any endeavour to send a Papal representative to London." *Ibid.,* 11. Consalvi's mission followed Erskine's by no more than fourteen years.

CHAPTER V

CONSALVI, THE JESUITS, AND SOME UNFINISHED BUSINESS

AT THE side of the major issues which preoccupied Cardinal Consalvi in his dealings with Viscount Castlereagh and the British government in these years, ran the problem of the restoration of the Society of Jesus in that country. On August 7, 1814 Pope Pius VII had proclaimed in the church of the Gesù in Rome the reconstitution of the Society in the bull *Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum.*[1] This act, coming as it did just two weeks previous to Consalvi's departure for Vienna and the opening of the congress, was not calculated to improve the chances of success of his mission. Feeling was still keen about the Jesuits and their alleged misdeeds, and to many this papal restoration seemed to hail the advent of a drive on the part of the Church to regain its position of privilege and power enjoyed in the heyday of the ancien régime. To the mind of Pius VII, his act was but the rectification of a long-standing injustice done to a body of men who had served the Church loyally and well for a period of over two centuries.

To a statesman such as Consalvi, the restoration of the Society could not be viewed singly or solely on its intrinsic merits; to him the problem had to be interpreted in the light of the attitude of the governments of the principal European Powers at the time and their relations to the Holy See. Several weeks before being named by Pius VII as his acting secretary of state,

[1] Text of the bull in Andreas Barbèri, *Bullarii Romani Continuatio, XIII,* 323–325. For a recent scholarly article which surveys the whole question of Jesuit restoration cf. Paul Dudon, "La résurrection de la Compagnie de Jésus (1773–1814)," in *Revue des questions historiques* (Avril, 1939), 21–59.

Consalvi had expressed his opinion on the restoration of the Jesuits in a letter of February, 1800 to Monsignor Albani, then papal nuncio to Vienna. He stated at that time that he had always been persuaded of the need of the restoration of the Society, but he never went so far as to believe that the Church could not get along without the Jesuits since it was without them for many centuries. He added that if he was the one in command he would restore them "tomorrow." As it was, he had already told the pope this a short time before, but the fear of the opposing princes had held up the execution of the pope's act. As he related to Albani, the pope, if he lived and maintained his freedom, or if not Pius VII then his successor, ought to restore the Jesuits without further delay. He concluded his letter with the words: "Eccovi la mia professione di fede su questo punto, mi conoscete troppo onesto, per non esser veridico." [2]

Knowing the cardinal as we do, it is not difficult to take him at his word to Albani in this explanation of his position on the Jesuits. In fact a year and a half later he was trying to smooth away some of the difficulties for the unfortunate Jesuits by facilitating their entry into Russia where Pope Pius VII by the brief of March 7, 1801 had formally restored their Russian province. In a letter to the papal agent in St. Petersburg, Abbé Benvenuti, Consalvi on July 2, 1801 had written that ex-Jesuits "who are now in England and in other non-Catholic countries," might, under the brief of the pope, be aggregated to the Russian province.[3] As far as personal sympathies were concerned, Consalvi was more friendly disposed towards the Jesuits than were some of his colleagues in the Sacred College, among them Pius VII's prefect of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide, Stefano Cardinal Borgia who had been associated with the Congregation off

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[2] "Pio VII (1800–1823). I giorni e le glorie di Roma," in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III, 299.

[3] Pollen, J. H., "An Unobserved Centenary," in *The Month,* CXV (May, 1910), 458; Thomas Hughes, *History of the Society of Jesus in North America. Documents.* I, Pt. II, 817, n. 6.

and on since 1770. Pius VII appointed him rector of the Roman College in 1801. But despite Consalvi's sympathies, it was necessary for the man who had in his charge the conduct of the pope's foreign relations to have his eye and ear alert to catch the current trends in the policies of the secular governments. It was for this reason that a noted English Jesuit historian could write: "Cardinal Consalvi was personally in favour of the Jesuits, but, as might be expected from so great a diplomatist, thought that the assent of the various Governments should be won first." [4]

The distractions of the years that followed the opening of the new century gave no opportunity for the Holy See to take any radical action on the Society. During a good part of the first fifteen years of Pius VII's pontificate the pope was himself in captivity with general war rampant in Europe. It was only with the fall of Bonaparte in 1814 that this, among much other unfinished business, could again be given effective attention. However, in that year the long-awaited formal restoration came. We are interested here only in so far as the proclamation of Pius VII concerned England and the furtherance of Anglo-papal relations. In his bull the pope stated that he extended all concessions and faculties to the Jesuits elsewhere as they had been enjoying them in Russia and the Two Sicilies, though aside from his own Papal States he did not specify the places of restoration by name.[5] Nonetheless the public affirmation of the revival of the Jesuits caused widespread uneasiness, not only in the chambers of government, but even in certain clerical circles where they were not popular. Among the English ecclesiastics who were opposed to the restoration was Bishop Poynter, vicar apostolic of the London district, whom we have already had occasion to meet in connection with the fight for Catholic emancipation. Poynter was strategically placed to cause trouble for the English supporters of the Jesuits. He was, as has been mentioned, in

[4] Pollen, *Op. cit.*, 458.
[5] Barbèri, *Op. cit.*, XIII, 324.

the good graces of the British government, and his relations with the pope and Consalvi were most cordial, having helped to pave the way for the latter's London visit in the summer of 1814. Another was Dr. Robert Gradwell who served as rector of the English College in Rome from 1818 to 1828 and acted as agent at the Holy See for the Poynter party, if such it could be called. Still another enemy of the Jesuits was Bishop William Gibson, vicar apostolic of the North. However, the Society had a doughty defender in the vicar apostolic of the Midland district, John Milner, who, as one has described him, "was always ready to bind up his sheaves and he had a sure instinct for the cockle."[6] John Milner did not scruple to enter the fray on behalf of the "gentlemen of Stonyhurst."

The important point was, however, that it was Poynter's group and not Milner who had the ear of Rome. Consalvi had learned a good deal of the Jesuit prejudices in England on his visit to that country; he heard more of them through his communications with Poynter and Gradwell. He was determined therefore to go cautiously and not to allow this smoldering storm to break and destroy his last hope of an agreement with the British government on larger questions. Thus when the cardinal prefect of Propaganda, Litta, under whose jurisdiction England fell as a missionary land, wrote a letter on February 14, 1818 to Bishop Gibson favoring the cause of the Jesuits and the ordination of their men *titulo paupertatis,* all of the vicars apostolic except Milner joined in a remonstrance against Litta's judgment on the ground of fears of inciting the ill-will of the government, and Poynter at once instructed Gradwell to oppose it in Rome. The latter performed his part of the business by enlisting the aid of the cardinal secretary of state, and on April 18 he was able to inform Bishop Gibson that Consalvi would not fail to obtain a recall of the letter. Litta cancelled his famous letter on May 3

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[6] Mathew, David, *Catholicism in England, 1535–1935,* 170 (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936).

and wrote Gibson that by order of the pope his previous letter of February 14 was "to be held as not having been written."[7] That Consalvi overestimated the extent of the English hatred of the Jesuits may very well have been true. Pollen gives as an example of this wrong impression the fact that the cardinal had written Pacca from Paris on July 25, 1814 to the effect that the Jesuits at Stonyhurst had been obliged to protest that they were not Jesuits "to save themselves from immediate expulsion." This Pollen states was not true, but it does, as he adds, make Consalvi's views as expressed to Pacca easier to understand. In that despatch he had written of the Jesuits in England:

> Someone spoke to me a few words about them, but I cut him short, and said in general, that His Holiness in re-establishing Jesuits since the year 1801, had done so for those states which desired it, without respect to others. As to Jesuits, I should think it well to advance with great watchfulness and deliberation as regards England, and not to pledge oneself to anything, considering the decided opposition of the Government. All cannot be done in a day, as the proverb runs, and again—one must give time to the times. As for the Jesuits or semi-Jesuits in that country it will therefore be necessary in my judgment to proceed slowly; very very slowly.[8]

Although this communication had been sent to Pacca in 1814, it continued to represent the cardinal's views on this question for the remainder of his lifetime. Pollen gives it as his opinion that Consalvi never overcame a twofold error in judging the English question; one was an exaggeration of the power possessed by the British cabinet in a so-called free country such as Great Britain, and the second was that the Jesuits were no worse off legally

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[7] Pollen, J. H., "The Restoration of the English Jesuits, 1803–1817," in *The Month,* CXV (June, 1910), 597.

[8] *Ibid.,* 592, citing Vatican Archives, *Nunziatura di Colonia,* 1814, minute.

speaking than were the English bishops and secular clergy.[9] Writing from Vienna on September 26, 1814 Consalvi had let Pacca know that the Jesuit restoration was a matter of discussion between himself and Castlereagh. He said the British foreign secretary had asked just what had transpired in Rome anent a restoration of the Society since the publication of the bull, letting the cardinal know that the promulgation had not been pleasing. This reaction Consalvi said he had foreseen because of the fact that the publication had been done with " troppe fumate." Nonetheless, he said he explained to Castlereagh as simply as possible the Holy See's reasons, instancing how the Jesuits had been in the process of restoration since 1801 in Russia and then in Sicily and Naples, at the request of the rulers of those countries. He assured Pacca he admired the bull of Pius VII, saying he thought it had expressed the matter with circumspection on this delicate question, so much so as to be truly beyond reasonable criticism.[10]

In this matter of a Jesuit restoration in England, as on all other questions pending between Great Britain and the Holy See, Castlereagh was not embarrassed by a lack of advice on how he should act. The ubiquitous Sir John Hippisley wrote him from London while the foreign secretary was attending the Congress of Vienna. This letter, dated November 10, 1814, contained a strong warning to Castlereagh against giving his consent for the Society's return to England. To buttress his views, Sir John enclosed a copy of Pius VII's bull of restoration, the subject headings of a four-volume work on the history of the Jesuits published in 1761, a letter to Hippisley from the pope, and a copy of the treaties of Westphalia and the bull of Innocent X condemning those treaties issued on November 26, 1648. With this array of evidence Hippisley hoped to convince the foreign secretary of the peril involved in any weakness shown on this question. Hippisley told Castlereagh that before Consalvi had

[9] *Ibid.*, 592–593.

[10] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 301, citing Vatican Archives, *Congresso di Vienna,* 1814.

left London in July he had sent a letter to Pius VII by the cardinal telling His Holiness of the low opinion he had of the Irish Catholics and the "tergiversation" of their bishops; moreover he informed Consalvi that he should call to the attention of Pius VII the public pronouncements made in parliament by Hippisley himself on the return of the Jesuits to England. For Castlereagh's benefit he included Pius VII's reply to his letter, dated from Rome on September 19, 1814. This letter of the Holy Father, written in Italian, is a model of politeness and gratitude for Sir John's interest and aid given in bringing peace between the clergy of England and of Ireland, and for his help given to the Catholic cause in his capacity as a member of parliament. But the interesting thing about the letter is the Holy Father's complete silence on the important question of his attitude on the restoration of the English Jesuits.

Hippisley felt that the four volume work which he had sent Castlereagh some time before on the history of the Society would help him in framing his judgment, for there he could "trace, from the best sources, the progress of a society which, from its cradle, has been estimated to be dangerous to the civil power, till at length the Sovereigns of Europe, compelled by a common instinct, united in the abolition of the Order."[11] Castlereagh's correspondent recalled that when he had spoken in parliament on this danger most members had pooh-poohed him, but he was not without supporters, for, "Your lordship will recollect that Mr. Canning, in replying to the observations made by me in Parliament, admitted that the 'establishment of the Jesuits in this country, after having been abolished in every Popish country

[11] This history, written in 1761 just three years before the suppression of the Society in France and two years following their expulsion from Portugal, was probably the work of the Abbé C. Coudrette, *Histoire générale de la naissance et des progrès de la Compagnie de Jésus,* in four volumes published in Paris and Amsterdam in 1761, written in the vein of the "enlightened" attack upon the Society, and suppressed at Paris in 1762. Cf. C. Sommervogel-P. Bliard, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus,* T. XI, cols. 175–176, 179. (Paris: Auguste Picard, 1932.)

in Europe, is a fact of a very alarming nature.' " Lest Castlereagh should be misled by Russia's example, Hippisley went into a lengthy explanation to account for Russia admitting the Jesuits, in which he was at pains to make it clear that their activities were closely watched by the government at St. Petersburg, their teaching in the schools rigidly supervised and inspected, and a prohibition promulgated against their giving instruction in the Catholic faith. To show the foreign secretary how annoying the Roman court could be on public questions, Hippisley enclosed Innocent X's bull against parts of the treaties of Westphalia in 1648, though he assured Castlereagh that the sovereigns ignored the protest, even the Catholic monarchs.[12]

Rome too had its correspondents who gratuitously furnished it with literature on the controversy over the restored Society. In his letter of October 25, 1815, Hugh Clifford had written Consalvi that he had sent a copy of a book written by an English Protestant entitled *La nuova congiura contro i Gesuiti scoperta* to Cardinal Brancadoro which he felt would be of " the greatest

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[12] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 191–198. Hippisley's dislike of the Jesuits carried him to great lengths, as an examination of the two volumes of *Documents* edited by Father Thomas Hughes, makes clear. For example, in his parliamentary speeches he urged the right of the British government to seize the Jesuit properties at Stonyhurst as Charles Plowden, S. J., mentioned in his letter to Joseph Tristram, S. J., of May 22, 1814, where he said: *" In defending Stonyhurst against the attacks made in Parliament, . . . special notice should be taken of Sir John Hippisley's* grounding a right to seize this property on a spiritual sentence of the Holy See (the dissolution of the Society), though we all disclaim upon oath the very shadow of power or right in the Pope to meddle with temporal concerns, etc." *Ibid.,* Pt. II, 1140. The meddlesome tactics of Hippisley were even known on the other side of the Atlantic where Archbishop Carroll of Baltimore, concerned over the question of the security of Jesuit properties in his archdiocese, referred to certain enemies of the Jesuits in public life in America in a letter to Father John A. Grassi, S. J., superior of Georgetown College, on February 21, 1815, in the words: " There are in our legislative bodies (*such persons*) as Sir John Hippisley Cox, ready to embrace the erroneous statements of mis-informed men." *Ibid.,* Pt. I, 376.

utility" to the Jesuits and to Catholics generally.[13] Nor were certain friends of the Jesuits at the Holy See prone to let the matter drop. Milner petitioned the Holy See for permission to ordain Jesuit candidates for the priesthood and in reply Cardinal della Somaglia, pro-prefect of the Congregation, wrote a letter on December 14, 1818, favoring ordinations of the Stonyhurst Jesuits in England as regular clergy by any Catholic bishop. Meanwhile Bishop Poynter, the unofficial liaison officer at London between the Holy See and the government, requested Viscount Sidmouth, secretary of state for home affairs, to give a declaration for the government on the Jesuits. Sidmouth, who was rightly described some years later as a "dichiarato nemico de'Cattolici,"[14] (*sic*) replied to Poynter, after consultation with his fellow ministers, and informed the bishop that they had "insuperable objections to the restoration of the Jesuits in England." This information was sent to Gradwell in a letter of March 14 from Poynter in which the latter asked him to contact Consalvi. In consequence of this opinion a papal brief was issued on April 18, 1820 revoking the Somaglia letter of December 14, 1818. Cardinal Consalvi wrote Poynter telling him to reassure Sidmouth that the rescript had been withdrawn and that the Society, "nondum restitutam censeri" in England seeing the government did not desire it.[15] The government was gratified at the turn of events and expressed their pleasure, news of which Poynter forwarded to Consalvi on June 13, 1820.[16] The

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[13] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 397.

[14] Bishop Baines to Leo XII, Aug. 14, 1828. Hughes, *Documents,* Pt. II, 1144. Sidmouth's attitude had not greatly changed from the day when he stated in debate on Feb. 12, 1799, that if he had to choose between the reenactment of the popery laws and Catholic emancipation, coupled with parliamentary reform, he should give the preference to the former. Haile, Martin and Edwin Bonney, *Life and Letters of John Lingard, 1771–1851,* 176, note.

[15] Hughes, *Documents,* Pt. II, 1142–1143. Consalvi to Poynter, Apr. 18, 1820, from Rome.

[16] Pollen, J. H., "The Recognition of the Jesuits in England," in *The Month,* CXVI (July, 1910), 23–36.

cardinal's letter, which had been conveyed through Dr. Gradwell in Rome, did not, however, fail to protect the Society's rights elsewhere,—and even remotely in England. Pollen gives an analysis of this letter in which he says:

> After one knows the inner meaning of the message, one can see where that meaning is obscurely to be traced. After explaining over several pages that the Society was "not considered as restored," Consalvi throws in the phrase, "The Society is, however, in general so restored, if the Government would admit it, there would be no need of a special Apostolic decree for the Society to be received in England." When one tries to square that with what is required by the Church for the sanction of Orders and of their Missions, one dimly perceives that the English Province of the Jesuits must (for Consalvi's hypothesis to be true) have already existed in some form or other by the sanction of the Church.[17]

The cardinal then was not, as all agree, opposed to the restoration of the Jesuits either in England or elsewhere. He did, however, regard their return to England in a formal manner in 1814 as inopportune and dangerous to the success of the difficult negotiations he was conducting with the British government. Generally speaking, this remained his feeling to the end of his term of office, for he never completely despaired of reaching an understanding with London. Such is the view taken by the Jesuit his-

[17] Pollen, J. H., "The Recognition of the Jesuits in England," in *The Month,* CXVI (July, 1910), 32–33. One reason for the difficulty of this whole question, either at the time or in its narration, was the often contradictory instructions about the restored Jesuits emanating from various officials of the Holy See at different intervals in the years after 1814. This lack of a uniform policy on the part of Rome, plus the clashing viewpoints of the English bishops on the Jesuits, made it a thorny problem indeed. For an orderly summary of the leading documents, and an analysis of them by Bishop Baines in a communication to Leo XII on August 14, 1828, in which Baines rehearses the case, cf. Hughes, *Documents,* Pt. II, 1141–1146. The Society of Jesus was only put upon a proper ecclesiastical footing in England by a brief of Pope Leo XII of January 1, 1829.

torians themselves in the light of his long-range policy. On the occasion of the centenary of Cardinal Consalvi's death in 1924 *La Civiltà Cattolica,* a leading Jesuit journal, paid him high tribute for his attitude towards the Society. Because of the bitter quarrel between the *zelanti* and the *diplomatici* within the college of cardinals during the late years of Pius VII's reign, the former party made it seem that Consalvi had very little friendship for the Jesuits. Rinieri, the leading Jesuit authority on the diplomatic history of the papacy in this period, attested the fact that Consalvi worked with real enthusiasm, " ma con vigile cautela " because of the stubborn resistance of Spain and Portugal, for the restoration of the Society which the cardinal felt would be a useful instrument, " to arrest the tide of the revolution." The editors of *La Civiltà Cattolica* quite frankly stated in their commemorative essay at the time of the cardinal's centenary: " It is for us a special duty of gratitude to note the sincere friendship of Consalvi towards the Society of Jesus." [18]

In more than one capacity Cardinal Consalvi showed himself a sincere friend to English Catholic interests in the period of the Restoration. In the terrific tumult which ensued as a consequence of the continental wars, the religious activities of English institutions on the continent, to say nothing of their real property, were seriously disrupted. During the course of the revolution in France the schools of the Catholic English, Irish, and Scotch had suffered badly, and in the general confusion attendant upon the transition from the Directory to the Napoleonic rule, these properties had all been grouped together and placed under the supervision of a joint administrator, a scheming Irishman by the name of Ferris. It is not difficult to understand that this system of administration redounded to the satisfaction of none of the parties involved. The English and Scotch naturally resented Ferris. Representations to this effect were made to

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[18] " Il Cardinale Ercole Consalvi nel primo centenario dalla morte," in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1924), 112–113.

Cardinal Consalvi during his London visit. The result was that when the cardinal reached Paris he brought the complaint to the attention of Abbé de Montesquiou, acting minister of the interior in the provisional government of Louis XVIII. Consalvi requested the minister to lay the case before the king and to ask for the dissolution of the administrative union of the colleges of the three nationalities, the return to their original owners, and the expulsion of Ferris.[19] The protests against the arrangement even reached official British circles, as we learn from a letter of Earl Bathurst, secretary of state for war and the colonies, who addressed himself on the subject to the Duke of Wellington in September, 1814 in which he told the duke that the Scotch Roman Catholics should be allowed to have their college in Paris restored to their own hands and to dispose of it as they liked. This, said the earl, was the Prince Regent's desire.[20] The pressure of the cardinal and the British government brought results, for on September 23 King Louis XVIII sent a decree, countersigned by the Abbé de Montesquiou, to the Duke of Wellington in which the administration and control of the English and Scotch properties were separated from the Irish, leaving the joint administrator in charge of only the Irish college and its interests.[21]

At the same time that the Catholics of the British Isles won a more satisfactory administration for their institutions in France, renewed interest in the continental mother-school of the English Catholics, the English College in Rome, had been aroused. This institution, the traces of which first appeared in the fourteenth century as a hospice for English pilgrims to the Eternal City, had undergone a sad transformation during the preceding decade and a half. Upon the French occupation of Rome in 1797 it had been closed, its revenues seized by the French, and its students sent back to England. Not until the storm of the Napoleonic

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[19] Ward, Bernard, *The Eve of Catholic Emancipation,* II, 262.

[20] *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,* IX, 222. Bathurst to Wellington, Sept. 6, 1814.

[21] *Ibid.,* 280–282. Louis XVIII to Wellington, Sept. 23, 1814.

era had subsided was there any chance of its re-opening. The best years of the school were seen from the day in 1579 when it was entrusted to the care of the Jesuits by Pope Gregory XIII up to the suppression of the Society in August, 1773. With the suppression of the Jesuits the college was given over to Italian secular priests and for the next quarter century it underwent a marked decline. Italian administration was agreeable neither to the English ecclesiastical supporters nor to the students. Consequently when it came time to talk of a re-establishment the question of administration was of the first importance. The English vicars apostolic were intent upon recovering the control of the institution, and with this in mind Bishop Poynter wrote Viscount Castlereagh in July, 1814 stating that he was speaking not only in his own name but in that of the vicars apostolic of both England and Scotland, when he requested him to interest himself in the English and Scotch colleges maintained at Rome for the education of young men for the priesthood to serve in their respective countries. The whole point of the letter is contained in Poynter's sentence: " It is our joint desire that all youths who are educated to officiate as clergymen in Great Britain be impressed as much as possible with the feelings of British subjects." From this it followed that the students in the Roman houses must have British superiors and not Italians. Poynter informed Castlereagh that the vicars apostolic had petitioned Cardinal Litta, prefect of Propaganda, to this effect. But, and this is where Castlereagh's service was solicited, Poynter and his fellow bishops felt their petition to the cardinal prefect " would be most effectually strengthened, were the British Government to signify that it is also their wish that these colleges should have British Superiors." [22]

Just four weeks after Poynter's letter to Castlereagh, the cardinal prefect of Propaganda wrote Poynter that the college was soon to be re-opened and inquired about a certain Father Stephen

[22] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* X, 65–67. Poynter to Castlereagh, July 2, 1814, from London.

Green who had been recommended for rector by Bishop Milner. Father Green, however, died before any action was taken in his behalf and the cardinal protector of the college, Cardinal Braschi, had his long tenure of that office terminated by death about the same time. In this interval Cardinal Consalvi, acting in his capacity as secretary of state, decided to take the institution under his protection and see it through the uncertain period until a rector could be formally installed. The cardinal saw this temporary duty as a further chance to be of assistance to the English Catholics whom he knew so well and for whom he entertained a high regard. Consequently in April, 1817 Consalvi became cardinal protector of the English College and helped to assist the struggling institution to regain its standing. Fortunately in this same spring Father John Lingard, the English historian, arrived in Rome and interested himself in the cause of the institution. Lingard was in touch with Dr. Macpherson, rector of the Scots College, who told him that Consalvi was well disposed to an English secular priest as rector. Lingard wrote his friend Bishop Poynter this news and urged speed in the appointment. He wrote, " Mr. Macpherson requests in the most pressing manner that your lordship would send some one over as agent. He could get the English College for him from Cardinal Consalvi." The active aid of the cardinal protector was evidenced when on July 18, 1817 Lingard wrote Poynter that, " He (Consalvi) took down the names of the persons now in possession as the agents of the late Cardinal Braschi, and said he would send for them, and make them give an account of the revenues of the college." Again Lingard emphasized the need of quick action, " at all events recommend some one to the Cardinal, and he will, I trust, name and appoint him rector." [23] With such able prompting the cardinal wrote the English vicars apostolic and asked them to select an English priest for the rectorship and to send him to Rome at once. In this way the danger of another Italian régime was obviated by the direct intervention of the powerful secretary

[23] Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.*, 150–152.

of state. Acting on the suggestion of the English vicars apostolic, Father Robert Gradwell received his appointment from Consalvi in August and was formally installed in March, 1818.[24]

The need of Consalvi's aid did not cease with the installation of Gradwell as rector of the college, for the Italian Jesuits, backed by a group within the Sacred College, were in no sense reconciled to the loss of the institution to the English secular clergy. An attempt had been made to evict Gradwell during an absence of Consalvi from Rome. Gradwell had an audience of Pius VII in which the pontiff promised him his protection, and two days following Consalvi's return from Terracina the cardinal sent Gradwell a document " constituting him rector, as from the Pope himself." Lingard gave a report of these incidents to his friend, Dr. John Kirk, in a letter of May 29, 1818, and he stated that following the incident related above, Gradwell still had trouble:

> A short time ago, while he was at the Vatican with Consalvi, Grassi (General of the Jesuits) entered the college, took formal possession, and turned out Gradwell's servant, telling him that his master might go to an inn. Gradwell, on his return, took possession again, and wrote an account of all to Consalvi, who immediately sent for Grassi and reprimanded him severely.

Lingard concluded this section of his letter with the opinion that, " all this shows that Gradwell is safe while Consalvi reigns, but he will have hard work afterwards. Consalvi has recovered for him about 6000 crowns per annum, and a great part of the library." [25]

Ten candidates for the priesthood arrived from England the following December as the first contingent of a student body, and

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[24] Gradwell was very close to Poynter and an enemy of the Jesuits. Among his other duties he accepted the offer of acting as Roman agent for Archbishop Maréchal of Baltimore in which capacity he became deeply immersed in anti-Jesuit policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Hughes, *Documents,* Pt. II, 1048. Gradwell to Maréchal, Feb. 9, 1821, from Rome.

[25] Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.,* 164–165.

among them was the future first cardinal archbishop of Westminster, Nicholas Wiseman. In his memoirs published forty years later, after he had returned to England as archbishop, Wiseman paid tribute to Consalvi for his assistance to his old school when he wrote, " the re-establishment of the suppressed English College, in Rome—was the work, almost spontaneous, of Pius, and his great minister Cardinal Consalvi." [26]

In the period of eight years from June, 1815 when the cardinal returned to Rome from the Congress of Vienna up to the death of Pope Pius VII in August, 1823, he never failed to use his influence and power as the pope's foreign minister to advance the interests and deepen the friendship with the British court. This cultivation of cordial relations with Great Britain often took the cardinal off the path of official duty, and at times drew down upon him the criticism of colleagues within the Sacred College. In that body he led the party known as the *diplomatici,* those prelates who were willing to yield on unessentials to meet the position of the secular governments in order to win support for larger issues which the Church was advancing. The more numerous group of the cardinals, however, belonged to the *zelanti* who took a quite uncompromising stand against what they felt were the dangerous elements then loose in the world. To their mind, the Church should show an unbending hostility to the efforts of the governments to win further concessions. The old Church had suffered enough from the Revolution and its aftermath during the previous quarter century. Now that it had been restored in most lands to a status of public respect and considerable authority it was time to guard its rights more jealously than ever. Between the two parties there was a wide breach of attitude on public questions, and the *zelanti* did not fail to point to Consalvi as one who would yield too much in order to keep the good-will of the courts of Europe. Nonetheless, so long as Pius VII lived and Consalvi continued to enjoy his confidence, the *zelanti* were powerless to do much about the secretary of state's policies.

[26] Wiseman, *Recollections of the Last Four Popes,* 23.

Although Consalvi had left Vienna without the British concordat which he had hoped to negotiate, he persisted in his anticipation that he might yet succeed. He therefore allowed none of his cordial contacts with the English to wane. Many of these friendships the cardinal had formed years before as a young man and their continuance was but the loyalty of a sincere affection. For example, while returning from Vienna to Rome the papal secretary interrupted his journey at Florence to visit the court of the grand duke of Tuscany, but also to extend his greetings to the Countess of Albany, wife of the pretender, Charles III, and sister-in-law of the Cardinal of York, who was then in the Tuscan capital. He informed Pacca in a letter from Venice on June 23 that he was making a call on the countess "from which I am not able to dispense myself."[27] The years after 1815 opened the continent again to English travel in an uninterrupted way and many Englishmen took advantage of it. Numbers of them went to Rome where Consalvi proved a gracious and amiable host. Speaking of these visitors to the Eternal City, Angelucci remarks, "the highest English personages in extraordinary number wished to visit this city which they had been accustomed to hear called *Babylon and prostitute* by their Protestant ministers, and to see again that cardinal so gentle and skillful whom at one time they had admired so much in his red mantle in London . . . For the English it appeared the cardinal had a weakness; he favored them in everything, and thus others showed jealousy."[28]

Among the distinguished English visitors to Rome during the Restoration was Dr. John Lingard, the young priest who was destined to do so much for the rewriting of the history of England. Lingard arrived in Rome on May 26, 1817 armed with a letter of introduction from Bishop Poynter to Cardinal Litta, prefect of Propaganda. From Litta the church historian was

[27] Rinieri, *Corrispondenza*, 747.

[28] Angelucci, G. A., *Il grande segretario della Santa Sede; sunto della vita di Ercole Consalvi*, 65.

hoping for permission to secure additional documents for his *History of England* upon which he had already spent eleven years of labor. On the first visit Litta was very cordial, but as he wrote in a letter of June 17 to Poynter, a few days later Lingard noted a marked coolness towards him from the cardinal prefect. He was momentarily at a loss to understand the reason but it soon came to light. The fiery Milner did not approve Father Lingard's work and had written Cardinal Litta that the historian's efforts were useless as he, Milner, had answered all the anti-Catholic attacks in England and therefore Lingard should not be encouraged in his pursuit.[29] Disgusted by his failure to carry out his mission, Lingard quit Rome for Naples in the company of Lord Stourton and returned only on June 24 in time for the ceremonies celebrated on the feast of Sts. Peter and Paul. The English party found upon their return that rooms had been engaged for them by Cardinal Consalvi for the duration of the festival and that their company included the king and queen of Spain and the princess of Wales. Struck by this gesture, Lingard decided to appeal to the secretary of state for permission to use the Vatican Archives. In his journal he recorded the result:

> Nothing could exceed the kindness of his Eminence. He sent for Monsignor Baldi, and in my presence told him to order, in his name, all the officers to give me every facility, and to procure for me such MSS. as I should then mark down in writing. But though they obeyed, everything had been thrown into so much confusion by the French, that I did not procure all the codices I wanted.[30]

It is not difficult to imagine the feeling which the historian carried away for the secretary of state when he left Rome on July 7.

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[29] Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.*, 144–146. In a letter of July 24, 1817 from Geneva Lingard told Poynter that he later heard from Consalvi's secretary that Milner had pictured him to Cardinal Litta "as a notorious Jansenist." *Ibid.*, 153.

[30] *Ibid., Op. cit.*, 152.

In the journal which he kept during his visit to the continent, Lingard spoke of the Roman court and its leading personalities. He remarked, "Consalvi, the minister, is one of the greatest talents, and is indefatigable in industry." [31] It had been but one more demonstration of the predilection shown by Consalvi for the English.

Nor did the cardinal allow himself to be distracted from his goal by any rumor or gossip which reached his ears on the policies of the English within the Italian peninsula. In February, 1816 Lebzeltern, Austrian ambassador to the Holy See, reported to him there were serious rumors to the effect that Lord William Bentinck was conducting maneuvers to create an independent and united Italy. The cardinal thanked the ambassador for the news but offered no credence to the rumor, telling Lebzeltern that such would be "unworthy of his honorable sentiments and would correspond poorly with the noble ideas of his illustrious nation. I am not able to induce myself to believe that Lord Bentinck had actual correspondence with the heads of the sect of the Carbonari and of the Independents." Consalvi's informer received only the slender consolation that His Eminence would watch Bentinck's conduct and correspondence.[32] In this case the

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[31] *Ibid.*, 154. Lingard had noted something of the daily routine of Consalvi as well, for he added: "After spending the morning in giving audience, he will take a few poached eggs for dinner, with two or three glasses of water, then apply again to business till eleven at night, throw himself on his sofa in his bed-gown, snatch two or three hours' sleep, dress, drive 18 miles to Castel Gandolpho to the Pope, return again, and apply once more to business by nine in the morning." *Ibid.* While this schedule of the cardinal's day is impressive, the fact that he is alleged to have taken only two or three hours of sleep does stretch credulity a bit too far. On August 24, 1821, Pope Pius VII issued a special brief conferring the triple academic honor of doctor of divinity, civil, and canon law upon Father Lingard. At the same time the degree of D.D. was conferred on three other English priests, among them Gradwell. Consalvi wanted to make them all monsignori, but Dr. Gradwell objected that the title was strange to England, so the D.D. degrees were given instead. *Ibid.*, 193.

[32] Cassi, G., *Il Cardinale Consalvi ed i primi anni della restaurazione pontificia 1815–1819*, 61.

Austrian ambassador's information was based on something more solid than idle gossip, for Bentinck's tactics in Italy were such that ultimately his own government had to relieve him of his post. But Consalvi stuck to his preference from which the ambassador of another Power was not going to dislodge him.

Prominent English officials and members of the nobility realized Consalvi's affection for their homeland, and those interested either politically or socially in Italy did not fail to avail themselves of it. For example, Elizabeth, Duchess of Devonshire, who was resident in Rome for a considerable time, was on terms of close friendship with the cardinal. When the Princess Charlotte, daughter of the Prince Regent, died in 1817 the duchess wrote the regent a letter of sympathy in which she mentioned that that very morning she had a letter from Consalvi informing her of the sad news and stating how much the cardinal was affected by it. She assured George, "You will easily believe how very sincerely and strongly Cardinal Consalvi is affected by this misfortune to you my dear Sir, to whom he is so gratefully attached . . . On every occasion I receive the kindest attention from him, & the conviction of his attachment to your R. H. person."[33] About a year later Castlereagh, who was then attending the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, wrote a letter to Consalvi introducing Stratford Canning, English minister to Switzerland, who was on his way to Rome for the purpose of trying to forget the recent death of his wife.[34] The following March Castlereagh wrote the cardinal again, this time to tell him of the death of his sister, Octavia, because Consalvi had always taken an "affectionate interest" in her.[35] The husband of the dead woman, Lord Ellenborough, also wrote him from Paris to communicate the same news some two weeks later.[36] An illustration of how these

[33] *Letters of George IV,* II, 214. Duchess of Devonshire to Prince Regent, Nov. 23, from Rome.

[34] *Mémoires,* I, 118. Castlereagh to Consalvi, Oct. 27, 1818, from Aix-la-Chapelle.

[35] *Ibid.,* I, 118–119. Castlereagh to Consalvi, Mar. 15, 1819.

[36] *Ibid.,* I, 120–122. Lord Ellenborough to Consalvi, Apr. 2, 1819.

cordial relations could be mutually beneficial is afforded by the problems confronting the British government in Malta and Corfu. In the case of the former island the British had conquered it from the French during the Napoleonic wars and Corfu had been given over as a protectorate of Britain's at the final settlement in Vienna. In both islands there were acute ecclesiastical questions which the Church and the government were anxious to settle. It was in this vein that Consalvi wrote Metternich from Rome on August 27, 1815 recommending the needs of the archbishop of Corfu. The cardinal told Metternich that he was sending a recommendation of the archbishop to Castlereagh for support and he asked the Austrian chancellor if Castlereagh had left Vienna would he deign to intercede with him for the prelate and explain the difficulties which he was encountering in his efforts to restore order to his island bishopric. He informed the chancellor that the correspondence of late from Corfu had stated that the English governor there had commanded that the residence of the archbishop be set in order for the latter's occupancy.[37] Malta too occupied the minds of both British and papal statesmen where the French occupation and the change to English rule necessitated many adjustments. In a letter of April 7, 1820 to Castlereagh the cardinal referred to this question and expressed his regret that he was unable immediately to get a reply off to the foreign secretary " relative to the change proposed for Malta." [38]

Although the attitude of the Prince Regent towards the political rights of his Catholic subjects had undergone a decided change since his entry into the chair of the regency, that change did not alter his friendly personal relations with the Holy Father and his secretary of state. All through the years of the Restoration there was a fairly constant exchange of courtesies between the prince and the Holy See. On one occasion George sent to Cardinal Con-

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[37] Van Duerm, *Correspondance,* 94.

[38] *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* XII, 239.

salvi a gift of a brilliant scarlet robe made from Indian cloth of great value.[39]

Nor were these contacts always confined to purely personal affairs. In the years after the fall of Bonaparte the presence in and around the Mediterranean of the ships of the Barbary pirates was a serious obstacle to the trade and commerce of Britain's merchant vessels in those waters. There was no power in the Mediterranean strong enough to hold them in check. Consequently the British government kept a squadron on duty there as a protection to their commerce. In serving their own interests the British were not adverse to making capital out of these ships in another way. They afforded a fine instrument with which to win favor with the Mediterranean states and that at no extra cost. The navy of the pope was either negligible or non-existent; therefore when the papal government made an appeal for aid the British government let it be known that these vessels were at their service. The Holy Father was gratified and informed Consalvi on May 4, 1815 that he had written the Prince Regent to thank him for placing his fleet at the disposal of the pope and leaving his regiments there to guard his interests.[40] Six months later the cardinal again conveyed the gratitude of his government to Great Britain through the medium of the archbishop of Florence, who, it was intended, should so inform Lord Burghersh, British minister to Tuscany.[41] Not only was the British squadron helpful in preventing a landing of the pirate crews on the papal coasts, but their engagements with the latter had succeeded in liberating a number of Christian captives held by the Mohammedans, captives who were chiefly the subjects of the king of the Two Sicilies and of the pope.[42] When news of a British victory

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[39] Allies, Mary H., *The Life of Pope Pius the Seventh,* 371.

[40] *Mémoires,* I, 90. Pius VII to Consalvi, May 4, 1815, from Genoa.

[41] Cassi, *Op. cit.,* 173–174. Consalvi to archbishop of Florence, Nov. 6, 1815.

[42] While the British remained active they did not succeed in ending the pirate scourge, and Cassi, in good Italian fashion, expresses his regret

over the Arabs reached Rome the Holy Father wrote a letter of congratulation to the Prince Regent felicitating him on the reported victory of his armed forces and the freeing of many captive slaves.[43]

While the ministers of the crown in Britain were, like Canning, quite wary of conducting any direct dealings with the Holy See for fear of incurring the penalties of *praemunire,* no such legal scruples prevented the regent himself from corresponding at frequent intervals with the pope and his chief minister. George wrote Pius VII a letter of thanks on May 29, 1817 for the latter's congratulations sent on the suppression of the riots of the previous winter, which had been brought on by the agitation over the reform issue and the acute suffering of the proletariat in the growing industrial towns.[44] In this same year Consalvi had presented the Prince Regent with a large collection of private papers of the Stuart family which had come into his possession, and on September 6 the regent conveyed his thanks for these documents to the pope.[45] The special cordiality obtaining between the two courts was once more made manifest when the Holy Father commissioned his secretary of state to write the allied sovereigns in October, 1817 his gratitude for the testimonies of their esteem for him, "et notamment au Prince régent."[46] In the fall of the year the death of the regent's daughter was not allowed to pass without an official word of

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that Italy—once a proud maritime power—had been reduced in the early nineteenth century to asking protection from foreign ships. He maintains the Italians of that day felt the shame of it. Cassi quoted a letter of the Neapolitan consul, l'Albertazzi, to Consalvi on July 29, 1817, to the effect that five "North American" men of war had arrived at Naples and it was rumored they would join the British and sail to Algeria. *Ibid.,* 178.

[43] *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1923), 398–399. Pius VII to Prince Regent, Sept. 23, 1816.

[44] *Letters of George IV,* II, 194. Prince Regent to Pius VII, May 29, 1817.

[45] *Ibid.,* II, 199. Prince Regent to Pius VII, Sept. 6, 1817.

[46] *Mémoires,* I, 92. Pius VII to Consalvi, Oct. 6, 1817.

condolence from the pope, which was thankfully acknowledged by the ruler.[47] Special thanks were tendered the Holy Father by George IV on April 29, 1820 in acknowledgment of the pope's letter of congratulation upon the prince's accession to the throne.[48]

In the year of George IV's succession a Catholic church was completed at Moorfields. On this occasion Pope Pius VII sent one of his most precious gifts, a massive gold chalice studded with gems together with a set of cruets, a dish, and a bell to match. The set had been given to the Holy Father by the cathedral chapter of Mexico City upon his restoration to his capital. The pope consecrated the chalice himself and when someone remarked that he was parting with the costliest gift he possessed, he replied: " There is nothing too good for me to give the English Catholics." [49]

The years were now growing heavy upon the old pontiff, and when he suffered a fall in the summer of 1823 it hastened a severe illness and his physical condition became a matter of deep concern to those about him. Reflecting the fact that George IV's relations with the pope were understood by those outside official circles, we find the duchess of Devonshire writing to the king on July 8, 1823 to tell him about Pius VII's condition. " Your Majesty has always expressed so great an interest about His Holiness the Pope, that I flatter myself that these few lines independent of what the Baron de Reden will have written, may be acceptable to you, tho' alas their contents are of a melancholy nature." The duchess assured His Majesty that the health of his friend, Consalvi, was improved, adding that His Eminence was " touch'd to the extreme at your Majesty's kind interest about his health which you express'd Sir to Sr Henry Halford." [50]

The years of the Restoration were fraught with peril to the

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[47] *Letters of George IV,* II, 243. Prince Regent to Pius VII, Jan. 31, 1818.

[48] *Ibid.,* II, 327. Prince Regent to Pius VII, Apr. 29, 1820.

[49] Wiseman, *Op. cit.,* 139.

[50] *Letters of George IV,* III, 6. Duchess of Devonshire to George IV, July 8, 1823, from Rome.

security and independence of the Papal States by the forces at work within the Italian peninsula. The Holy See was aware of the menace which the secret societies constituted to public order. It was because of their revolutionary political designs as well as their anti-clerical policies that Pope Pius VII was brought to condemn the Carbonari in his encyclical of September 13, 1821. The Free Masons had been condemned as long ago as 1738 by Clement XII and again in 1751 by Benedict XIV.[51] The activities of these groups had grown in Italy since the first years of the century and were threatening the very foundations of government. Almost as dangerous to the pope's independent position was the overshadowing power of Austria in Italian affairs. While striving with general success to maintain friendly relations with the Hapsburg monarchy, Consalvi had seen the danger and from the days of the Congress of Vienna up to his resignation from office, he was on the alert to forestall Austrian dictation of papal policy. He realized keenly that the Holy See might quickly be suspect by the Powers of Europe as a mere puppet régime for Metternich unless an independent attitude was asserted and maintained. Therefore it is a correct judgment to say that in the years after 1815, " the Papacy, under the distinguished influence of Consalvi, was . . . by no means disposed to acquiesce in Austrian domination of the peninsula." [52]

The status of the papal government was a unique one. Unless he was prepared to forget his character as the universal father of all Catholics in all countries, the Holy Father had to be ex-

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[51] For the text of Pius VII's bull, *Ecclesiam a Jesu Christo,* cf. Barbèri, *Op. cit.,* XV, 446–448. For the bull of Benedict XIV, *Providas Romanorum* of May 18, 1751, which reprints in full that of Clement XII of May 4, 1738, cf. *Bullarium Benedicti Papae XIV,* VIII, 416–425 (Mechlin: P. J. Hanicq, 1827).

[52] *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,* I, 485. A survey of the diplomatic problems outstanding between the Holy See and the Italian states after 1815 can be found in Nicomede Bianchi, *Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia* (Torino: Dall'Unione Tipografico-Editrice, 1865), I, 269–305; II, 180–222.

ceedingly careful to guard against committing his government to one nation against another, or to one group of Powers against another. His spiritual office demanded a neutral course and there was no fear Pius VII would not follow it, except in cases of such wanton injustice done his person and state as those perpetrated by Bonaparte. For this reason therefore the pope refused to adhere to the Holy Alliance of September, 1815, and not simply because he "would be no party to a compact devised by a heretic and a Liberal." [53] Despite the fact that the alliance fitted in with the Metternichian scheme of the new order for Europe, the pope and his foreign minister refused to comply.

It was a combination of the factors mentioned above that brought genuine trouble to Italy as the third decade of the nineteenth century dawned. The ceaseless activities of the secret societies honeycombed Italy with a network of revolutionary bodies enamored of the liberal creed and intent upon the radical transformation if not outright destruction of the existing governments. Set against these forces was the presence of the agents and troops of the Vienna administration, the protector of the status quo, and the most effective instrument for the preservation of the reactionary policies personified in the Austrian chancellor. Judging the situation through the perspective of over a century, a clash was inevitable. The explosion came in the summer of 1820 in the kingdom of Naples when an uprising against the government of Ferdinand I broke out. The situation at once became critical for the Holy See, hemmed in as it was between the Neapolitan state and the Austrian-dominated dominions in the north. Its main concern then, as during the political disturbances of the Napoleonic era, was for the welfare of religion.

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[53] *Cambridge Modern History,* X, 10. This explanation of Pius VII's refusal is accompanied by the information that the pope was "busy with his preparations for a new crusade against Liberalism," at the time. Anyone who has investigated the pontificate of this pope with any thoroughness will recognize at once the unfairness of this judgment written in 1907 when anti-clerical liberalism was so much in vogue.

Whatever system of government might be adopted by the various states was their own business and the papacy could and did make its peace with absolute and constitutional monarchies as well as with republics. That the government of the Papal States was, and intended to remain, an absolute monarchy was perfectly true. As Cardinal Consalvi made clear at the outset of the Neapolitan revolution, " The position of His Holiness as Head of the Church obliges him to have care for the interests of religion in the Kingdom (Naples), whatever may be the form of government that may be adopted there." [54] However, the pope and his foreign minister were not insensible to the dangers to their own government of a liberal revolt on their frontiers. That the Holy See had no intention of yielding to the liberal trend in the government of the Papal States was made evident when Consalvi in September, 1820 wrote:

> If any government in its elements is in contrast with those of a constitutional government, it is the Papal government. . . . The fundamental principle of constitutional government, if applied to the government of the Church, becomes a principle of heresy. If it were introduced in the government of the States of the Church, men would soon desire that it be extended to the government of the Church itself.[55]

Therefore the only course to pursue was one of strict neutrality in the hope that neither the germ of liberal revolt from the south nor the smothering reaction from the north would gain the ascendancy within the pope's temporal jurisdiction. It was a year of deep anxiety and uneasiness which lay ahead for the Roman government. Try as it did, the papal government could

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[54] Quoted in the Introduction to Joseph H. Brady, *Rome and the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820–1821,* 13. This thoroughly documented study of Professor Brady is based principally upon materials drawn from the Vatican Archives. It offers the reader an admirable survey of Consalvi's policies in this particular episode of his career.

[55] Quoted in Brady, *Op. cit.,* Introduction, 15.

not prevent an Austrian invasion of its territories and the temporary occupation of certain points in the legations.

However, it is not with Consalvi and Austria that our interest lies, but rather with the Neapolitan revolution and how it reacted on Anglo-papal relations which His Eminence was at so much pains to preserve on a friendly basis. Fortunately for Consalvi's English policies the British government had no mind to interfere directly on Metternich's side, much as they might be courted by the Holy Alliance Powers to join in crushing what was regarded as a common danger. Britain's position was briefly this, that if Austria felt sufficiently imperiled to warrant direct intervention in Naples there would be no obstruction from London, but under no circumstances was the British government going to be a party to any league of Powers to coerce Naples. Therefore, when Metternich proposed a conference of the Powers, and made it known that the Neapolitan revolution was the business of all as well as Austria, Castlereagh quickly responded in a way to disillusion the chancellor of any such opinion. The British foreign secretary stated that London was prepared to honor its treaty obligations, but if it was the intention "to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us, without our having quitted it." [56] In this way Consalvi was saved the embarrassment of opposing himself to Great Britain in the moves he took to hold in check the Austrian policy towards Naples. Considering the official position outlined by Castlereagh in his reply to Metternich's memorandum, it would therefore seem that Consalvi was under a misapprehension in writing the Austrian chancellor that information from Naples on August 29 had brought the news that Admiral Maitland had

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[56] Quoted in *Cambridge Modern History,* X, 27. Castlereagh's reply, Sept. 16, 1820.

arrived there and the English had offered the aid of their fleet to subdue the island of Sicily.[57]

The situation was closely watched by the government of the Holy See and information conveyed to Britain during different stages of the revolt and its settlement. For example, Lord Colchester, former speaker of the House of Commons, and a man severely critical of the Holy See, was visiting in Italy at the time of the Neapolitan uprising. Colchester was curious about what was going on. In his diary entry for November 10 the English traveler related that Consalvi claimed he knew of no passing of Austrian troops over papal territory to Naples and he said that if Austrians invaded the Papal States from the north the Neapolitans had threatened they would do so from the south. The cardinal had remarked that His Holiness relied upon the guarantees of the Vienna congress for the integrity of his territory.[58] Just a month later Colchester noted that Consalvi had called and "told us the Neapolitan news," which was to the effect that Ferdinand had been forced to adhere to the Spanish constitution of 1812 before his government would let him depart for Laibach. His Eminence told them it was not known how the king would travel but it was thought he would sail in a British ship to Leghorn. Consalvi assured Colchester of his efforts to prevent war between Austria and Naples and explained how dangerous such an event would be to the Roman government since the Neapolitan frontier was "not twenty miles from Tivoli."[59]

Meanwhile the Powers had decided to assemble in conference at Troppau in late October to adjudicate the Neapolitan business. Britain refused to send a plenipotentiary but did commission Lord Stewart, the ambassador at Vienna, to attend in the rôle of an observer. In the course of the discussions at Troppau there

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[57] Van Duerm, *Correspondance,* 270, n. 1. This letter from Consalvi to Metternich is undated, but the editor of the correspondence states that on the back of the letter it was noted "*beantwortet den 16 Sept.*"

[58] *Diary of Lord Colchester,* III, 176. Entry of Nov. 10, 1820.

[59] *Ibid.,* III, 185. Entry of Dec. 11, 1820.

was evolved a protocol which erected the policy of intervention in the affairs of revolting states as a principle of action growing out of the settlements of 1814–1815. To this Castlereagh steadily refused to adhere and Stewart more than held his own against committing Britain to the Protocol of Troppau. As the conference wore on and seemed to be getting nowhere, Capo d'Istria, one of the secretaries for foreign affairs of Alexander I of Russia, made the suggestion that Pope Pius VII be asked by the conference to mediate the dispute between Naples and the protesting alliance Powers. It was hoped by the Russian minister that in this way he could checkmate Metternich's intervention doctrine. However, to date the pope had not so much as been formally invited to send a delegate to the conference. Consalvi pointed out the danger of the pope's accepting mere confidential advice of the Powers to the effect that they wished the papal government represented. He maintained that to accept without a public and formal invitation would throw Rome open to suspicion in Naples as acting in sympathy with the censorious Powers at Troppau. Therefore Austria, Russia, and Prussia formally invited the Holy See on January 6, 1821 to send a plenipotentiary to Laibach where the conference had moved that month and whence Ferdinand I of Naples himself was invited. Consalvi promptly accepted the invitation and designated Cardinal Spina, legate at Bologna, to represent the Roman government.[60]

Having accepted a place in the conference of Laibach, however, did not mean the Holy See intended to allow itself to be used as an instrument for furthering the designs of any one group of states against another. Consalvi quickly informed the meeting that the Holy Father could not act in the capacity suggested by the Russian delegate, namely as mediator. His reasons were that with Ferdinand I in Laibach, the pope would be placed in the position of mediating between the Powers and the king on one side and the parliament at Naples on the other, thus recognizing the latter as a legitimate party in the mediation. Further-

[60] Brady, *Op. cit.*, 65–68.

more since the quarrel centered around a constitution at Naples it would be exceedingly difficult for the Holy Father to propose a constitution of ever so moderate a character without stirring up the liberal desires within its own state which he had no intention of fulfilling.[61] Thus Consalvi refused to perform the function outlined by Capo d'Istria for the Holy See which angered that gentleman no end at thus seeing Metternich's scheme given a new lease on life. Capo d'Istria vented his rage at the principals in Rome by retorting that, " perhaps one ought to have expected such a reply from a Pope who may be considered as dead and a Cardinal Secretary of State who is dying." [62]

Despite Capo d'Istria's gloomy analysis, the cardinal was still three years removed from what might be described as a dying condition. During the remaining months of the Laibach congress his representative, Cardinal Spina, continued to assert the pope's position with firmness, maintaining the necessity for Rome's neutrality, and consequently a refusal to join any intervention move. Even Lord Stewart gave England's moral adherence to the Powers' measures for bringing order to the Neapolitan kingdom, without, however, associating Great Britain in their active moves. But try as he might to avert the Austrian invasion of the Papal States, Consalvi did not succeed. When the occupation came he was at pains to hasten an explanation to the governments of the conditions under which Rome gave its reluctant consent to an action it could not prevent. In this instance, as throughout his career, he thought of London and the possible reactions there.

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[61] Brady, *Op. cit.,* 69.

[62] Webster, *Op. cit.,* II, 314, citing LaFerronnays to Pasquier, Jan. 4, 14, 1821. Paris *A.A.E.,* 718 ff., 67, 181. Metternich had not been disturbed by Capo d'Istria's effort to sidetrack his protocol, since he obtained Alexander I's consent to have the request for Pius VII's "appui moral," and it was cynically understood that the Austrian armies should be used immediately *after* Pius' intervention without waiting for any measures of conciliation. For the policy of Capo d'Istria, cf. Stamati Th. Lascaris' *Capodistrias avant la révolution grecque, sa carrière politique jusqu'en 1822,* Chap. VI (Lausanne: Imprimerie Centrale, 1918).

He was careful to inform Castlereagh of all the details lest it give rise to resentment on the part of the British government.

> Consalvi seemed especially anxious that England understand his motives and actions. In addition to sending the explanatory note direct to London, he sent a duplicate copy to the British minister at Florence, with a request that he forward it to his government, as well as to the Nuncio in Paris, directing him to deliver it to Lord Stuart for dispatch to London; he was to take advantage of the occasion to make known the position of the Pope in the matter. . . . After the occupation was suspended, he sent copies of all the documents relating to it to Paris, with directions to the Nuncio to read them all to Stuart, and to emphasize the effort that was made to exclude an Austrian garrison in time of war, and to place the Pope in a position to refuse to allow it without violating the agreement made in replying to the Austrian note of May 27.[63]

To the end of his term as chief minister of the pope, Cardinal Consalvi continued this attitude of opposition to Austrian encroachment upon the rights and liberties of the Holy See. Consalvi was more conscious of the realities involved than the clique who, in their jealousy of him, spent their time disparaging his labors and trying to lessen his credit with Pius VII through various maneuvers; he "had comprehended that in order to safeguard the liberty of the Holy See it was expedient to disassociate its cause from that which Austria methodically pursued since the Congress of Vienna." [64]

In all his dealings with the English government and its subjects Consalvi had escaped the more extreme manifestations of an ugly bigotry which had marked for so long the attitude of many persons in Britain towards the Holy See. His tactful manner, his impressive and gracious bearing in London had won him friends

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[63] Brady, *Op. cit.*, 184–185, n. 12, quoting *Archives of the Paris Nunciature*, viii, in Vatican Archives, despatches of Consalvi of May 11 and June 9, 1821.

[64] Mollat, G., *La question romaine de Pie VI à Pie XI*, 126–127.

almost in spite of themselves. However, there was one leading Englishman of the day whose good-will he could not capture. This was Charles Abbott, Lord Colchester, for fifteen years speaker of the House of Commons after Pitt's resignation in 1801, and an inveterate foe of the Church of Rome. Colchester had worked vigorously against the various Catholic relief bills as they came up in parliament during his term of office, and after his retirement in 1817 a visit to Rome did not break down his prejudice. While he was no longer in a position to do serious damage to Anglo-papal relations, yet Consalvi did not fail to receive the English visitor with his customary urbanity. But on Colchester, who has been described as one who "had an exaggerated opinion of his own importance," [65] the effort was lost. It was during the time that the conference was sitting in Laibach on the Neapolitan affair that Colchester and Lord Guildford, chancellor of the Ionian Islands, were accorded an audience of Pius VII. They were presented to the Holy Father by Baron Reden, minister of Hanover to the Holy See, on January 2, 1821. Colchester was not impressed by the old pontiff and commented in his diary on the pope's clothes, noting that the crimson buskins with gold embroidered crosses on the feet were an imitation of the Byzantine emperors which prompted him to add, "another instance this of royal prerogatives copied and claimed by the early sovereigns of the Church of Rome." Before departing from the Quirinal, Colchester and his friend called on Consalvi who, "came out of his closet to receive us very courteously, and mentioned the recent arrival of a courier from Lord Castlereagh on his way to Naples." The English visitors dined with the cardinal and chatted before dinner about the latter's need for air, exercise, etc., but Colchester added, "he said to me, 'Non; je ne fais que manger et boire *l'amertume.*'" He was a trifle ill-informed in his gossip, for he noted in his diary for this day, "the current news is that Consalvi is going to the congress." [66]

[65] Walpole, Sir Spencer, *A History of England,* I, 322 (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902).

[66] *Diary of Lord Colchester,* III, 192. Jan. 2, 1821.

Two of the main preoccupations of Lord Colchester during his Roman holiday were the work that should be done in excavating the Forum and the provision of support for the Protestant cemetery in the city. In prosecuting both endeavors his instinctive dislike of the ecclesiastical government, and particularly of Consalvi, was heightened. The day following his visit to His Eminence he attended a meeting at the house of William R. Hamilton, British minister at Naples from 1822 to 1825. There assembled a number of English residents of Rome and the purpose of their gathering was to get up an English subscription to excavate the Roman Forum. The pope and Cardinal Ruffo, so Colchester reported, were opposed to the project, but " Cardinal Consalvi had (the day before) expressed himself obligingly to Mr. Hamilton on the subject, but added that it was not in his department, but under the Camerlengo, Cardinal Pacca, who was '*poco geloso,*' which the Duchess of Devonshire amended into ' gelossisimo.' " [67] The English group decided that the project would have to be abandoned because of lack of funds, proper superintendence, and a want of sanction from the papal government. Concerning the last point, Colchester remarked there was lacking support from the pope's government, " at all times jealous of English, and of all foreign interference." That Consalvi appreciated the value of the excavation work was made abundantly clear by the labor and money expended by his ministry in the restoration of many of the ancient monuments of the Eternal City in the years after 1815.[68]

In the matter of the Protestant cemetery, Colchester felt equally aggrieved by the lack of encouragement and understanding shown by the Holy Father and his ministers. He stated that three of the ambassadors of non-Catholic Powers, Niebuhr for Prussia, Italinsky for Russia, and Baron Ompteida for Hanover, had made efforts to have the burying ground repaired. In consequence a subscription amounting to nearly 1000 crowns was raised by the English, but again, according to Colchester, the

[67] *Diary of Lord Colchester,* III, 193. Jan. 3, 1821.

[68] For a description of Consalvi's services to the arts and his care for the preservation of the monuments of antiquity, cf. Fischer, *Op. cit.,* 121–133.

cardinal was the cause of its failure. Consalvi's delays, he said, killed the plans. On one occasion His Eminence had said the delay was due to the illness of the papal architect, " although the architect was daily at Monte Cavallo upon other public business, and went about everywhere as a rich man in his own carriage." [69] For four months Colchester tried off and on to put the project through, and just two days before he left Rome for France in May he again referred to the cemetery and accused Consalvi of refusing to allow Pius VII to sign the necessary papers for its repair, and then of trying to shunt the whole business by offering another piece of ground. Colchester claimed that a certain monsignor—next on the list for a red hat—had acted as the intermediary between a Roman lady and the pope over the deal and had agreed to a proposal to bribe one of the pope's secretaries to have the job done. " The sum asked for Monsignor was 50 l." [70] According to Colchester, Consalvi finally quashed the whole business by having recourse to the defense that he had already refused a similar request from the prince of Denmark.

Altogether Colchester had a poor opinion of the papal secretary of state and the Roman régime in general. He recognized Consalvi as the ablest of the lot, but felt the cardinal did not always enjoy the full confidence of his ruler. " Consalvi is the Pope's only ostensible and efficient minister. He is supported by all the courts of Europe. But the Pope does not always implicitly adopt his advice; and upon some important matters, especially ecclesiastical, acts sometimes on the suggestions, of the Camerlengo Pacca, whom he does not like—His Holiness, now for twenty years a reigning sovereign, and with many good qualities, has no knowledge of or talent for the administration of public affairs." [71] Over a year after his departure from Rome Colchester was still ruminating on Consalvi and the cemetery. He noted in his diary in August, 1822 that he had a letter from

[69] *Diary of Lord Colchester,* III, 196–197. Jan. 14, 1821.
[70] *Ibid.,* III, 226. May 13, 1821.
[71] *Ibid.,* III, 197. Jan. 14, 1821.

Niebuhr, Prussian ambassador to the Holy See, " with copies of Consalvi's articles in the *' Diario di Roma,'* abusing me for what I had said in the debate on the Roman Catholic Peer Bill, respecting Protestant tombs at Rome." [72] He found a sympathetic echo for his low estimation of the cardinal in Lord Redesdale, speaker of the house and later lord chancellor of Ireland. Redesdale wrote Colchester on September 8, 1822 regarding the Catholic question in which the former paid his respects to the cardinal. " I presume that Cardinal Consalvi is a counterpart of our Doctor Troy, Dr. Coppinger, Dr. Milner, etc.; and, like them, will scruple nothing to forward the great cause of Catholicity. Our English advocates for what they call Catholic Emancipation have adopted the spirit of the Sacred College, and are as expert in misrepresentation as Cardinal Consalvi." [73]

Fortunately for the conducting of cordial relations between the courts of Rome and London in the years of the Restoration they were not at the mercy of Colchester and Redesdale. Colchester revealed himself as unable to understand the point of view of Consalvi and he felt personally aggrieved and injured that the cardinal did not stop all official business to transact the petty items of a Roman excavation and the repair of the Protestant cemetery. Actually Consalvi was too busy to take up Colchester's schemes for these matters, but to Colchester it was only another instance of the duplicity and hypocrisy of one whose courteous refusals hurt his pride.

Among the losses which the Holy Father had sustained as a consequence of the French occupation of his dominions was that of a large part of the most precious art treasures of the Vatican. These had been seized by the French and transported to the Louvre by the orders of Napoleon. When the empire fell and Europe began to return to normal, the pope quite naturally sought to have the contents of his stolen gallery returned to Rome. In

[72] *Ibid.*, III, 197, 256, of Jan. 14, 1821 and Aug. 15, 1822.

[73] *Ibid.*, III, 257. Sept. 9, 1822, with copy of Redesdale's letter of Sept. 8, 1822.

executing the difficult task which that imposed, first gratitude was owed to Great Britain for the restoration of the Vatican objects. In the hope of retrieving these possessions of the Holy See, Pius VII had commissioned Antonio Canova, the famous sculptor, to proceed to Paris to see what could be done.[74] The pope had written to Louis XVIII asking that His Majesty facilitate the return of the art treasures, and Canova sought out Castlereagh who was in the French capital in September, 1815 for the negotiation of the final treaties of peace. In a letter of September 11 the foreign secretary communicated the purpose of Canova's visit to the British prime minister, the Duke of Liverpool. He stated that the artist had expressly assured him he had been instructed by Pius VII to say that the latter had no right to sell any of the chefs d'oeuvre in the papal collection since they were only his trust for the term of his pontificate, not his possession. However, Canova remarked he had been given permission to dispose of some of the secondary objects in order to get money to cover the cost of transportation of the principal pieces to Rome. Cas-

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[74] Alessandro Ferrajoli (Ed.), *Lettere inedite di Antonio Canova al Cardinale Ercole Consalvi* (Roma: Forzani E. C., Tipografi del Senato, 1888). This little brochure contains fourteen letters written by Canova to Consalvi between August 10, 1815 and early 1816. They are mostly from Paris where Canova was conducting the business of the transfer of the art treasures. On October 12, 1815 Canova wrote Consalvi from Paris to inform him that the task was practically accomplished and he remarked that Castlereagh came to him the previous evening to offer his congratulations and to instruct him to convey to the cardinal his deep respects and for His Eminence to render his homage to the Holy Father and to tell him that, "although of different faith he has taken pleasure and satisfaction in protecting our rights and the rights of His Holiness." *Ibid.*, 15. In a letter from Consalvi to the artist of October 26, 1815 one sees again the strong predilection of the cardinal for England. After speaking of England's part in this transaction he added: "England is too great to have need of increasing her glory; but by what she has done on this occasion the British Government, with a generosity without example, will carve in the heart of His Holiness, in mine, and in that of all the Roman people a lasting sentiment of infinite gratitude." *Ibid.*, x.

tlereagh told Liverpool that no sum of money could buy the more distinguished works for the Prince Regent's collection, and therefore the British might very well take the " disinterested line," in the transaction. If through the prince's intervention the stolen properties were restored to the pope, then, " His Royal Highness would probably feel it more consistent with his munificence to give this old man a small sum out of the French contribution, to enable him to carry home his gallery, than to see him exposed to the reproach of selling the refuse without any strict right to do so, in order to replace what is really valuable in the Vatican." [75] In other words, since the ruler of England could not hope to secure any of the more valuable items in the collection, why not capitalize on a bit of aid given in getting them back to the pope's palace? The prime minister shared the view of his foreign secretary and informed Castlereagh he believed he was acting wisely in the case. If King Louis XVIII balked at returning the pope's property then all the works of art should be taken from France rather than only those belonging to England's allies, if it " shall be necessary therefore to take away the works of art by force." Liverpool closed his reply by stating, " I quite agree with you, that if the treasures of the Vatican are to be restored, this country ought to give every facility for transporting them in safety." [76]

In the midst of so many pressing problems the transfer of the Vatican art objects to their rightful gallery was quite understandably delayed. However, they began arriving in Rome the following summer and on July 6, 1816 Pius VII wrote to thank the Prince Regent for permitting the British vessel *Abundance* to transport them from the port of Antwerp. The Holy Father sent to the regent a gift in token of his gratitude, and in a letter of December 19 the prince thanked him for the handsome present

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[75] *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,* XI, 154. Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sept. 11, 1815 from Paris.

[76] *Ibid.,* XI, 164. Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 19, 1815 from Fife House.

of a " temple and cup in Rosso Antico." [77] Castlereagh was also rewarded with a gift from the pope for his part in the business.[78] The courtesy and service of their government to the Holy Father was naturally gratifying to the English Catholics, and Wiseman noted in his memoirs that, " it is agreeable to relate, that the heavy expense of their (art works) removal from Paris to Rome was defrayed entirely by our Government." [79]

Both the Holy Father and his secretary of state were keen lovers of art. It was through their efforts that the Braccio Nuovo of the Vatican Museum was opened in 1822. Not only was Canova patronized, but Albert Bertel Thorwaldsen, a Dane, and probably the most distinguished sculptor of the classical school then living, was generously rewarded in the papal service for many years. Thorwaldsen was the artist selected by Consalvi to execute the celebrated tomb of Pius VII in St. Peter's for which the cardinal left a large legacy. Therefore, although neither the pope nor his foreign secretary liked having their pictures painted, they did understand the request of a fellow art-lover when Sir Thomas Lawrence, the most famous British painter of the period, arrived in Rome in May, 1819 with a commission from the Prince Regent to have the pontiff and his minister sit for their portraits. The regent had given Lawrence the task of painting all the prominent statesmen who had been associated with the restoration settlement in order that they might be assembled at Windsor Castle. Thus there came into being the well known Waterloo Gallery at Windsor. Consalvi sat for Lawrence somewhat against his personal instincts. A friend of Wiseman's related, " His Eminence said that he had always been adverse to having his portrait taken, but added, showing him

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[77] *Letters of George IV,* II, 181–182. Prince Regent to Pius VII, Dec. 19, 1816 from Carlton House.

[78] Webster, *Op. cit.,* II, 30.

[79] Wiseman, *Op. cit.,* 132. Fernand Mourret, *Histoire générale de l'église,* VII, 402, says the British government gave 200,000 francs to cover the cost of transportation.

Lord Castlereagh's letter, ' However, what can I do in this case? It is impossible to refuse.' " [80] After many wearisome sittings the English artist completed his work on the full length portraits of both Pius VII and Consalvi and in that manner the first and best likeness of the cardinal was made.[81] Lawrence was captivated by the charm of His Eminence and their relations were close and friendly. Four years after his work on the Consalvi portrait, in a letter to George IV's private secretary, Sir William Knighton, the artist described Consalvi as " the true lover of His Majesty, and the most high minded gentleman, that, next to the King, and of elevated station, I have ever known." [82]

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[80] Wiseman, *Op. cit.*, 32–33.

[81] The two portraits hang today in the Waterloo Gallery and were listed among those done by Sir Thomas Lawrence at the command of George IV as worth £525 each. *Letters of George IV*, III, 488. The cardinal's portrait is reproduced as the frontispiece to this volume.

[82] *Ibid.*, III, 40. Lawrence to Knighton, Nov. 11, 1823 from Russell Square. Lingard related in a letter to Miss Hannah Joyce that Lawrence had pronounced Consalvi's head " the finest that God had ever made." Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.*, 295. The literary accomplishments of the Holy See were recognized when Abbé Angelo Mäi, Vatican librarian, was one of ten honored with membership in the Royal Society of Literature in March, 1824. Of these ten, Abbé Mäi was one of only two foreign scholars so honored. *Letters of George IV*, III, 69.

CHAPTER VI

FINAL EFFORTS

THE LONG reign of Pope Pius VII was drawing to a close. For more than twenty-three troubled years this gentle old man had presided over the destinies of the Church. Through that long period, with the exception of the eight years of exile and separation forced on him by Napoleon, Cardinal Consalvi had served faithfully the man whom he helped to elect in the conclave at Venice in March, 1800 in the capacity of his secretary of state. In all those twenty-three years of official association there was never a break between the two. Even under the severe pressure of the French emperor for a repudiation of Consalvi, the pope never went beyond a reluctant acceptance of Consalvi's resignation from office in 1806, proffered to relieve the Holy Father of further embarrassment from the conqueror. Moreover, as soon as the storm had passed and Pius VII could resume his residence in Rome, the cardinal was reappointed to his old post in the spring of 1814. In this constant favor shown to Consalvi the Holy Father did not have the support of a majority of the Sacred College.[1] On the contrary, the party of the *zelanti* felt the secretary of state was entirely too much given to truckling to the secular governments. They accused him of making the pope's government more secular than ecclesiastical, and they did not scruple at attempts to undermine the confidence of the Holy

[1] For an interesting discussion of the liberal point of view of Consalvi in contrast to the conservatism of Pacca, cf. "Cardinal Pacca and the Temporal Power," by J. J. Dwyer in the *Dublin Review,* CLXXXIII (Oct.–Dec., 1928), 266–281. For the internal reforms of Consalvi in the Papal States and the opposition of the majority of the cardinals to his policies, cf. Leopold von Ranke, *Historisch-biographische Studien,* 91–135. *Sämmtliche Werke,* XL.

Father in his great minister. It was all in vain. To the end Pius VII stood steadfastly loyal to the man who gave more distinction to his reign than any other ecclesiastic of that quarter century.[2]

It is not difficult therefore to understand what a cruel blow it was to Consalvi when his old friend and master breathed his last on August 20, 1823 in the eighty-first year of his life. As was the custom, the cardinal ceased to be secretary of state upon the death of the pope who named him to the office. Many felt that Consalvi was now entirely finished. In the ensuing balloting which marked the conclave called in the next month, the hand of the *zelanti* was evident, first in support of Cardinal Severoli and finally in the election of Cardinal della Genga on September 28 who took the name of Leo XII. As Lingard remarked in a letter to Kirk, " the Padri are in ecstasies that Consalvi is not the new Pope." [3] It was this same Della Genga who had been sent to Paris in the spring of 1814 by Pius VII to negotiate with the Powers on the return of the Papal States. He had been singularly unsuccessful and when Consalvi arrived there in June the encounter was not pleasant.[4] Consalvi superseded Della Genga in

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[2] Mourret, *Op. cit.*, VIII, 63–64. Speaking of the intimate friendship of the two men, Pacca said: " Consalvi had, in fact, even from the very commencement of the present pontificate, always enjoyed the favour and full confidence of Pius VII, and might exclaim as our poet Dante sang of Pietro della Vigne, minister of the Emperor Frederick:

'Io son colui, che tenni ambo le chiavi,
Del cuor di (Chiaramonti), e che le volsi, Serrando e disserando.'
'I am the man who held the keys of (Chiaramonti's) heart,
And turned them too, locking and unlocking it.' "

Historical Memoirs of Cardinal Pacca, I, 417.

[3] Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.*, 201. Lingard to Kirk, Oct. 13, 1823.

[4] Cf. P. Rinieri, " Missione a Parigi di Monsignor della Genga e del Cardinale Consalvi (Maggio, 1814)," in *La Civiltà Cattolica* VI (1902), 272–287 [18th Series]. Also Alexis François Artaud de Montor, *Histoire du Pape Léon XII,* I, 15 ff. (Paris: A. Le Clere et Cie, 1843. 2 vols.) Artaud de Montor discusses the painful episode in Paris, and while allowing that Consalvi had grounds for irritation, yet he says Consalvi treated Della Genga " avec une sévérité blâmable," I, 16.

the conduct of the discussions with the allied statesmen by order of the pope. Quite naturally this led to a coolness between the two men. Consequently the election of Della Genga in 1823 made the *zelanti* confident that they had seen the end of Consalvi.[5]

Consalvi continued to reside in Rome until after the coronation of the new pope on October 5, and then he retired to a seaside resort at Porto d'Anzio to rest. For the better part of a year before Pius VII's death the cardinal had been suffering from recurrent sick spells and his condition through the autumn was not favorable. The Duke of Devonshire writing to George IV from Rome in November reported on His Eminence's health:

> I have seen the Cardinal Consalvi, who, I regret to say, is extremely unwell; he was very much delighted with the kind expressions and recollection of Yr. Majesty which I conveyed to him; he begged me to say everything to express his devotion and gratitude. He has no share in the new Government; his successor, the Cardinal Somaglia, is eighty-two years old. Consalvi has, however, been received by Leo the 12th with marked attention and kindness.[6]

But Consalvi was not too ill to lose his lively English interests

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[5] Count Rudolph Apponyi, attached to the embassy of his cousin, Count Anton Apponyi, Austrian ambassador to Rome from 1819 to 1826, commented in his diary under date of April 5, 1829 on the election of Castiglione as Pius VIII to the effect that the latter would have been elected in 1823 in place of Della Genga, "s'il ne s'était pas prononcé aussi ouvertement pour Consalvi." *Vingt-cinq ans à Paris (1826–1850). Journal du Comte Rodolphe Apponyi,* 158, edited by Ernest Daudet. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1913.) Nicomede Bianchi, *Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia,* II, 279–389, prints a number of documents illustrating the interests and desires of the secular governments in the outcome of this conclave. In the instructions sent to the Neapolitan minister to Rome was the information that King Ferdinand placed Consalvi first among those cardinals "la cui promozione si desidera." *Ibid.,* II, 382. (Torino: Dall'Unione Tipografico-Editrice, 1865.)

[6] *Letters of George IV,* III, 41. Devonshire to George IV, Nov. 20, 1823 from Rome.

and hopes as, for example, when he met a friend of young Wiseman's who had just returned from England early in November. On that occasion the cardinal was curious to learn how the death of Pius VII had been taken in Britain, and Wiseman's friend who kept a journal, wrote under date of November 4, "I told him he was universally praised and lamented, even in the London papers."[7]

As the weeks passed it seemed that Leo XII's statement made at the close of the conclave, that they were "electing a dead man," might prove true. The new pope grew seriously ill in December and sent for Consalvi who had returned from his villa at Porto d'Anzio when the Holy Father had refused permission for him to retire there permanently. During this interview, which lasted for two hours, the cardinal reviewed the problems which faced the new pontificate, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. Among the questions discussed was the recognition of the revolted colonies of Spain in South America which Consalvi counseled should be accorded papal recognition.[8] The relations of the Holy See with a number of states were canvassed, and the cardinal did not neglect to urge his lifelong policy of friendly relations with the British government. After having gone over a number of difficult phases of papal diplomacy relating to France, South America, and Russia, His Eminence remarked to Leo XII, "But soon you will have something to comfort you. In London I worked incessantly for the emancipation of the English Catholics. The Duchess of Devonshire has since helped me with different Cabinets and with King George. This affair advances with the evident protection of God. It proceeds slowly; without ever losing a step. Live and emancipation will come about under your reign!"[9] As a matter of fact Leo XII's life fell just two

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[7] Wiseman, *Op. cit.*, 122.

[8] For Consalvi's policy towards the Spanish American republics cf. "The Papacy and Spanish-American Independence," by J. Lloyd Mecham in *Hispanic American Historical Review,* IX (May, 1929), 154–175.

[9] Artaud de Montor, *Histoire du Pape Léon XII,* I, 170. Montor, who

months short of the passage of the Catholic emancipation measure.

Consalvi remained on in Rome much to the chagrin of the *zelanti* who had hoped for a complete eclipse of the great statesman. Their chagrin was turned to alarm when on January 14, 1824 Pope Leo XII appointed him to the important office of prefect of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide and assured him of his entire confidence.[10] The cardinal felt gratified at the confidence reposed in him by the new pontiff in naming him to Propaganda, but he was never to exercise the duties of that office, for ten days following the appointment Consalvi was dead.[11]

For many months previous to his audience with Pope Leo XII the cardinal had been unwell. Nonetheless his condition was not

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was first secretary of the French embassy to the Holy See, got his information on this audience from the Duc de Laval, the French ambassador, to whom Consalvi had spoken, from the Duchess of Devonshire, the close personal friend of the cardinal, and from certain details related by Leo XII himself. For the story of the relations between Leo XII and Consalvi after the former became pope, cf. Montor, *Léon XII,* I, 148–177.

[10] Ward, *Op. cit.,* III, 107–123. Gradwell, rector of the English College, and an agent of Archbishop Maréchal of Baltimore, was, as mentioned before, an enemy of the Jesuits. Writing to Maréchal on January 17, 1824 he gave the archbishop news of Rome and spoke critically of Leo XII's favors to the Jesuits, but Gradwell saw hope in Consalvi's appointment to Propaganda of which he told Maréchal, and added: "It is hoped that this will infuse wisdom into the public councils, and check that tide of reacting enthusiasm, bigotry and ultra Jesuitism, which portended no good to the Church in general, and was certainly exciting astonishment and disgust in this city." Hughes, *Documents,* I, Pt. I, 1053. Gradwell to Maréchal, Jan. 17, 1824.

[11] Gradwell informed Maréchal of Consalvi's death and regretted his passing since "Consalvi would have forced the Jesuits of America to execute the Brief." Hughes, *Documents, I,* Pt. I, 1053. Gradwell to Maréchal from Rome, Feb. 28, 1824. He was here alluding to a brief of Pius VII issued on July 28, 1822 and a decree of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide, giving decisions in favor of the archbishop of Baltimore against the Jesuits in his diocese on matters of appointments to parishes and certain properties owned by the Order. *Ibid.,* I, Pt. II, 1066–1067; Pt. I, 481–482.

thought alarming by his friends and he continued through the autumn and early winter to go back and forth from his villa at Porto d'Anzio to Rome. Thoughtful as he always was for the future, and in accordance with Consalvi's systematic way of life, His Eminence had made his will on August 1, 1822. The first and principal care in his final testament was obviously for the state of his own soul. He left a large sum of money as offerings for two thousand Masses to be said for the repose of his soul after death, a stipend of five paoli for those said in the presence of his mortal remains, and three paoli for those said elsewhere. Most of his fortune was willed to the Congregation of Propaganda Fide for the furtherance of the missionary labors of that organization in pagan lands. Likewise a sum was set aside for the erection of a fitting monument in St. Peter's Basilica to his master and friend, Pius VII. The handsome tomb which the visitor to St. Peter's sees today, upon which Canova first worked, and after his death, Thorwaldsen, was the final tribute of Consalvi to the man to whom his official life was so closely linked. In his will, as in all the activities of his high office, his English connections were remembered. Gifts were bestowed upon a number of his English friends as, for example, on members of the family of Viscount Castlereagh and the old Countess of Albany, the final surviving representative of the Stuart family. The Countess received a ring with a diamond chip. It was a graceful recognition of his early debt to the lady's distinguished brother-in-law, the Cardinal of York, to whom Consalvi owed much. To his intimate friend Elizabeth, Duchess of Devonshire, there was willed a snuff-box, to the Countess of Sandwich in London a sculptured obelisk in gilt bronze, and to Lady Mathilde Ward a Trajan column embellished in gilt bronze. Two snuff-boxes bearing portraits of the king of England were willed one to the Monastery of the Child Jesus and a second " entourné de brillants " to the Capuchins of Monte Cavallo.[12]

[12] *Mémoires du Cardinal Consalvi,* I, 197–214. Cretineau-Joly here reprints the cardinal's will.

Within a week of his final audience of Leo XII the cardinal became so ill that he was compelled to take to his bed. On January 22 he performed from his sickbed one of the last official acts of his life when he signed the dimissorial letters for the ordinations of several students of the English College in Rome. Two days later a set of important documents were sent to His Eminence by the pope for his signature, and the papal messenger bore the inquiry whether there was anything His Holiness could do for the cardinal. By this hour Consalvi's life was rapidly ebbing away and he sent back word by the messenger that he begged the apostolic benediction of the Holy Father. Leo XII promptly commissioned this to be taken to the dying cardinal by his closest friend, Cardinal Castiglione. At half past one on the same day, January 24, 1824 Consalvi breathed his last.[13] One of the closest personal attachments of the cardinal's life had been that of his brother, Andrea, and the death of the brother on September 6, 1807 had come to him as possibly the cruelest personal suffering of his life. It was for that reason that Consalvi's body was not buried in the Pantheon, his titular church, but rather in the church of San Marcello where it rests in a modest tomb alongside Andrea. His heart was removed from the body, however, and deposited in the Pantheon.[14]

The death of Consalvi brought genuine sadness to the small

[13] Wiseman, *Op. cit.*, 123–124.

[14] *Ibid.*, 117. Illustrative of the deep affection between the Consalvi brothers is a little story related by the Duchess of Devonshire in her *Anecdotes and Biographical Sketches.* The duchess had included some Latin and Italian verses written by the cardinal in honor of his brother, and she added: "Copied May 21, Rome, 1817, in Cardinal Consalvi's garden, which is on the site of the litus pulchrum. These inscriptions were put up by him on the loss of his brother, Marchese Andrea Consalvi, whom he loved with uncommon affection. He always carries a small picture of this brother every where with him; when the Cardinal arrived in England, in 1814, the Custom House officers at Dover seiz'd this portrait which extremely affected Consalvi, who offer'd to pay anything they chose to name for it. On its being made known, however, to Lord Liverpool, the picture was restored directly." 29.

circle of close friends who had come to love him. He was not a man given to cultivating a wide group of intimate acquaintances. Scarcely anyone who met him failed to be impressed by him, almost everyone admired him, but only to the few was it given to draw close and earn his deep affection. He was ever courteous and kind, but with his friends the studied and official politeness gave way to a warmth of feeling which won a response in sincere affection.

One of those who had an opportunity to know the cardinal both in an official and a private capacity was the Duc de Laval, ambassador of France to the Holy See. Having learned of Consalvi's death the ambassador wrote to Chateaubriand, "Today it is necessary to do nothing but praise this memory honored by the tears of Leo XII, by the silence of enemies, finally by the profound sorrow with which the city is filled, and by the regrets of foreigners, and especially of those who, like myself, have had the good fortune to know this minister so agreeable in his political relations, and so engaging in the charm of his private acquaintance."[15] Father Lingard too had known the cardinal well and when he learned the news he wrote Gradwell, rector of the English College, on February 20: "It affected me much. I was attached to him on account of his kindness to me when at Rome, on account of his great talents, etc., and on account of his friendship for you and your establishment." Gradwell shared his friend's views and said in a letter of March 25, 1824 that Consalvi left no equal behind, "even his oppositionists feeling his loss and seeing the wisdom of his administration."[16] Another of these intimate friends was from the land the cardinal always loved and favored, an English lady who had for long been resident in Rome, the Duchess of Devonshire. She was saddened greatly by his death and outlived him by only two months. Her husband, the duke, reported her death on March 30, 1824 to King George IV and remarked, "I was just beginning to hope

[15] Artaud de Montor, *Léon XII*, I, 176–177.

[16] Haile and Bonney, *Op. cit.*, 202.

that she was recovering her spirits which had almost left her since the great loss she had in Consalvi." [17] A final testimony of the esteem of the British monarch for the cardinal reached Rome too late to be delivered to him. On January 17, just a week before the cardinal's death, George IV wrote him a letter in which he thanked His Eminence for his continued interest and kindness on matters affecting Great Britain and spoke generously of the high regard the king entertained for his "eminent qualities, personal character, and the wisdom and moderation which you have manifested in the eminent post which the venerable Pope Pius VII has confided to you in the most important and critical moments of his reign." [18]

In any investigation of the relations of the Holy See with the kingdom of Great Britain during the decade of years following the fall of Bonaparte, it is not difficult to give a final evaluation as to the success or failure of those negotiations. In every important respect the cardinal secretary took a leading, and at times an initiating rôle. Of all the subjects discussed between the two courts in those years, both of greater or less importance, the two most significant were the aid solicited by the Holy See for the return of its lost provinces and the efforts made to win Catholic emancipation and a concordat with England. In the former endeavor Consalvi's success was conspicuous, considering the relative unimportance of the Roman government among the secular states and the generally unimpressive bargaining position in which he was placed vis-à-vis the great Powers. In the re-

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[17] *Letters of George IV,* III, 70. Devonshire to George IV, Mar. 30, 1824 from Rome. The Duchess of Devonshire and Baron de Reden, Hanoverian minister to Rome, launched a project for having a medal struck in Consalvi's honor and solicited funds among his friends for this purpose. They were to be sold to all friends and admirers of the cardinal; also "afin d'honorer convenablement la mémoire du cardinal, ces médailles seraient offertes aux souverains de l'Europe qui ont connu et apprécié ce digne ministre, et qui lui ont donné en toute occasion des témoignages de leur auguste bienveillance." Duchess of Devonshire. *Op. cit.,* 82–83.

[18] *Mémoires,* I, 188–189. George IV to Consalvi, Jan. 17, 1824.

covery of all papal territory of 1789 except the Venaissin and Avignon in southern France and the narrow strip of Ferrara, the cardinal, as we have seen, was assisted in no small measure by the support of Viscount Castlereagh and the general dispositions of Britain towards the cause which Consalvi so ably and persistently defended. This instance affords an interesting example of the profit to which the close personal friendship between the two men was turned.

In the second case, that of Catholic emancipation and an entente with the British government of a formal type, Consalvi failed. That failure can in no way be attributed to any blunder or ineptness on his part. As has been pointed out, there were a number of responsible British officials who thought well of the idea when it was first raised, and during 1813 and 1814, when national feeling in England was so strongly sympathetic to the pope's position, Castlereagh himself looked upon the scheme with favor. The two principals in the negotiations, if left unhampered by their governments, might easily have arrived at an understanding, for both were of the mind that the mutual relations should be placed upon a firmer footing. Nonetheless public opinion is ever fickle and when the stirring sentiments of the last years of the war began to subside the traditional anti-papal feeling in Britain took a noticeable upswing in 1815. Castlereagh, sensitive to this opinion, saw the hopes of a formal understanding fade as that year moved into its summer. Two other factors, neither of which Consalvi nor Castlereagh could control, gave the coup de grâce to the concordat. These were the internal quarrels which left the Catholic body of the British Isles a divided and embittered lot, and secondly the mounting ire of the *zelanti* party within the Roman curia which opposed this strange and unprecedented cordiality with a Protestant government. Castlereagh could no more stem the tide of ill feeling aroused over the angry debates and recriminations on the Catholic relief issue than could the English bishops win a united front among themselves or their subjects on how to give a fixed form to a

settlement. Consalvi was no more successful in converting the reactionary group within the Sacred College to his way of thinking, though this would have proved less necessary to the success of the plan, for Consalvi was the minister of an absolute sovereign who might or might not take the advice of his cardinals as he saw fit. It is not unlikely that should it have happened that the differences in Britain were reconciled, Pius VII, with the energetic urging of his powerful secretary, might have overridden the objections of the cardinals. In any case, though his efforts ended in failure, Consalvi's tactful handling of the delicate issues involved did no permanent injury to the Catholic cause except among the extremists whose opinions of his acts and motives were quite at variance with the views which the cardinal really held. Catholic emancipation came, but without a concordat and that five years after Consalvi's death. He would have welcomed the victory of 1829, but he would have regretted the lost opportunity to put the relations of his government with that of Britain on a more regular and stable basis.

Thus the score on major questions was even. On the minor matters involved between the two governments Consalvi's long contact with the British and his constant sympathy for things English were of real service to both officialdom and the private citizen. It needed no strong pressure for the cardinal to give backing to Castlereagh's campaign against the slave trade, and through the suggestion of Consalvi the Holy Father gave his support by addressing the Powers chiefly guilty of the traffic in slaves. Again Consalvi was helpful in keeping a close watch and limit on the activities of Caroline, Princess of Wales, during her long sojourn in Italy, and this at a time when the British government was fearful that at any moment that unpredictable lady might give cause for embarrassment. The episode of Murat with his far-flung ambitions for all Italy was liquidated with slight damage, and Consalvi and Castlereagh were mutually of an easier mind when the troublesome king of Naples was no more. On the question of the Jesuit restoration to England, which if

urged with imprudent haste would have only added fuel to the fire of anti-Catholic feeling in that country, Consalvi was cautious and insistent that the zealots cool their ardor. In this too Castlereagh was thankful to his friend, for feeling was such in 1815 and the years thereafter that any forceful move on the part of the Holy See to render the restoration decree effective in Britain would have done more harm than good. Finally in the matter of the Neapolitan revolution of 1820, the line of conduct assumed by Consalvi met the approbation of the British who were determined not to be associated with the Powers in any active intervention there and at the same time not to give encouragement to the forces of rebellion. Consalvi's artful handling of the grave danger to the political peace of Italy by his refusal to be a party to the schemes of Metternich or to countenance the revolutionists, was clearly in agreement with the policy assumed by Castlereagh in the negotiations over the change of government at Naples.

On the reverse side of the ledger, Britain's principal service rendered in these years to the government of the Holy See was the support given, as we have seen, to the recovery of its dominions at the Congress of Vienna. Of less importance, but viewed by Rome with considerable seriousness, was the passive attitude taken on the precedence question at the congress. While reserving a formal protest in principle yet the British delegates let it be understood that they would cause no trouble in the matter, and following a protest to save their own national laws, they would not dispute the precedence accorded to the representatives of the Holy See in the diplomatic protocol governing the congress and future meetings. In the case of Joachim Murat's belated bid for an Italian throne the government of Great Britain gave hearty support to Consalvi when it was seen what were the true character and ambitions of Murat. It is true that individual Englishmen were sympathetic to his cause, but it is equally true that the responsible officers of the British government, once convinced of his scheme, supported the cardinal's position in seeking to curb Murat. Great Britain was also helpful to the Papal States

in lending the assistance of its Mediterranean fleet for action against the Barbary pirates in these years and protecting the papal coasts from depredations. In this it was following the precedent of naval aid tendered to Pius VII when an offer was made to the Holy Father to use a British war vessel to make good his escape from Bonaparte's imprisonment at Savona. Finally in a question which did not vitally affect the relations between the two courts, it is true, but which was indicative of the friendliness obtaining, the Holy Father and his art-loving minister were deeply grateful for the generous aid extended by the British government in the recovery of the stolen Vatican art treasures.

The judgments of both contemporary and later critics of Cardinal Consalvi were virtually unanimous in attesting to his brilliance of mind and integrity of character, as well as to his urbane and gracious personality. That all did not agree with his official policies is quite true. Napoleon, for example, had no sympathy for Consalvi as might be expected. Anyone who so constantly set himself at odds with the accomplishment of Bonaparte's purposes as did the cardinal might anticipate his wrath. Not only did the cardinal defend too well the prerogatives of the Church at the time of the concordat negotiations in 1801, but his predilection for the English irked the conqueror. Writing to Pius VII in 1806, Napoleon complained of the papal secretary of state and the latter's treatment of Cardinal Fesch, Bonaparte's ambassador to Rome. He accused Consalvi of entertaining a hatred of Fesch who "has constantly experienced refusals while the preferences were for the Anglo-Russians."[19] Despite the fact that Bonaparte had met with such stout resistance from Consalvi all through their official and unofficial contacts over fourteen years, and that the emperor continued to view the whole papal government with supreme contempt,[20] yet the manner in which Consalvi

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[19] *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, XI, 528.

[20] From the contents of a private unsigned letter detailing an interview with Bonaparte at Elba in the latter part of January, 1815 and written

performed his high function for the Church did not fail to win a certain reluctant admiration from the man who had despoiled the institution which Consalvi served. A curious coincidence threw the two athwart each other's paths for the last time when Napoleon was on his way to Elba in the spring of 1814. The fallen emperor and his escort had stopped overnight at Fréjus. It happened that Consalvi, now liberated and on his way to join the Holy Father at Cesena, stopped the same night near Fréjus. The following morning as the cardinal was standing on a bit of rising ground awaiting the change of his horses Napoleon's coach drove by. Bonaparte, seeing the cardinal from his coach window, remarked to Field Marshal von Keller sitting by his side: "He is a man who does not wish to appear to be a priest, but he is more of a priest than all the rest of them." [21] The remark may have been a cut at the cardinal's ecclesiasticism or it may have been a compliment, but whatever way one interprets it, one can-

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from Rome on February 9, Lord Liverpool relayed the following notes on Bonaparte's opinions of the papal government: "The Pope, he observed, was a *grand malheur pour l'Europe;* that the dominion of priests was detestable. Every sovereign should be at the head of his own Church; that we were much indebted to Henry VIII for getting rid of him; that he had attempted it, but popery had no such fancy. As an individual he observed that the present Pope was a *bien bon homme,* and as such had been well entertained at Fontainebleau, but ignorant in the extreme; and that amongst the Cardinals, for he had seen them all at Paris, there was not one to whom he would give a seat in the fourth rank at his Council. Ecclesiastic governments, generally speaking, were bad: the empire of the rulers was not of this world." *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,* IX, 554.

[21] Nielsen, F., *History of the Papacy in the XIXth Century,* I, 338 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906). Nielson cites for his authority a work published a year after Consalvi's death: J. L. S. Bartholdy, *Grundzüge aus dem Leben des Cardinals H. Consalvi,* 55 (Stuttgart, 1825). This was "il signor Barone Bartholdy" of whom Consalvi spoke in a letter to Della Genga on August 22, 1814. *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1924), 526. Bartholdy was consul general for Prussia in Rome between 1815–1818. An effort to locate Bartholdy's work was unsuccessful.

not escape the implication that it paid tribute to the sternness with which Consalvi adhered to what he believed to be right.

We have already seen Metternich's high compliment to Consalvi's intelligence and understanding. Another famous contemporary who had occasion to encounter the cardinal in a number of embarrassing circumstances and to learn how unrelenting Consalvi could be on essentials, has little or nothing to say of him in his *Memoirs.* Talleyrand's relations with Consalvi had not been happy, either in an official capacity regarding the concordat or in the personal business of Talleyrand's secularization. One can understand therefore what was meant when it was said that, " rarely did the Prince de Talleyrand come up against a man less manageable by the methods which he understood so well. It is perhaps necessary to see in this the reason why, addressing himself to posterity in his *Memoirs,* he spoke very little of his contests with the secretary of state of Pius VII." [22] Another contemporary of Consalvi, Colonel Frid. Fricher de Bougy, who was sent to Rome to discuss the difficult problems attendant upon the reorganization of the dioceses in Switzerland, paid tribute to the qualities of the cardinal. Writing to Sir John Hippisley on several occasions he related the progress of the negotiations and gave his impressions of the Roman statesmen. Speaking of Consalvi he said, " The Pope and he are the two men I respect here of those I have seen." Some months later the colonel told of his departure from Rome and added, " The Card. Cons. (Secretary of State) behaved to the end like a gentleman. Of his talents and cleverness it belongs not to me to speak, but I like the char-

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[22] Gallavresi, G., " Le Prince de Talleyrand et le Cardinal Consalvi," in *Revue des questions historiques,* LXXVII (1905), 170–171. As a matter of fact Talleyrand mentioned Consalvi only once in his *Memoirs* and that in an insignificant detail concerning Pius VII's sorrow at having to part with the cardinal at Bonaparte's orders. *Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand,* II, 90, edited by the Duc de Broglie (London: Griffith, Farran, Okeden and Welsh, 1891).

acter of this man, respect his behaviour, and admire his parts." [23] Two English prelates who had much contact with Consalvi, namely Poynter as vicar apostolic of the London district and Gradwell as rector of the English College in Rome, regarded him as " far the most capable man in the Roman Curia." [24]

Nonetheless, though the general impression of Consalvi by his contemporaries was a good one and the judgments of later historians in the main complimentary, the cardinal was not without his critics in pursuing the high aims which he set for his government. One criticism which was made of him during his lifetime and which persists in the works of a number who have studied his career, was that Consalvi, in his effort to win the good will of foreign governments, occasionally showed favoritism to them as against those of the pope's own state. Silvagni put it thus: " One of his defects, according to all the chroniclers of the time, was that of having a little too lively care for his reputation with foreigners, of a kind that they (the rich and powerful travelers) abused it, and the Romans, the public services and the citizens were usually wrong when they dealt with any foreigners." [25] The cardinal was also insistent upon details which at times gave him the reputation with some of being petty and straining for little triumphs. However, when one understands how much importance the Holy See always attaches to the preservation of principle, the stricture that Consalvi was " too apt to bargain for small favours," [26] and others of a similar nature, are seen in a different light. The cardinal's diplomatic jockeying for a recognition of precedence for the delegate of the Holy Father among the representatives attending the Con-

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[23] *Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,* XII, 594, 690. De Bougy to Hippisley from Rome, June 18, and Stuttgart, July 10, 1818; from Berne, Sept. 12, 1818.

[24] Ward, *Op. cit.,* III, 109.

[25] Silvagni, D., *La corte e la società romana nei secoli xviii e xix,* II, 764.

[26] Webster, *Op. cit.,* I, 335.

gress of Vienna, as also his stubborn resistance to the cession of the narrow strip of Ferrara, might indeed seem petty to those less concerned than he to protect principle and save every inch of what was at best a very small dominion.

In the opinion of Ranke, who had occasion to write of Consalvi in an essay supplementary to his *Geschichte der Päpste,* the cardinal possessed the arts of diplomacy, but his genius was for a certain agility rather than for a vigorous execution of business. More serious than any other criticism made by Ranke was that Consalvi did not take his pledged word too strictly. The historian remarked the unshakeable character of Consalvi's resolve, however, when it was a matter touching the papal power.[27]

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[27] Ranke, Leopold von, *Historisch-biographische Studien,* 57–58. The full passage reads: "Consalvi was full of spirit and he possessed to a high degree all that can be termed diplomatic skill. He had refinement and good breeding. But he was more supple and many-sided than vigorous and of creative genius. At least in his administration of foreign affairs, it would be futile to seek for the talent to adjust matters in conformity with energetic concepts; even though he possessed this ability, he was far too weak to make it felt. But even with the odds against him, he moved with self-reliance and force. He pressed forward as far as he could do so with security; he likewise yielded as far as it seemed to him necessary and feasible; he knew how to stay within these two extremes; he never broke off, he never gave up. He promised very lightly without deeming himself directly bound thereby; likewise he did not take unusual pledges very literally. 'Just sign,' he would say to the hesitant, 'in case of necessity you will not be held.' He toned down every refusal with the hope of a grant or some outlet. Yet no demands could call in question the extent of the Pope's authority. As soon as this point was raised, Consalvi became stern and inflexible; he would declare emphatically: he was ready for a martyr's death rather than to permit the undermining of that which he considered to be the foundation of the Church. It is asserted that Napoleon once said: Consalvi does not wish to appear as a priest; yet he is more a priest than any of the others. In this he was like the Pope. He never missed a spiritual exercise; he could be seen praying alone in the churches. His effectiveness rested on this harmony of his religious views. He knew how to avoid all that could have disturbed mutual agreement (with the Pope). Whatever he submitted to the Pope was most carefully weighed: one observes the same in his despatches and notes; he used to revise them

Among recent works on Consalvi, enthusiasm for his statesmanship has run high, in fact at times too high. In a work published on the eve of the centenary of the cardinal's death, Angelucci related a number of Consalvi's feats and pronounced them " successes so much the more worthy of consideration and remembrance, since how much more difficult and perilous were the circumstances, how arduous and often nearly desperate the struggles in which Consalvi found himself, struggling against enemies ever powerful and formidable, in as memorable an age as was that of the Great Revolution and of the greater Napoleon I." [28] Struggles he had and enemies too, but it is exaggerating Consalvi's accomplishment to picture him singly locked in

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often. Every word gave him scruples. This accounts for the fact that the despatches are repetitious and awkward. With the advance of years he appeared taciturn and even shy in personal intercourse; he was ever grave; scarcely ever did he display any cheerful enjoyment. And never did he lose sight of the dignity of his position. He was frugal by nature and lived alone almost too simply. Only on important occasions he was generous by design. His fêtes were princely. In spite of the exhaustion of the papal treasury, to him no expense was too great to show the foreign princes the capital in full splendor. His ambition was to have the States of the Church appear of equal rank with the rest of Europe. The capital should be at the same time the metropolis for art and antiquity. With this end in view he even took care of the Roman collections, their merited display, and the excavations." In this connection there was discovered a similarity of expression which would seem a bit too close to be a mere coincidence. Fischer, in discussing Consalvi's religious life, quoted Bartholdy directly as having written of the cardinal: " Notwithstanding his preoccupations, Consalvi assisted publicly at all chapels (which Fischer explains in a footnote meant solemn papal divine services), and ecclesiastical functions, (and) in the religious exercises, in fasts, confessions, etc., he was very zealous. Often one saw him in the churches praying solitary and alone." *Ibid.*, 330, citing Bartholdy, 291. Evidently Ranke took the final sentence above from Bartholdy, or Fischer was careless in naming his authority.

[28] Angelucci, G. A., O. S. M., *Il grande segretario della Santa Sede: sunto della vita di Ercole Consalvi*, 4. This monograph is more of a eulogy than a scientific investigation; there is practically no documentation nor a bibliography, and the work abounds in extravagant praise.

mortal combat with all the evils generated by that exciting time. It is depriving the cardinal of no credit to declare that during the years of his active statesmanship he always found powerful backers against Bonaparte. He played his part in the overthrow of the titan, but he would be the first to state that his rôle was a secondary one. In a study written with the Italian nationalist ideal steadily in view, Consalvi is portrayed as even making his contribution indirectly to national unity. "At a distance of several decades from the fulfillment of national unity it does not seem inopportune to turn one's thought and historical inquiry to some of the old Italian states and to their more representative personages, to those especially who, during the grave changes of the Napoleonic age, knew how to conserve to themselves and their actions a line proper and rightly distinct. Such was Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, secretary of State during the whole pontificate of Pius VII." [29] If Consalvi's constant vigilance and effort to lessen, if not to eliminate, the power of France and then Austria from the Italian peninsula, be a contribution to the future attainment of national unity, then a contribution he made. Nonetheless His Eminence would have been the last to move consciously towards the goal of national unity, for his first and all-important secular interest was the preservation of the pope's sovereignty, and in any plan for unity among all Italians such sovereignty was pretty nearly bound to remain solely in the order of the ideal and not to become a primary concern in the *Realpolitik* of Italian nationalists. With the same future national unity in mind, Cassi sees the cardinal's close relations with Great Britain as aiding that end. "Thus Cardinal Consalvi inaugurated in 1814 that policy of friendship between Italy and Great Britain which, pursued afterwards by Piedmont, turned to high advantage to the national cause." [30] Again one must in sober-

[29] Cassi, Gellio, *Il Cardinale Consalvi ed i primi anni della restaurazione pontificia (1815–1819)*, 7.

[30] *Ibid.*, 18. On the other hand there is the treatment of a recent writer which is a quite unjustifiable condemnation of Consalvi's whole pro-

ness say that Consalvi would be quite innocent of such a result accruing from his cordiality with the British. As a matter of fact the London government's ultimate moral support and sympathy for the Italian national cause were motivated by factors remote indeed from any memory of Consalvi's friendly attitude to the English. The conduct of the British government towards Piedmont's ambitions in the mid-years of the century would have distressed Consalvi no end, and had he been living he would probably have found it difficult not to break with his beloved Britain over the sympathy shown to the policies of Cavour.

It is certain that Consalvi left his mark upon the history of the Church in the early nineteenth century and that mark was almost without exception to the good. In a discussion of papal history in the years of the Restoration he has been justly called, "the Minister who influenced so powerfully the course of events, both in Church and State, . . . not only a remarkable but a singularly attractive personality. . . . Consalvi's influence gave its character to his (Pius') Pontificate. . . . His unusual ability, his extraordinary powers of work, and dexterity in business, justified the confidence of the Pope. Consalvi was accessible to modern ideas on political questions, and . . . impressed upon the Papal restoration a stamp of high statesmanship and moderation, which the reactionaries never forgave." [31]

While this tribute is all true, one of the most convincing evidences of Consalvi's greatness as a statesman comes from the respect and deference always shown him by the ranking

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cedure at Vienna. The work of Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), shows a real lack of understanding of the cardinal's position in Vienna. It is difficult to comprehend how Ferrero's reading of the documents in Rinieri, as quoted in his notes, could yield the picture of Consalvi as, "an intelligent man, but . . . also violent, outspoken, obstinate, and sometimes irascible" (p. 304). The whole passage here on the papacy and its problems is marked by a lack of insight and sympathy characteristic of the late nineteenth century school of Italian anti-clericals.

[31] *Cambridge Modern History,* X, 131–133.

European figures of the age. Even at his worst Bonaparte felt a certain grandeur about the man which won his attention, while Metternich and Talleyrand, often in disagreement with the cardinal, sensed his greatness and treated him as an equal. In the case of Castlereagh, even more removed from Consalvi's intellectual milieu, his respect amounted to a genuine affection for the cardinal. Some of this consideration was doubtless due his rank as chief minister of the Universal Father of the millions of Catholics spread through the lands of these statesmen, just as these same men saw in the Church a ready instrument for helping to restore public order to Europe. But when all these factors are gauged, the unusual deference paid Consalvi is in large measure attributable to his own uncommon qualities of mind and soul. It was not difficult to see in him a man who fought for principle, for the moral law, and for the ultimate victory of the right, and as such did his integrity and intelligence make him one of the great figures of the age. An analysis of any major phase of Cardinal Consalvi's career makes it easy to concur in the judgment that, " when with the help of the documents, until now known only in part, there will be put in full light the great figure of Consalvi, it will appear, with the most splendid proof, how through his singular activity, often passed over by historians and not rarely treated badly, he had been one of the most brilliant glories of his century." [32]

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[32] " Il Cardinale Ercole Consalvi nel primo centenario dalla morte," in *La Civiltà Cattolica,* III (1924), 97.

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INDEX

Albani, Monsignor, and Consalvi on Jesuits, 133
Albany, Countess of, and Consalvi, 148
Alexander I, of Russia, 23; and Consalvi, 27
Angelucci, on Consalvi, 148, 189
Avignon, papal loss of, 64

Bathurst, Earl of, and Catholic school properties, 143
Benevento, Duchy of, restored to Holy See, 63
Bentinck, Lord William, and Papacy, 19; and Murat, 45–46; and Castlereagh, 47–52; plan for united Italy, 150
Benvenuti, Abbé, papal agent in St. Petersburg, 133; and Jesuits in Russia, 133
Berthier, and French invasion of Rome, 9
Béziers, Consalvi banished to, 3
Bologna, legation of, restored to Holy See, 63
Bonelli, question of appointment as London agent, 31–32
Borgia, Stefano Cardinal, prefect of Propaganda, unfriendly toward Jesuits, 133–134
Bourbon, family of, see Empress Marie Louise.
Braschi, Cardinal, protector of English College; death of, 145
Burghersh, Lord, and Castlereagh, 126; and Papacy, 126–127
Butler, Charles, and Catholic relief bill, 76; and Catholic question, 79 n., 86; and Milner, 86

Camerino, and dependencies restored to Holy See, 63
Canning, George, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 10; Castlereagh's successor, 42–43, 130; and international slave trade, 42–43; and Catholic question, 75; royal veto on bishops and right of censorship, 76–77; and Catholic problem, 130, 131 n.
Canning, Stratford, visit to Consalvi, 151
Canova, Antonio, papal agent for return of Vatican art objects, 168, 170
Capo d'Istria, and Neapolitan revolution, 161–162
Caprara, Monsignor, emissary to England for Clement XIV, 7
Cardinals, College of, and British demands, 99–100; refusal of *exsequatur,* 102–103
Caroline, Princess of Wales, 66–69; in Italy, 66–69; and Consalvi, 66–69; and Pius VII, 66–69
Cassi, on Consalvi, 190
Castlereagh, Lord Robert Stewart, and freedom of pope, 20; and London visit of Consalvi, 24; interview with Consalvi, 29–30; and abolition of international slave trade, 39; and Metternich, 53; and Sir John Hippisley, 52–53, 84, 85 n.; and Princess Caroline of Wales, 67; chief secretary for Ireland, 73; and relief to Catholics, 73–74; in Perceval cabinet, 81; and Parnell, 82–83; and Archbishop Troy, 82–83; and Charles Butler, 86; demands on Holy See in exchange for emancipation, 91; papal procedure in English case, 92; and Catholic emancipation, 97–113; and papal decision, 117–118; and Cooke, 117–120; and Jesuit restoration, 137–139; friends sent to Consalvi, 151; death of sister, 151; and ecclesiastical trouble in

Malta, 152; and Naples, 159; death of, 130
Catholic question, in England, 73–132; and royal veto, 76; censorship of papal documents, 76; private negotiations on, 89–90; appointment of British attaché to Rome, 90–91; Irish distrust of English, 95–96; loss of public interest in, 120–121
Catholicism, status of, in England, 8, 117–121
Châtillon, meeting of Powers at, 18
Clancarty, and Consalvi, 57–58
Clement XIV, and Duke of Gloucester, 7
Colchester, Lord Charles Abbott, and Consalvi, 69, 160, 164; and Protestant cemetery in Rome, 165–167
Concordat of 1801, 2, 4 n.; and French bishops, 11; allowed oath to government, 97
Consalvi, Ercole Cardinal, education of, 1; domestic prelate, 1; auditor of Rota, 1; prisoner of French, 1; secretary at Venice conclave, 2; appointed secretary of state, 2; banished to Rheims, 3; *Mémoires* of, 3; description of appearance, 3–4 n.; president of Congregation of Arms, 9; in Naples, 9; aided by Acton, 9; and Erskine, 11–13; and Napoleon, 15–16 n.; at Paris peace parley, 21–22; and Poynter, 22; arrival in London, 23; meeting with Castlereagh, 24–25; at Congress of Vienna, 34–72, 36 n.; given precedence at Congress, 37–38; and slave trade, 40–41; conference with Lord Clancarty, 57; and Final Act of Congress of Vienna, 62–63; protests Treaty of Tolentino, 25, 64; and Princess Caroline of Wales, 67–69; and Lord Colchester, 69, 164–167; contemporary opinions of, 70–71; and Catholic British subjects, 73–132; banished to Béziers, 80; commissioned to attend Paris conference, 88; approval of English demands, 97–99; and suggested oath of loyalty, 102; opinion on decision of commission of cardinals, 114–116; reply to Castlereagh concerning entente, 127; and Jesuit restoration in England, 132; Jesuits discussed with Castlereagh, 137; recalls Somaglia letter on Jesuits, 140; not opposed to Jesuit restoration, 141–143; and Scotch, Irish, and English schools in France, 142–143; and English college in Rome, 145–146; and *diplomatici,* 147; and John Lingard, 149–150; and English friends, 150–151; and Malta, 152; and Prince Regent, 153–155; and Barbary pirates, 153; and secret societies, 156–157; on papal monarchy, 157; statement to Castlereagh following Austrian occupation, 162–163; portrait by Lawrence, 170–171; retired on election of Leo XII, 174; appointed prefect of Propaganda, 176; death of, 176–178; contemporary opinions on, 179–180, 184–192; success in getting return of Papal States, 180; efforts toward Catholic emancipation in England, 181–182; summary of his work, 182–184
Cooke, Edward, secretary to Castlereagh, 60–62; in Rome, 60–62, 109–110; and Bishop of St. Malo and Murat, 61–62; and Cardinal Pacca, 110; and Pius VII, 100; and Poynter, 111.
Corfu, see Malta.
Curtis, Archbishop Patrick, promise of aid to Castlereagh, 128

De Bougy, Col. Frid, opinion of Consalvi, 186–187
De Laval, French ambassador to Holy See, 175–176 n.; on death of Consalvi, 179
Della Genga, elected pope, 173; unsuccessfully negotiated for return of Papal States, 173

De Montesquiou, Abbé, and British continental schools, 143
Diplomatici, party in College of Cardinals, 142, 147

Elizabeth, Duchess of Devonshire, friend of Consalvi, 1 n., 151; and George IV, 155; death of, 179
England, early relations with Holy See, 7–8; diplomatic relations with Holy See, 9, 18; three demands on Rome, 76–132
English College, in Rome, 143–147
Erskine, Monsignor, papal agent in London, 10; provisional pension from George III, 10; named cardinal, 10; and concordat of 1801, 11; work of, 11 n.
Etruria, Marie Louise of Bourbon, ex-queen of, 62
Exsequatur, royal, 91, 100; refused by commission of cardinals, 103

Ferrara, Legation of, restored to Holy See, 63
Ferris, joint administrator of British continental school properties, 142–143
France, and neutrality of Pius VI, 9; and Papal States and war in Italy, 13–18
Frascati, school of Scolopii Fathers at, 1
Frederick William III, of Prussia, 23; and Consalvi, 27, 28 n.
French refugee clergy in England, 8

Gallo, Duke di, see Bentinck.
George IV, of England, see Regent.
Gibson, William, opposed to Jesuit restoration in England, 135
Gradwell, Robert, opposed to Jesuit restoration, 135; Poynter's agent in Rome, 140–141; appointed rector of English College, 146
Grattan, Henry, and the Catholic question, 75–76

Hapsburg, see Empress Marie Louise.
Hayes, Richard, Irish delegate to Rome, 121; in Anglo-Papal relations, 121–122
Hippisley, Sir John Cox, friend of Cardinal of York, 6; agent for England in Rome, 8; aid to Pius VII, 18 n.; letters to Castlereagh, 52–53, 84–85; and Milner, 107–108; on restoration of the Jesuits, 137–139
Holy Alliance, attitude of Pius VII toward, 157, n.
Holy See, early relations with England, 7–8; and Napoleon's Italian campaign, 13; territory restored to, 63; and Jesuit question, 134; and restoration of Jesuits in England, 139–142; and Neapolitan revolution, 157–159; and English relations in Neapolitan revolution, 159–163

Ireland, and the Quarantotti rescript, 85–88; distrust of English government, 95–96

Lawrence, Sir Thomas, English artist, 170; painter of Consalvi and opinion of cardinal, 170–171
Lingard, John, and English College, 145–146; and Vatican Archives, 149; opinion of Consalvi, 150
Litta, Lorenzo Cardinal, prefect of Propaganda, 103; unfriendly to England, 103–104; and Consalvi, 106–107; and decision of curia, 112; favored cause of English Jesuits, 135; and John Lingard, 148–149
Liverpool, Lord, prime minister of England, and international slave trade, 41–42; attitude toward Catholics, 24 n., 74; and Vatican art treasures, 169
Lunéville, treaty of and pontifical legations, 14

Macpherson, Dr., misrepresentation of Poynter to Quarantotti, 77–78; and Catholic question, 84–85
Mäi, Angelo, Vatican librarian, 171 n.

Malta, ecclesiastical trouble in, 152; Metternich and, 152; Castlereagh and, 152
Marches, and dependencies restored to Holy See, 63
Marie Louise, Empress, attempts to compensate, 56, 62
Marsden, Alexander, and Irish reaction to Quarantotti rescript, 85–86
Maynooth College, government aid in opening of, 76
Mémoires, of Consalvi, 3, 4–5 n.
Metternich, Austrian chancellor, non-committal on reconstruction of Papal States, 26; guaranteed Murat Papal States by treaty, 26–27; and Italy, 53–54; plan for Austrian domination of northern Italy, 62; and Neapolitan revolution, 157–163; opinion of Consalvi, 70
Milner, Bishop John, and the royal veto, 76; appeal to Rome, 80; and British government, 96; at Rome, 107–108; disagreement with other English bishops, 123; rebuked by Propaganda prefect, 128–129; in favor of Jesuit restoration in England, 135; petition to ordain Jesuit seminarians as regular clergy, 140
Murat, party, intrigues of, 26–27; Austrian support of, 45; and Bentinck, 45; and effect on Holy See, 51; Austrian opposition to, 58; intrigues of and Holy See, 60–62; cause lost, 62. See Empress Marie Louise.

Napoleon, and abolition of Papal States, 14; and Consalvi, 16–17 n.; escape from Elba, 58; opinion of Consalvi, 184–185
Negroni, Cardinal, auditor of Cardinal of York, 4

Oath, of fidelity of bishops to British king, 91
O'Connell, Daniel, and royal veto of bishops, 77; opposed to concordat and Consalvi, 108
Oxford Journal, unfavorable attitude toward Consalvi, 122

Pacca, Bartholommeo Cardinal, Papal pro-secretary of state, 2 n., 26; Consalvi's letters to, 54–55; and pope's proposed visit to Congress of Vienna, 72; and British demands, 99–100; negotiations with England, 105; and Cooke, 109–110
Papal States, attached to kingdom of Italy, 16; endangered by claim of Etrurian queen, 62; occupation of by Austrians, 162
Paris, Treaty of, 63
Parnell, Sir Henry, 82; and Archbishop Troy, 82–83
Pensions, question of clerical, 117
Perceval, British prime minister, assassinated, 74
Pirates, Barbary, 153
Pius VI, and Consalvi, 1; death of, 2; captivity in Siena, 9; in Valence, 9
Pius VII, election of, 2; appointment of Consalvi, 2; flight from Murat, 61; objection to Vienna treaty, 65, praise of England, 65–66; and Princess Caroline of Wales, 67–69; proposed visit to Congress of Vienna, 71; evacuation of Rome, 109; letter to the Irish, 124–125; and limited veto, 125; and restoration of the Jesuits, 132; relations with Prince Regent, 152–155; on secret societies, 156–157; refusal to mediate Naples dispute, 161–162; and return of art treasures, 167–170; painted by Lawrence, 171; death of, 173
Plunkett, introduced bill for Catholic emancipation in 1821, 129
Pollen, J. H., on Consalvi and Jesuit question, 134–137, 141
Ponsonby, lord chancellor of Ireland, and Catholic question, 75–76
Ponte-Corvo, principality of, restored to Holy See, 63
Poynter, Bishop William, and royal veto, 77; appeal to Rome,

77–78; at Rome, 113–114; and English government, 116; opposed to Jesuit restoration in England, 134; and English College, 145
Praemunire, of Elizabeth, 21 n., 130–131 n.
Propagation of the Faith, Congregation of the, 92

Quarantotti, head of Propaganda, 78; and rescript, 78–79 n.; and Hippisley, 84–85

Radet, General, captor of Pius VII, 14
Ranke, Leopold von, on Consalvi, 188–189, n.
Ravenna, Legation of, restored to Holy See, 63
Regent, Prince, audience of Consalvi with, 78; promise of support at Vienna, 78; and Princess Caroline, 66–67; and Pius VII, 88, 152–155; and Catholic question, 88–89
Rheims, Consalvi banished to, 3
Rinieri, Jesuit historian, on Consalvi, 142

St. Malo, French ambassador to Rome and Cooke, 60
Severoli, papal nuncio to Vienna, and papal visit to congress, 71; on Consalvi in Vienna, 37 n.
Sidmouth, Viscount, secretary of state for home affairs, and governmental declaration on Jesuit question, 140, 140 n.
Silvagni, on Consalvi, 187
Spina, Cardinal, legate in Bologna at conference of Laibach, 161–162
Stewart, British observer at Congress of Troppau, 160–161
Stuart, Sir Charles, and Consalvi, 73

Talleyrand, at Congress of Vienna, 36; and Consalvi, 36 n.; opinion of Consalvi, 186
Testaferrata, Monsignor, papal nuncio to Lucerne, 82; question of British citizenship of, 20 n.
Thorwaldsen, Albert, Vatican sculptor, 170
Tolentino, treaty of, protest against by Consalvi, 25, 64
Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, and royal veto, 78–80; relations with Castlereagh and Parnell, 82–83

Venaissin, papal loss of, 64
Venice, conclave of cardinals to elect pope, 1–2
Veto, royal of bishops, 76. See Milner, Canning, O'Connell, Poynter, Quarantotti.
Victor Emanuel I, proposal for united Italy under, 54
Vienna, Congress of and papal question, 34–72; papal precedence at, 37–38; settlement of political and territorial problems, 47

Wiseman, Nicholas Cardinal, and Accademia Ecclesiastica, 1; and Consalvi's musical talent, 5 n.; and Consalvi's relations with English College, 147

York, Cardinal of, patron of Consalvi, 4; promotes Consalvi for archpriest of St. Peter's, 5; receives pension of British government, 6; last will of, 6

Zelanti, party in College of Cardinals, 147, 173–174, 176

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